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ABSTRACT

In 1930, African American sociologist Charles S. Johnson of Fisk University traveled
to the Republic of Liberia as the American member of a League of Nations commission
to investigate allegations of slavery and forced labor in that West African nation. In the
previous five years, the face of Liberia had changed after the large-scale development of
rubber plantations on land leased by the Firestone Tire and Rubber Company, with
headquarters in Akron, Ohio. Political turmoil greeted Johnson in Liberia, an
underdeveloped nation teetering on the brink of economic collapse. This dissertation
focuses on Johnson’s role as the key member of the League of Nations Commission of
Inquiry, and examines events leading up to the investigation. Also touched upon are the
life and career of Harvey S. Firestone, the history of the rubber and automobile
industries, and Liberia’s relationship with the U. S. Department of State.
Central to this dissertation, however, is Charles Johnson, an important and
underappreciated figure in African American history. Johnson’s diplomatic approach to
race relations in the United States earned him respect from philanthropic foundations that
funded his research projects, but also led to criticism and jealousy from his black
colleagues and peers. Because Johnson guarded his privacy so closely and left behind
little in the way of personal information, the journal that he kept for six months in Liberia
becomes all the more important as a clue to his inner thoughts and feelings, as well as a
guide to his personality and character. Furthermore, Liberia shaped Johnson’s thinking
as a scholar in important ways, particularly in regard to the economic foundations of
exploitation, caste and class, and political disfranchisement.

iv

Johnson’s mission to Liberia and his spirited defense of that nation’s tribal citizens, as
this study shows, suggests a more complicated and assertive individual that contrasts with
the largely one dimensional image of him that has metastasized over the years. Indeed,
Johnson was one of the few African Americans who showed any interest in the welfare of
Liberia’s indigenous tribes. In that regard, he was a maverick, overlooked and
underestimated.

v

INTRODUCTION

Several years after Harvey S. Firestone, president of the Firestone Tire and Rubber
Company of Akron, Ohio, announced plans to establish the largest rubber plantations in
the world in the Republic of Liberia, Harvard political scientist Raymond Leslie Buell
leveled charges of “economic imperialism” against the tire magnate and the U. S.
Department of State, and warned of the probability of wholesale exploitation of native
labor.1 In 1929, the international community focused its attention on Liberia after
allegations that high officials in the black republic used forced labor for private purposes,
and that others profited from coerced shipments of native workers to the Spanish-owned
island of Fernando Po, a condition analogous to slavery. An international commission
under the aegis of the League of Nations in 1930 investigated the allegations of
impropriety, and produced a report that led to changes at the highest levels of government
in the black republic as well as a protracted battle for Liberian sovereignty in the years
that followed.
While numerous studies have analyzed the activities of Firestone and the State
Department in Liberia, the role of Charles S. Johnson, the black sociologist from Fisk
University and key member of the League of Nations commission of inquiry, has never
been explained in any detail even as some scholars have cast doubt on his qualifications,
character, and motives.2 Nor has the 1930 League investigation itself been treated
1

Raymond Leslie Buell, “Mr. Firestone’s Liberia,” The Nation, 126, 3278 (May 1928), 521-24.
R. Earle Anderson wrote in 1952: “The inquiry lasted only about four months . . . . It is hard to believe
that these inexperienced investigators, under the conditions that actually existed, could have been able even
to approximate the careful obtaining and weighing of testimony without which their findings would at best
be of questionable validity.” Anderson continued: “Surely this was a situation calling for the utmost skill
of experienced investigators. Yet there appears to have been no formal examination of witnesses, no
competent questioning, no cross-examination.” R. Earle Anderson, Liberia: America’s African Friend
2
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comprehensively. In addition to serving as a firsthand, critical analysis of the behind-thescenes work of the commission, the journal that Johnson kept of his experiences during
six months in Liberia provides an unexpurgated view of the very private sociologist, and
contradicts uninformed portrayals of him by others as timid and manipulative. Yet,
Johnson’s African diary has been left all but untouched by historians. Furthermore,
important sources pertaining to Firestone and the U. S. State Department have been
overlooked or neglected. As a consequence, Johnson’s participation in the inquiry has
been understated to the point of obscurity; Harvey Firestone reduced to little more than a
symbol of corporate greed; and the State Department equally credited and blamed for
formulating and carrying out an elaborate plan of action that was, in reality, jerrybuilt and
sure to either fail entirely or produce unintended consequences.
From a professional standpoint, Johnson’s odyssey in West Africa is essential to
understanding the intellectual growth of the author of such classic sociological studies as
Shadow of the Plantation (1934), and Growing Up in the Black Belt (1941). In Liberia,
Johnson developed more completely a distinctly humanistic approach to sociology that
sought to understand the world through the eyes of its subjects, hallmarks of his bestknown works in later years. His crash course in international diplomacy, and immersion
in a severely underdeveloped society that had only begun to modernize with the coming

(Chapel Hill: University of North Carolina Press, 1952), 104 (first quotation), 105 (second quotation).
Following Anderson’s lead, Charles Morrow Wilson wrote in 1971: “The requested commission was
chosen with appalling ineptness. Its American member, Dr. Charles S. Johnson of Fisk University, then
one of the better-known Negro colleges, accepted with forthright protest, explaining that he had no
firsthand acquaintance with Africa, knew extremely little about Liberia, and nothing about the Fernando Po
controversy. Dr. Johnson also stated that he had no appropriate experience in investigatory procedures, and
was accepting only from a sense of devotion to a cause and with the hope that God and competent
colleagues would help him through.” Charles Morrow Wilson, Liberia: Black Africa in Microcosm (New
York, Evanston, and London: Harper and Row Publishers, 1971), 122 (quotation). There is no evidence
that Johnson said any of the things attributed to him by Wilson, and the author did not cite his sources. The
idea that Johnson had “no appropriate experience in investigatory procedures” is, of course, nonsense.
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of Firestone in 1924, went far in shaping his economically based understanding of race
relations. In Liberia, where caste and class ruled the day and Johnson was considered by
many to be “white” because of his education, the idea that “racial prejudice is least of all
racial” took on added meaning; it formed the foundation of his thinking on black and
white relations that he built on for the rest of his life. Indeed, the economic, social, and
political importance of education in the black republic made a lasting impact on Johnson;
his ideas on education and race relations would later influence Gunnar Myrdal’s
monumental An American Dilemma (1944), the study in social engineering that Thurgood
Marshall used with powerful effect in arguing Brown v. Board of Education before the
U. S. Supreme Court.
From a personal standpoint, Johnson’s extraordinary patience and self-control,
reliance on facts, and measured, diplomatic approach—elements of his style that so
confounded black intellectuals like E. Franklin Frazier and Ralph Bunche—made him a
perfect candidate for the Liberia mission. But his six-month stay in the black republic not
only challenged his skills as a sociologist and statesman but also tested his physical and
mental will. Johnson’s observations during his extended interlude in Liberia, where local
political leaders relied on natural as well as supernatural forces to hinder his progress if
not make him disappear altogether, become especially important because of the deeply
felt humanity and compassion for society’s underdogs that they reveal, and suggest a
more complicated, assertive, and vulnerable human being who came to guard his private
views more closely as the 1930s progressed and his public role at Fisk University became
more prominent.

3

In Chapter 1 of this dissertation, Johnson’s life and work up to 1930 are analyzed in
some detail in order to better understand who it was, precisely, that the U. S. State
Department chose as American commissioner to investigate conditions in Liberia.
Marcus Garvey also played an important role in African American thought in the 1920s,
and his attempt to initiate widespread immigration to Liberia—a key forerunner to
Firestone’s entry into the black republic—receives close attention as well in the first
chapter. For similar reasons, Chapters 2 and 3 are devoted to a thorough study of the
main players involved in the buildup to the investigation; namely, Harvey Firestone,
Liberia, and the U. S. State Department. The investigation itself and Johnson’s role in it
are studied in Chapters 4 and 5, which utilize the sociologist’s personal journal
supplemented by other primary sources.
Charles S. Johnson’s mission to Liberia as a League of Nations representative holds a
unique place in African American history and merits closer attention than it has received.
Coming as it did during a transitional period in his career, Johnson’s role in the 1930
League investigation went far in shaping his views on race relations for the next quarter
of a century. Observations made in the black republic are indispensable not only for
understanding the sociologist on a professional as well as a personal level, but also for the
insights that they offer into native life and Americo-Liberian political leadership. As this
dissertation shows, Johnson’s mission to Liberia, where tribal citizens viewed his arrival
as a matter of life or death, must be considered a central, rather than a peripheral, event in
the career of an important but often underestimated twentieth-century African American
scholar and thinker.

4

CHAPTER 1
THE EDUCATION OF CHARLES S. JOHNSON, 1893-1929

. . . Negroes live and think in a state of isolation
which is almost complete; no white group understands
it, or can fully understand it.
Charles S. Johnson, from The Negro in Chicago (1922)

In December 1929 Fisk University sociologist Charles Spurgeon Johnson accepted an
invitation from President Herbert Hoover to serve as the American member of a tripartite
League of Nations commission to investigate slavery and forced labor in the Republic of
Liberia. By then, he had experienced firsthand virtually every major event or movement
that had shaped African American history in the previous fifteen years. In 1916 Johnson
moved from his native Virginia to Chicago, where he quickly became the foremost
student of the Great Migration. In 1918 he saw combat in World War I, a defining
moment for African Americans who believed that patriotic military service abroad would
earn them new measures of respect and equality at home. Shortly after his return to
Chicago in the summer of 1919, Johnson was nearly killed when he found himself caught
in one of the worst race riots in American history. In the early 1920s he moved to New
York at the height of Marcus Garvey’s appeal to the black masses, and later in the decade
he became a leading promoter of the Harlem Renaissance. Johnson’s personal journey
resulted in an acute sense of what another traveler to Liberia a few years later referred to
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as “one’s place in time, based on a knowledge not only of one’s present but of the past
from which one has emerged.”1
The international crisis created by charges of slavery and forced labor in Liberia
again placed Johnson at the center of events. Favoring militancy as their chief criterion
for gauging the significance of twentieth-century African American leaders, some
historians have brushed aside the Fisk sociologist as too willing to compromise with
white elites to be taken seriously; his experience in Liberia has received scant attention.
Yet, Johnson’s lodestar was education, not propaganda and protest. In a capitalistic
society driven by new and constantly changing technology, he rejected the idea of
separatism—economic or otherwise—and emphasized the urgent need for African
Americans to gain the educational skills necessary to compete with whites, or risk being
left behind as a permanent underclass. Agitation for civil rights, as Johnson saw it, could
carry the African American cause only so far without an economic base of power.
Johnson’s critics, however, have failed to come to terms with the depth of his
understanding of African American life and race relations. Nor have they recognized his
compassion for society’s powerless and dispossessed, nowhere more apparent than in his
defense of Liberia’s oppressed tribal majority in 1930. Whereas the militant editor of
The Crisis, W. E. B. Du Bois, lauded Americo-Liberian leaders and took for granted their
mistreatment of tribal citizens for the sake of law and order, Johnson sided with the
natives.2
1

On Johnson’s life and career, see Richard Robbins, Sidelines Activist: Charles S. Johnson and the
Struggle for Civil Rights (Jackson: University Press of Mississippi, 1996), and Patrick J. Gilpin, “Charles
S. Johnson: An Intellectual Biography” (Ph.D. dissertation, Vanderbilt University, 1973). Graham Greene,
Journey Without Maps (New York: Doubleday, 1936), 19-20 (quotation).
2
David Levering Lewis, W. E. B. Du Bois: The Fight for Equality and the American Century, 1919-1963
(New York: Henry Holt, 2000), 124-125. Lewis mentions the League of Nations commission to investigate
slavery and forced labor in Liberia but fails to note that Johnson was a member. See also Lewis, When
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An unwavering advocate of black equality, Johnson never categorized himself as a
“race man,” one who jumped to the defense of other African Americans “good or bad,
right or wrong.”3 Objectivity characterized Johnson’s work, whether during his early
days compiling and writing much of The Negro in Chicago: A Study of Race Relations
and a Race Riot, the official study of the five days of racial violence that struck that city
in the summer of 1919, or as editor of Opportunity, the journal of the National Urban
League. Yet from the vantage point of Opportunity’s comfortable Manhattan offices,
Johnson’s views on the Republic of Liberia in the mid-1920s largely paralleled those of
other black intellectuals, many of them dedicated “race men.” Founded by free people of
color and former slaves in 1822, Liberia had long served as a symbol of black freedom
and as an important example of black capability and self-determination. In the 1920s,
when black scholars spent considerable time and energy refuting the idea of black
inferiority, favorable articles in newspapers like the Baltimore Afro-American, and
glowing reports by W. E. B. Du Bois in The Crisis, offered an overwhelmingly positive
image of Liberia.4

Harlem Was in Vogue (New York: Alfred A. Knopf, 1981), 46-47, 90; Jonathan Scott Holloway,
Confronting the Veil: Abram Harris, Jr., E. Franklin Frazier, and Ralph Bunche, 1919-1941 (Chapel Hill:
University of North Carolina Press, 2002), 114, 124-25, 142-43, 168-69; Anthony M. Platt, E. Franklin
Frazier Reconsidered (New Brunswick and London: Rutgers University Press, 1991), 97-101; James O.
Young, Black Writers of the Thirties (Baton Rouge: Louisiana State University Press, 1973), 83-84; and
August Meier, A White Scholar in the Black Community, 1945-1965 (Amherst: University of Massachusetts
Press, 1992), 14-18, 73-87.
3
Horace, R. Cayton, Long Old Road: An Autobiography (New York: Trident Press, NY, 1965), 250
(quotation); Young, Black Writers of the Thirties, 76.
4
On the founding of the Republic of Liberia see, for instance, Tom W. Shick, Behold the Promised Land:
A History of Afro-American Settler Society in Nineteenth-Century Liberia (Baltimore and London: Johns
Hopkins University Press, 1980); and Amos J. Beyan, The American Colonization Society and the Creation
of the Liberian State: A Historical Perspective, 1822-1900 (Lanham, New York, and London: University
Press of America, 1991). Baltimore Afro-American, April 5 and May 14, 1924 ; Pittsburgh Courier, April
5, 1924; W. E. B. Du Bois, “Africa,” The Crisis (April 1924), 247-54; and Du Bois, “Little Portraits of
Africa,” The Crisis (April 1924), 273-74; J. R. Hooker, “The Negro American Press and Africa in the
Nineteen Twenties,” The Canadian Journal of African Studies, 1 (March 1967), 45-46. Although Du Bois
favored Firestone’s investment in Liberia, he wrote: “Everything really depends upon the attitude of white
capital in America. If they want to do a fine and unusual job in imperialism they have the opportunity here
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In November 1925, as Liberian president Charles D. B. King negotiated with the
Firestone Plantations Company to lease a million acres of land and establish the largest
rubber plantations in the world, Charles Johnson, without objective reports or firsthand
observations to draw on, expressed concern not for the well-being of the black republic’s
tribal majority, but for the possible loss of national sovereignty that might result from
unchecked external forces. Several years before allegations of slavery and forced labor in
America’s “moral protectorate” reached the public, Johnson suggested in an editorial in
Opportunity that while American interests may have been completely innocent in Liberia,
“imperialism becomes a temptation difficult to withstand, once large stakes have been
planted.”5 Johnson’s parochial understanding of imperialism as something less than the
“maintenance and expansion of unchallenged power,” as one writer has defined it, led
him to focus his thoughts only on the implications posed by powerful outside forces in
Liberia, an entirely mainstream point of view unencumbered by conflicting evidence.6
Governed since its founding by a handful of families connected through politics and
intermarriage, the Republic of Liberia had survived over the years through the granting of
concessions to European colonial powers like Great Britain and Germany, a process that
steadily eroded Liberian sovereignty. Troubled in the past by native uprisings, and by
European encroachments on its territory that led to periodic U. S. military interventions,
Liberia showed few signs of progress toward self-sufficiency in the first three decades of
the twentieth century. The republic’s official “closed door” policy that limited foreign
investment, and lack of production that crippled its export trade, helped to perpetuate a
in Liberia . . . . On the other hand if the Firestone Plantations Company wishes it can repeat in Liberia all
the hell that white imperialism has perpetrated heretofore in Africa and Asia.” See Du Bois, “Liberia and
Rubber,” The New Republic (November 18, 1925), 325-29 (quotation on 329).
5
“Liberia’s Future in Rubber,” Opportunity, 3 (November 1925), 324 (quotation).
6
David Remnick, “Comment: After the Battle,” The New Yorker (March 31, 2003), 30 (quotation).
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severely underdeveloped condition that contrasted sharply with its prosperous northern
neighbor Sierra Leone, a British colony. In Liberia’s politically charged atmosphere,
always rife with rumor and superstition, chronic financial instability only added to
perceptions in some circles, particularly in Europe, of the hopelessness of black selfgovernment.7 Yet even at one of Charles Johnson’s lowest points during his 1930
mission to Liberia, when in a moment of exasperation he confessed that he knew little
about international politics and cared even less, he never questioned the efficacy of the
black republic’s form of government.8
Although marginalized in the United States because of his race, Johnson cared
passionately about the ideals and promise of democracy. Born in 1893 in Bristol,
Virginia, the son of a respected and successful Baptist minister, Johnson’s career path
followed what one writer has characterized as the “displacement of personnel from clergy
to academy.”9 As a youngster his “strange reading fare” included many books on
theology, and fatherly advice generally came to him in the form of Biblical quotations.10
Race consciousness imprinted itself on Johnson’s childhood when he noticed the
7

Martin Lowenkopf, Politics in Liberia: The Conservative Road to Development (Stanford: Hoover
Institution Press, 1976), 13, 47-48; George W. Brown, The Economic History of Liberia (Washington,
D. C.: Associated Publishers, 1941), 147-187; Yekutiel Gershoni, The Americo-Liberian Scramble for the
Hinterland (Boulder and London: Westview Press, 1985), 47-65; Raymond Leslie Buell, The Native
Problem in Africa (2 vols.; New York: The MacMillan Company, 1928) II, 727, 763-73, 890.
8
Charles S. Johnson, “African Diary,” June 14, 1930, 176, Folder 15, Box 88, Charles S. Johnson Papers
(microfilm) (Amistad Research Center, New Orleans, Louisiana). Hereafter cited as CSJP. While Johnson
may not have considered himself an expert on international politics, he nevertheless showed a deep interest
in Africa and the Caribbean in the 1920s. See, for instance, “ A Caribbean Issue,” Opportunity, 4
(November 1926); “Our Caribbean,” Opportunity, 3 (April 1925), 98; “American Investments in Latin
America,” Opportunity, 6 (April 1928), 99-100; “Hayti,” Opportunity, 3 (July 1925), 195; “King Cotton
in Africa,” Opportunity, 3 (July 1925), 196; “Abyssinia,” Opportunity, 4 (September 1926), 271-73.
9
Charles S. Johnson, “A Spiritual Autobiography,” in Louis Finkelstein, ed., American Spiritual
Autobiographies: Fifteen Self-Portraits, (New York: Harper and Brothers, 1948), 191-206; Edwin R.
Embree, 13 Against the Odds (New York, Viking Press, 1944), 48; Fred H. Matthews, Quest for an
American Sociology: Robert E. Park and the Chicago School (Montreal and London: McGill-Queens
University Press, 1977), 90 (quotation). See also Donald Cunnigen, “Myrdal, Park, and Second-Generation
African American Sociologists,” in Bruce R. Hare, ed., 2001 Race Odyssey: African Americans and
Sociology (Syracuse: Syracuse University Press, 2002), 51-53.
10
Johnson, “A Spiritual Autobiography,” 191-93;

9

disparity between the local white elementary school, located only a block away from his
family’s house, and the black school that he attended a mile across town. Also, with only
a few exceptions, residents in his otherwise all-white neighborhood “made it apparent
that there was a difference.” Even though his mother resisted being addressed by whites
“in the obnoxiously familiar fashion,” it was not until years later that Charles actually
learned her Christian name.11
A story that Johnson heard many times throughout his youth—a discussion always
accompanied by an “atmosphere of awe”—only reinforced for him what it meant to be a
black southerner at the turn of the century. In the year of Charles’ birth, as the story
went, a mob lynched an African American and dragged his corpse down the street and
past the Johnson house. Reverend Johnson, diminutive but determined, confronted the
mob and warned it that eternal fire and brimstone awaited as punishment for its sins, but
received only laughter for a reply. Afterward, the town held a mass meeting, which
Johnson recalled as “a memorable incident frequently told in my hearing, because the
Negroes in the town were afraid to attend.” He described the story as one of his “earliest
heritages.”12
Johnson’s middle-class Victorian upbringing, by his own estimate rigid yet never
harsh, and his education grounded in the Christian values of charity and piety, led him to
identify closely with society’s underdogs during the height of the reform-minded
Progressive Era. To be sure, Johnson’s scholarly pursuits always led in the direction of
social welfare rather than social theory. The appearance of Jim Crow segregation, the
cost for the successful passage of Progressive legislation, left an indelible mark on
11

Charles S. Johnson to Walter White, October 31, 1929 (quotations), NAACP Papers, Administrative File,
Personal Correspondence, C-98 (Manuscript Division, Library of Congress, Washington, D. C.)
12
Johnson to White, October 31, 1929, (quotations), NAACP Papers, Library of Congress.
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Johnson. Before de jure segregation in Bristol, Virginia, relationships between black and
white citizens generally ranged from cordial to indifferent. The appearance of new and
odious Jim Crow laws, however, produced what seemed like a sudden overnight change
in white attitudes. The sensitive Johnson never forgot the shock that he felt when white
citizens suddenly conveyed a sense of menacing hostility towards him and his family
without any apparent rational basis for doing so. White citizens, as Johnson recalled
many years later, came to know “less about Negroes and the Negroes appeared to care
less and less about their opinions.” While naturally concerned with segregation’s
“differential” form of justice and the damage that it inflicted on defenseless minorities,
Johnson grew to feel even more concerned with how “the process, and tolerance of it”
undermined the morals of the entire nation.13
At fourteen Johnson attended Wayland Academy in Richmond, and stayed on in
Virginia’s capital city to earn a bachelor’s degree at Virginia Union University in 1916.
Supporting himself during his undergraduate years with summer jobs at hotels and resorts
led to new experiences and contacts, including “three outstanding instances of racial
disrespect, tinged with animosity.” Friendships developed, however, after Johnson
resolved the “difficulties,” his “first indication . . . of the malleability of human nature.”
Temporary jobs also revealed, as Johnson recalled, “modes of white behavior so
shockingly at variance with my bringing up that what I lost in respect for the white race
was not wholly compensated for in observations of their prestige in other respects.” In
regard to white opinions of African Americans, Johnson learned that there “is practically
13

On the “progressive impulse,” see for instance John Whiteclay Chambers II, The Tyranny of Change:
America in the Progressive Era, 1890-1920, 2nd ed. (New Brunswick and London: Rutgers University
Press, 2000), 132-71; Johnson, “A Spiritual Autobiography,” 193 (quotations); Daryl Michael Scott,
Contempt and Pity: Social Policy and the Image of the Damaged Black Psyche, 1880-1996 (Chapel Hill
and London: University of North Carolina Press, 1997), 63.

11

always a difference between things as they are and things as they are imagined to be.”
The rather startling discovery that “there exist classes of Negroes who actually fit the
description applied indiscriminately to Negroes as a whole” rounded out Johnson’s
youthful thoughts on race.14
In the autumn of 1916 Johnson enrolled at the University of Chicago to begin graduate
work in the still relatively new and amorphous field of sociology.15 While he followed a
path different from others who took part in the Great Migration, and chose his destination
for different reasons, he nevertheless arrived in Chicago as merely one more jobless and
destitute young black man looking for work when he stepped off the train in the teeming
and corrupt city. For Johnson, Chicago may not have been the “land of hope” envisioned
by the thousands of black Mississippians and Louisianians who traveled north on the
Illinois Central Railroad in search of jobs and equal rights, but it served the purposes of a
young man eager to pursue a career outside of the church and beyond his father’s
shadow.16
Johnson’s potential as a first-rate scholar quickly became apparent to one of his
professors at the University of Chicago, Robert E. Park, a pioneer in the study of race
relations. While Park’s theory of a race relations cycle—conflict, competition,
accommodation, and assimilation—inspired much scholarly debate over the years, his
insistence on taking his students out of the classroom to study their subjects firsthand in
the urban streets made an immediate and long-lasting impact on young scholars like
14

Johnson to White, October 31, 1929, NAACP Papers, LC.
Matthews, Quest for an American Sociology, 89-93; Stow Persons, Ethnic Studies at Chicago, 1905-45
(Urbana and Chicago: University of Illinois Press, 1987), 28-32;
16
Johnson reportedly arrived in Chicago with less than two dollars. See Embree, 13 Against the Odds, 54.
James R. Grossman, Land of Hope: Chicago, Black Southerners and the Great Migration (Chicago and
London: University of Chicago Press, 1987), 13-119; Thomas Lee Philpott, The Slum and the Ghetto:
Immigrants, Blacks, and Reformers in Chicago, 1880-1930 (Belmont, Cal.: Wadsworth Publishing, 1991),
163-200.
15
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Johnson. The study of urban conditions became the hallmark of the “Chicago school” of
sociology, and the idea of “ecological succession,” whereby various groups and activities
influenced and replaced each other to produce new forms of accommodation, became its
chief doctrine. Johnson had never heard of Park or his theories when he arrived at the
university, but his enrollment in Park’s popular course, “The Crowd and the Public,” led
to his forming a close bond with the foremost leader of the Chicago school, a relationship
that paid large dividends for a black scholar with limited opportunities in the racially
restrictive world of academia in the first decades of the twentieth century.17
With its vast ethnic neighborhoods Chicago provided an ideal laboratory for Park and
his graduate students to explore the city’s racial frontier during a period of transition
accelerated by the arrival of thousands of black southerners lured by wartime labor
shortages, many of whom settled in the Black Belt, a tightly confined stretch of thirty
blocks running along State Street on the South Side. Residential segregation, while not
imposed by law, was nonetheless pervasive, a point of contention and conflict that
persisted for decades. Wentworth Avenue formed the western boundary of the Black
Belt beyond which lurked predatory Irish-American youth gangs that would play a
pivotal role in igniting and sustaining the 1919 race riot. Black migrants might have
escaped the oppression of the Jim Crow South but discovered in Chicago new forms of
racial hostility and segregation that appeared no less intractable.18

17

Robbins, Sidelines Activist, 31-32; Winifred Raushenbush, Robert E. Park: Biography of a Sociologist
(Durham: Duke University Press, 1979), 94-95, 100; Persons, Ethnic Studies at Chicago, 33, 60-95;
Butler A. Jones, “The Tradition of Sociology Teaching in Black Colleges: The Unheralded Professionals,”
in James E. Blackwell and Morris Janowitz,, The Black Sociologists: Historical and Contemporary
Perspectives (Chicago and London: University of Chicago Press, 1974), 124-36.
18
Matthews, Quest for an American Sociology, 126-28; Philpott, The Slum and the Ghetto, 118-27, 183200; Stephen Grant Meyer, As Long as They Don’t Move Next Door: Segregation and Racial Conflict in
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Johnson found in Park a mentor who brought a wealth of life experience to his
position at the University of Chicago, including most significantly a long-term and close
working relationship with preeminent African American spokesman Booker T.
Washington. As an undergraduate at the University of Michigan Park studied under John
Dewey, one of the most influential scholars and thinkers of the time whose ideas on “selfrealization” would later have a major impact on the thinking of Charles Johnson.19 After
graduating with a degree in philosophy in 1887, Park wrote for various newspapers for
the next eleven years, and for a time in the early 1890s worked as a police reporter in
New York. Park’s “beat” in Manhattan, the Essex Market Police Court, led him to cross
paths many times with muckraking journalist Jacob Riis, who a few years earlier shocked
middle-class readers with How the Other Half Lives, his exposé of immigrant life in the
tenements. Riis, originally from Ribe, Denmark, earned the nickname “the pious Dane”
because of a moralizing and overly sentimental style disliked by hardboiled New York
reporters, and he often scooped Park on many important stories. In New York Park grew
fascinated with the idea of studying city life as a process undergoing constant change; he
also came to despise reformers like Jacob Riis and their “civilizing” mission of spreading
the Social Gospel.20 Park believed that urban ethnic groups needed to be left alone to
work out their problems on their own terms, and that they should be studied without the
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self-serving biases inherent in Progressive reform. Most troubling of all to Park,
Progressives had used state intervention to achieve reforms that he found entirely
repugnant: immigration restriction and segregation. On the other hand, more militant
leaders like those of the NAACP in later years, had little respect for Park’s conservative
approach, believing that he moved far too slow to accomplish needed changes.21
Although Robert E. Park despised “do-gooders” and advised his students to steer clear
of them and their ideas, following graduate work at Harvard and the completion of a
Ph.D. in philosophy at the University of Heidelberg, his own muckraking instincts led
him to collaborate in the founding of the American Congo Reform Association in 1903.
For the next two years, until he grew disgusted with the political wrangling among the
missionary groups that funded the association, Park wrote articles and organized
activities aimed at arousing public indignation over King Leopold II of Belgium’s
abusive policies in the Congo Free State, which included the use of forced labor to
harvest crude rubber. Through his study of the Belgian Congo, Park concluded that what
colonized Africa needed most was a system of education; he felt that the establishment of
industrial schools offered the best chance to meet the immediate needs of natives. Park
even toyed with the idea of traveling to Africa for more intensive study, in his forties still
unsure what direction he wanted his life to take.22
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Even if Park’s affiliation with the Congo Reform Association ended badly and with
much bitterness on his part, it nonetheless led to his meeting Booker T. Washington, who
served as the group’s vice-president, and who came to redirect Park’s life toward the
study of race relations. In 1905 Washington invited Park to visit his famous Tuskegee
Normal and Industrial Institute in Tuskegee, Alabama. Park accepted, eventually
assuming the job of publicist for Tuskegee Institute, a position that he held for the next
seven years. Under the guidance of Washington, Park studied black life in the South, an
endeavor that convinced him that prejudice resulted not from inherited or received
perceptions, but from intergroup competition.23 Park carried this idea to the University of
Chicago, where he expanded and refined it to form his theory of a race relations cycle
based on a belief that state intervention always did more harm than good, an approach
that offered few solutions during the darkest days of Jim Crow and mob violence against
black southerners. Unlike John Dewey, who believed that academicians needed to
combine ideas with action, a view that carried great weight at the University of Chicago
in the early years of sociological study, Park resolved that scientific solutions to social
problems required the complete detachment of the observer from his subject of study.24
Park’s tenure at Tuskegee Institute came at the apex of Booker T. Washington’s
considerable influence in American domestic and international affairs. The “political
machine” that Washington built at Tuskegee gathered momentum after his famous
Atlanta Compromise speech in 1895 when he called for black accommodation as the best

23

Matthews, Quest for an American Sociology, 58-61; Gilpin, “Charles S. Johnson,” 76-110; Lindner,
Reportage of Urban Culture, 44-48.
24
Persons, Ethnic Studies at Chicago, 30; James B. McKee, Sociology and the Race Problem, The Failure
of a Perspective (Urbana and Chicago: University of Illinois Press, 1993), 109-11; John H. Stanfield,
Philanthropy and Jim Crow in American Social Science (Westport, Conn. and London: Greenwood Press,
1985), 31, 38-56. On Dewey and the University of Chicago, see Menand, Metaphysical Club, 285-333.

16

approach for dealing with the new Jim Crow South.25 Robert Park’s work at Tuskegee
promoted the soundness of Washington’s edict of black self-help and uplift, appealing
especially to the coalition of black and white moderates that formed the Institute’s
economic base. Park performed his public relations duties so well that black author
Ralph Ellison later referred to him disparagingly as the person most “responsible for
inflating Tuskegee into a national symbol.”26
Tuskegee’s powerful national image and Washington’s political influence brought
Robert Park into close contact with political affairs in the Republic of Liberia, a
development that later played a significant role in Charles Johnson’s decision to accept
his appointment to investigate allegations of slavery and forced labor in that West
African nation. Booker T. Washington took an active interest in African affairs and
became intimately involved in Liberian politics, particularly through his
recommendations to the U. S. State Department for ministerial positions, and by acting as
an intermediary for Americo-Liberian leaders seeking economic assistance from the U. S.
Congress.27 In 1909 President William Howard Taft offered Washington an appointment
to serve on a commission charged with investigating boundary disputes between
European colonial powers and Liberia, and to make recommendations for stabilizing the
Liberian economy. Emmett J. Scott, Washington’s secretary, eventually served on the
Taft commission. Scott’s report informed both Washington and Park, above all, that
Liberia’s reliance on imports could only lead to further loss of national sovereignty and
25
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economic disaster, and that the republic needed an American-trained militia to guard its
frontier. Washington later concluded that Liberia’s lack of self-sufficiency resulted most
of all from a failure to adopt the values of “self-denial and enterprise” that he preached at
Tuskegee. The United States could provide important financial and technical assistance,
Washington believed, but it was up to Liberians to develop their own resources and to
guard their own independence.28 The same problems that Park learned of in 1909
remained a generation later in Liberia and, in fact, had grown considerably worse because
of new forms of violence and terror directed at natives after the reorganization and
retraining of the Frontier Force recommended by the Taft commission.
In addition to his role as Charles Johnson’s mentor, Robert Park provided important
contacts that propelled the young sociologist’s career toward early success. Park served
as the first president of Chicago’s branch of the National Urban League, an organization
that assisted newly arrived black southerners in their transition to city life, and he created
a position within the League for Johnson as director of research and investigations.
Through his work with the League, Johnson met and impressed important black leaders
like Robert Russa Moton, Booker T. Washington’s successor as president of Tuskegee
Institute, and Emmett J. Scott, both of whom were active in Republican politics.
Johnson’s position with the Chicago Urban League and his relationship with Robert Park
gave him a unique perspective on the Great Migration, at once participant and student.29
Founded in January 1917, the Chicago Urban League depended upon funding from
corporations like International Harvester, and from Julius Rosenwald of Sears, Roebuck;
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the League acted as agent for both employee and employer as it attempted first to
convince corporate leaders to hire black newcomers, and then insure that black workers
performed their jobs satisfactorily. With an annual budget of less than $20,000 during
the initial years of the Great Migration, the League struggled to keep up with the
demands placed on it by the daily arrival of black migrants from the South in need of jobs
and housing. For example, on a single day in 1917 the League received housing
applications from six hundred and sixty four black newcomers, but had “only fifty-five
dwellings actually available for use by Negroes.” Accompanying the black housing
crunch came an increase in rent for African Americans as much as fifty percent as well as
an increase in racial hostility from white residents on the boundaries of the Black Belt
who feared a decline in property value that they believed followed black encroachment
on formerly all-white neighborhoods. Easing racial tensions became one of the Urban
League’s chief missions, though its conservative approach has received much criticism
from historians. But Chicago’s NAACP during the years of the Great Migration was all
but moribund, and the League proved indispensable in the assistance it offered to black
migrants. During the peak years of the migration black Chicagoans in need of help
turned to the Urban League, not the NAACP.30
In his role as chief researcher for the Chicago Urban League, Charles Johnson gained
immediate recognition after directing a survey on the African American community in
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Milwaukee. He also had the foresight to begin collecting letters written by black
southerners and recent arrivals seeking advice and help from the Urban League, some
three thousand in all. Johnson’s work caught the attention of Emmett J. Scott who, after
Booker T. Washington’s death in 1915, left Tuskegee to become treasurer of Howard
University. Scott’s interest in the Great Migration led him, with Johnson’s assistance, to
secure a grant from the Carnegie International Peace Foundation to study the exodus of
African Americans from the South. Scott “borrowed” Johnson’s services, and in the fall
of 1917 sent the young sociologist on his first trip into the Deep South.
In Mississippi Johnson studied local conditions and interviewed African Americans on
their way North in order to gain a clearer picture of attitudes and events surrounding the
Great Migration. Johnson’s immersion in his subject led him to determine that while
racial oppression definitely played a part in black flight from the South, hopes of
economic opportunity in the North acted as the main stimulus to migration. Indeed, he
felt that the best thing that any black southerner could do to escape economic death was
to relocate to a northern city and begin earning an income as quickly as possible. No one
studied the Great Migration as closely as Johnson; he remains the leading expert on the
subject by which all of his contemporaries are measured.31 In many ways Johnson’s trip
into the heart of the Mississippi Delta in late 1917 served as a starting point to his
professional career as a sociologist. Conducting research in the Delta forced Johnson to
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sharpen his survival skills in a new and hostile environment, an experience that helped
prepare him for the harsh trials that he would face in the course of the next few years, and
that he would rely on in 1930 to overcome the dangers of an extended stay in Liberia.
In 1918 Johnson enlisted in the army and joined 1,800 of his fellow African
Americans to form the 803rd Pioneer Infantry Division. His work in Chicago, while it
may have seemed far away and all but forgotten during basic training at Camp Grant in
Rockford, Illinois, actually benefited his brief military career. At Camp Grant he
received a letter from Emmett J. Scott, the new Special Assistant to the Secretary of War
assigned to oversee the treatment of black troops. Scott thanked Johnson for his help on
the Carnegie project, commending him not only for his “energy and enthusiasm” but also
for his “accuracy and dependableness.” Indeed, the migrant letters that Johnson had
collected and other research that he conducted formed the foundation of Scott’s Negro
Migration During the War, published in 1920. As a sign of his gratitude, Scott gave
Johnson “full permission” to pass the letter to his company commander, a gesture that
lent a certain amount of prestige to a young black enlisted man whose organizing skills
may otherwise have gone unnoticed.32
Johnson detested his time in the army, a fractured period in his life that wrenched him
away from his work and burgeoning career. From the point of his enlistment, through
basic training, and combat in France, Johnson professed no particular hatred toward his
German enemy. Worst of all for a headstrong individual confident in his own decisionmaking abilities, military conformity demanded a “hopelessly subordinate caste role . . .
with suspended judgment on the ultimates.” Sent to Europe with “uncertain duties” as a
32
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sergeant major in an infantry division, Johnson came under fire every day for three
consecutive weeks, though without suffering an injury. He later recalled that he spent
much of his time in France retrieving books from the rubble of libraries, and “spiriting”
food to German prisoners of war. Johnson’s systematic mind recoiled at the “wildly
destructive and inconclusive” nature of “his” war, World War I, a chaotic year that he
hoped to put behind him quickly as he resumed his scholarly pursuits.33
But instead of finding peace and any new sense of respect or equality at home, racial
turmoil greeted Johnson on his return to Chicago in the summer of 1919. On July 25th
Johnson and the rest of his army unit paraded down Michigan Avenue to the cheers of
black Chicagoans, who then met with the troops for a celebration in Grant Park on the
lakefront. Only two days later an incident that occurred on a sweltering Sunday
afternoon between black and white beachgoers on Lake Michigan sparked five days of
racial violence that left thirty-eight dead and over one thousand homeless. The riot
followed by only one week another racially motivated outburst in Washington, D. C. In
the months before the Chicago riot white workers engaged in labor strikes in the Stock
Yards district, and lashed out at black workers for their refusal to join unions as well as
for their role in the past as strikebreakers. Amid many rumors and anti-black newspaper
reports and other propaganda, housing competition and a wave of bombings in black
neighborhoods created a powder keg atmosphere ready to be touched off at any
moment.34
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An eyewitness to the mayhem in Chicago, Johnson never spoke publicly or published
anything about his experience. Years later, however, he recounted his ordeal in private to
his friend Edwin Embree, the president of the Julius Rosenwald Fund. In Embree’s
retelling of events, Johnson encountered “milling mobs” between the offices of the Urban
League on Wabash Avenue and his rooms near the University of Chicago. As violence
erupted from block to block, the young sociologist and returning war veteran narrowly
missed being struck by gunfire more than once while dragging injured victims to safety,
and watched in horror as a man standing only a few feet away from him was stabbed to
death. After finally reaching home and still in his bloodstained clothing, Johnson sat
down and typed an outline for studying the causes of the riot.35
Even before the Illinois state militia and a heavy rain brought an end to the rioting in
the first week of August, Governor Frank O. Lowden, at the behest of local business
leaders who feared the prospect of further racial disruptions and property loss, announced
that he would appoint a commission of experts to examine the events leading up to the
riot, and to make recommendations for reform.36 The Chicago Commission on Race
Relations, a privately funded, biracial group composed primarily of prominent
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businessmen—most notably Julius Rosenwald—began its work in October 1919. On the
official recommendation of Robert R. Moton, and because of the influence of Robert
Park, the commission selected Charles Johnson as its associate executive secretary. The
twenty-six-year-old Johnson became responsible for most of the research behind the
commission’s study, work that would earn him considerable praise in the next few
years.37 Johnson’s role in researching and writing much of The Negro in Chicago also
marked the very thing that brought him the most personal criticism from detractors in
later years; namely, telling wealthy white men exactly what they wanted to hear, a
supposition that ignores the limitations placed on black scholars throughout the first half
of the twentieth century.38
From the beginning of its work the commission believed “we are going to have a
report which will be an important document in American history.” Johnson’s outline and
the data that he collected soon after the riot gave the commission good reason for
optimism. Had the commission followed Johnson’s original outline, The Negro in
Chicago may well have provided a framework for any number of fundamental changes.
But Johnson’s proposed section on Chicago politics and race was dropped, eliminating
any chance for substantive recommendations for reform in a city plagued by violent
crime, corruption, and racial antagonism. Not without good reason did black Chicagoans,
as Johnson learned in conversation with them, find it difficult “to divorce the purposes of
the Commission from suspected connections with politics.” A close examination of the
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relationship between Chicago’s political bosses, vice districts bordering the Black Belt,
and corruption in the police department, proved too prickly for the practical-minded
business leaders who directed the commission. Johnson no doubt chafed under
restrictions that thwarted his desire to get to the root causes of the riot, suffering in
silence his only option other than being replaced. Even so, the young sociologist, a
particularly effective speaker in front of small groups, exerted a strong influence on the
commission. Johnson educated white commissioners by underscoring the damage that
discrimination in jobs and housing had on race relations, and he urged black members to
be bold in their demands for substantive concessions.39
While it is true that The Negro in Chicago failed in the monumental tasks of
transforming the city’s race relations and restructuring its politics, the fears of some
African Americans that the commission would use its final report to propose “a scheme
of compulsory segregation” proved unfounded. Johnson won that battle; the commission
denounced compulsory segregation. But Johnson lost out on the incendiary issue of
integration. In its argument for peaceful accommodation, the commission stressed the
need for more equality in the workplace, believing that an increase in capital would allow
black Chicagoans to solve housing problems on their own with a minimum of racial
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friction, even if it meant extending the boundaries of “voluntary” segregation without
attempting to eliminate them.40
Above all, the commission rejected the idea of black inferiority or “instinctual” racial
hostility; it sought to change public opinion and improve race relations by combating
negative stereotypes and misperceptions. It suggested that inflammatory newspaper
articles, activities of anti-black neighborhood associations that led to numerous
bombings, and unsubstantiated rumors in the weeks before the riot set the stage for more
widespread racial violence. The final report indicted the police department for official
misconduct; in many instances they ignored white lawbreakers while brutalizing African
Americans, which allowed the riot to spread in the early stages when it could easily have
been contained. Gangs of white teen-agers and young men from the Stock Yards district
bordering the Black Belt, viewed by police as “too dangerous to be interfered with,” took
the lead and incited others to riot.41
The commission determined that while job discrimination and equality in labor union
representation were serious issues that needed to be corrected, housing competition and
the anti-black exhortations of groups like the Kenwood and Hyde Park Property Owners’
Association caused racial tension on the South Side to reach the boiling point. Following
a line of reasoning similar to that of Herbert Hoover, who believed that American
40
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economic expansion would continue only by avoiding war and revolution, representatives
of Chicago’s business community, alarmed by the disruption and uncertainty caused by
riots, labor strikes, and the Red Scare of 1919 and 1920, sought peace and stability in
race relations mostly for self-serving purposes. With the destruction in Europe and on
Chicago’s South Side still fresh in his mind, Charles S. Johnson also preferred a peaceful
environment, albeit for reasons different from the commission’s powerful white
businessmen. Yet he understood that black advancement and progress in race relations
had traditionally grown out of tension and conflict. The results of riots like the one that
took place in Chicago were not entirely negative from Johnson’s point of view; the riot
illustrated in dramatic terms that African Americans in no way accepted their inferior
status and were restless to change it, thereby rejecting the idea of a permanent caste
system.42
Johnson wrote seven of the report’s eleven chapters, which provided the bulk of the
background material on the Great Migration, black housing, racial contacts, and the vital
role of public opinion. His work highlighted the extent of industrial exploitation and
housing discrimination faced by black Chicagoans, fundamental problems that demanded
immediate attention for any hope of progress.43 Guided by cold-blooded realism rather
than “calm acceptance” in his understanding that white racial hostility might persist for
generations to come, Johnson never intended for The Negro in Chicago to gloss over
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“evidence of intractable white racism as residue of a passing sociological age of conflict,”
as critics of the report have argued.44 Finding a way around the limits set by the
commission, Johnson used an abundance of personal interviews to great effect, at once
both humanizing the victims of racial discrimination and violence, and as a clever way of
addressing the misconceptions and negative stereotypes of African Americans that he
believed, like Robert E. Park, fed racial tension.
Through the use of personal testimony, or the “human document,” Johnson examined
both the mentality that fostered white racial hostility, and the emergence of the more
assertive attitude that characterized the “New Negro” after World War I. For example,
Johnson quoted a white Chicagoan who claimed, “I know I don’t want niggers living next
door to me, but I can’t tell you why.” The owner of a woman’s clothing store drew an
even harder line when he stated, “The more I know of niggers, the more I am convinced
that there is no good nigger but a dead one.” What the storeowner actually knew about
African Americans was not revealed, the implication being that his knowledge was at
best limited and probably based on newspaper stories or other negative publicity. On the
other hand, a black war veteran warned, “I can shoot as good as the next one. I ain’t
looking for trouble, but if it comes my way, I ain’t dodging.”45 Johnson’s effective use of
personal testimony, by far the most powerful element of The Negro in Chicago, helped to
define his humanistic approach to sociology, and became a hallmark of studies that he
directed for years to come.
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Although Charles Johnson enrolled for graduate courses in 1917 in order to complete
his Ph.D., his work for the Urban League that took him to the Deep South, the war, and
then his role in the Chicago Commission on Race Relations, derailed his plans. Johnson
never earned a Ph.D. but could easily have written a first-rate doctoral dissertation on the
1919 riot. In many respects The Negro in Chicago, while in no way the document that
Johnson would have preferred, served as an informal substitute for a dissertation; it
established his reputation as a serious scholar and, most importantly for the philanthropic
foundations that funded his projects for the next few decades, highlighted his ability to
work particularly well in an interracial setting.46
In 1921, a year before publication of the commission’s final report, Johnson left
Chicago for New York, where he became director of the Urban League’s Department of
Research and Investigation, and later the editor of Opportunity. Charles and his wife,
Marie, a young socialite from Milwaukee with a flair for organizing that complemented
her husband’s career, took up residence in the hinterlands of Flushing, Queens. Many
blocks uptown from Opportunity’s offices in Manhattan lay Harlem, the center of African
American life in the United States. In Harlem, where overcrowding, poverty, and neglect
had fast transformed the neighborhood’s six square miles into an urban ghetto, Johnson’s
measured, scholarly approach to improving race relations collided with the powerful new
force of Marcus Garvey’s emotional appeal to the black masses to rise up and return
Africa to the control of Africans. Garvey’s rhetoric and radicalism challenged traditional
black leaders, even those who had rejected most vehemently Booker T. Washington’s old
style of conciliation in exchange for the idea of the uncompromising New Negro. Black
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professionals like Charles Johnson and W. E. B. Du Bois abhorred Garvey’s bombastic
style and empty promises, but they understood the desperation that attracted lower-class
African Americans to his message in the explosive racial environment of the postwar
era.47
The Great Migration and World War I resulted in a heightened race consciousness
among African Americans impatient for change and disillusioned by the wave of white
hostility directed at them in the United States after the armistice. Afro-Caribbean
immigrants brought with them to New York a tradition of political radicalism and anticolonialism that President Woodrow Wilson’s idea of “self-determination” only
strengthened. W. E. B. Du Bois intended his militant phrase, “We return from the
fighting, we return fighting,” to inspire African Americans but it could just as easily have
applied to white Americans fearful of socialism, Bolshevism, feminism, and dark-skinned
immigrants. For every black action came a white response. Whereas African Americans
in northern cities, now in much larger numbers, redefined the meaning of blackness with
the New Negro movement, white Americans tried to reshape their own identities, as
exemplified by the astounding national growth of the Ku Klux Klan as well as a host of
anti-immigrant, anti-black publications by writers such as Lothrop Stoddard, Madison
Grant, and others. In the era of superpatriotism that followed the war, the National
Origins Act of 1924, which all but eliminated the flow of immigrants into the U. S.,
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allowed white Americans to focus more intently on their differences with black
Americans. By underscoring and promoting their belief in black inferiority, whites better
defined themselves in relation to the popular slogan “one-hundred percent Americanism.”
Ideas on black and white in the 1920s became increasingly polarized, particularly in New
York, the financial, intellectual, and cultural center of the United States, which exported
those ideas around the world. New York City in the post-World War I years, the very
symbol of the age of mass culture, provided a perfect environment for Marcus Garvey to
advertise, sell, and export worldwide his radical ideas on the New Negro.48
Garvey founded the Universal Negro Improvement Association in his native Jamaica
in 1915 in the hopes of bringing economic development and opportunity to the poorest of
that poverty-stricken British colony. Influenced by Booker T. Washington’s success at
Tuskegee, the small and rotund Garvey preached the need for education as the most
important means for achieving black uplift. He repeated the same message when he
immigrated to Harlem in 1916, where in a few years he established new headquarters of
the UNIA. After failing to attract much support for his cause, however, the man who
would soon declare himself “Provisional President of Africa” took a more militant stance,
claiming that the problems of race relations would be solved through struggle and
conflict rather than accommodation. At the Paris Peace Conference in January 1919, the
capitalist-minded Garvey joined briefly with socialist A. Philip Randolph to create a new
Pan-African organization that petitioned for native control of former German colonies.
In the postwar atmosphere of disruption and revolution, Garvey declared his astounding
intention of uniting “the four hundred million Negroes of the world into a vast
48
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organization to plant the banner of freedom on the great continent of Africa.” The
development of black-owned businesses, Garvey believed, would provide the necessary
capital to realize his dreams of a black empire in Africa.49
Garvey’s message of black pride and his promises of vast economic success resonated
most strongly in the United States with lower-class African Americans in search of hope
and inspiration in the wake of postwar lynchings and race riots. The Negro World, a
weekly newspaper published in Harlem, and the African World, published in South
Africa, kept Garvey’s growing international following informed of his exploits. The
launching of his steamship company, the Black Star Line (in contrast with the famous
White Star Line), among many other business ventures, added substance to the UNIA’s
program and thrilled Garvey loyalists throughout the Caribbean and the United States.
For sheer spectacle no one could match Garvey, whose use of military regalia and
bestowment of grandiose titles captured the imagination of the masses.50 The UNIA,
modeling itself now on other dues-paying fraternal organizations, even tried to recruit the
conservative Emmett J. Scott by giving him the title of Knight Commander of the
Sublime Order of the Nile for his service to African Americans during World War I.51
In the summer of 1920, as the world focused its attention on Geneva, Switzerland, and
the formation of the League of Nations, black Americans fixed their gaze on an
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international UNIA convention that drew delegates from twenty-five nations for the
purpose of drafting a Negro Declaration of Rights. Garvey’s announcement in a speech
before a crowd of 25,000 at Madison Square Garden of his intention of retaking “every
square inch of the twelve million square miles of African territory belonging to us by
right Divine,” sent shock waves through even the most complacent white reporters in
attendance. Lavish parades of UNIA members in full military dress accompanied the
convention, and were the talk of Harlem for months to come.52
The growth of the UNIA’s international membership, and the founding of the Black
Star Line that could transport large numbers of followers to distant lands, led Garvey in
the months before the 1920 convention to search for a new, permanent headquarters for
his organization. The Republic of Liberia’s history and constitutional exclusion of whites
from immigrating, owning land, or participating in government, made it Garvey’s choice
as the best site for achieving his Pan-African dreams. The publicity surrounding the
Black Star Line gave added weight to Garvey’s promise to create industrial and
agricultural projects that would “free Liberia of any debt that she owes to any white
government,” a reference to the million dollars that the republic stilled owed on a loan
from 1912. Liberia’s need for capital encouraged Garvey to send a spokesman to
Monrovia to pitch his idea and scout the political terrain a few months before the UNIA’s
convention in August 1920.53
Elie Garcia, a Haitian immigrant with ties to the Black Star Line, arrived in the capital
of Monrovia in June 1920. Monrovia’s mayor, Gabriel Johnson, a Garvey enthusiast who
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would receive the title of Supreme Potentate of the UNIA at the August convention, gave
Garcia a warm welcome. Impressed with the nation’s rich natural resources, Garcia soon
grew confident that the UNIA’s colonization program could work, particularly after
Liberia’s Secretary of State Edwin Barclay informed him that the republic would grant
“every facility legally possible” to effectuate Garvey’s ambitious plans. When it came to
assessing Liberian politics, however, Garcia had little faith in present conditions and
leadership. Americo-Liberians, according to Garcia, exhibited neither energy nor
initiative while harboring deep suspicions of anyone who did, particularly “American or
West Indian Negroes.” Based on what Garcia viewed as the weak moral character of the
Americo-Liberians, he advised Garvey not to let them handle any UNIA funds. Worst of
all, Garcia charged the Americo-Liberians with using natives for slave labor, a subject
that the U. S. State Department had received information about as early as 1912. Rather
than exposing the slavery issue or any hint of Garvey’s plan to emancipate Liberia’s
tribal majority, Garcia advised a stealthy course to achieve the required political changes.
Even though racial unity stood as the UNIA’s primary goal, the organization adopted the
same secretive investment methods practiced by other foreigners in the black republic
and refined by Americo-Liberians themselves.54
Marcus Garvey’s UNIA, much like the Republic of Liberia, suffered from internal
strife, mismanagement, and a chronic shortage of funds. Over the course of the next few
years as Garvey tried to raise money for his colonization program, his most ambitious
and important business enterprise, the Black Star Line, began to fail. As the U. S.
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government took an active interest in investigating the shipping company’s problematic
business dealings, criticism of the Garvey movement increased in the black press.
Garvey’s disastrous decision to defend himself at his trial on mail fraud charges in 1923
made him an easy target for his most vocal critics. Indeed, his conviction and five-year
prison term brought joy and relief to the black press, who viewed the UNIA movement
with as much, if not more, alarm than did the federal government.55
In August 1923 Charles Johnson joined in the chorus of black voices that denounced
Garveyism. Johnson’s normal style of controlled writing, an effective blend of elegance
and bluntness, took an unusually aggressive turn in the pages of Opportunity not long
after the UNIA leader’s trial and conviction. More concerned with the psychological
causes and effects of the movement rather than with Garvey himself, Johnson deemed the
“grand result” of the UNIA’s program to be “the fleecing of hundreds of thousands of
poor and ignorant Negroes.” He found the public outpouring of both sympathy and
condemnation an interesting contradiction in that it paralleled the “psychology of the
white world,” itself “a mixture of contradictions and paradoxes.” The danger of
Garveyism, as Johnson saw it, rested with its unrealizable goals, and how it played on the
increased postwar hopes and aspirations of African Americans. The “balked desires”
and “repressed longings” of lower-class African Americans demanded an outlet that
Garveyism readily afforded. Johnson suggested that the dreams of Garvey’s followers
fostered a “mental relaxation” that was actually nothing more than “a black version of
that same 100 per cent mania that now afflicts white America . . . ,” manifested most
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clearly in the resurgence in the early 1920s of the Ku Klux Klan. In the absence of the
UNIA’s leader, Johnson warned that the sources of the discontent among lower-class
African Americans that galvanized their allegiance to Garveyism “must be remedied
effectively and now, or this accumulating energy and unrest, blocked off from its dreams,
will take another direction.” Johnson and other black professionals considered with some
concern exactly what “direction” that would be in the future, particularly in the hands of a
leader more dangerous than the blustering and essentially “harmless” Marcus Garvey.56
Although the imprisonment of its leader dealt a serious blow to the UNIA, it did not
spell a quick end to Garveyism. Even with his troubles of 1923, and as he appealed his
case in 1924, Garvey proceeded with plans to begin sending colonists to Liberia, the first
African state to join the League of Nations, for what he hoped would be “the brightest
chapter in the history of the Universal Negro Improvement Association.” The contempt
that Garvey felt for Americo-Liberians only made him more determined to succeed in
West Africa. In private he blamed Liberian political leaders for deliberately underdeveloping their country in order to preserve their own power, and for weakening the
hopes of Pan-Africanism through their shameless exploitation of Liberia’s native
population. Garvey’s plans to plant independent UNIA settlements in Liberia, develop
the republic’s resources, and to recognize the rights of natives, went far beyond the idea
of fundamental reform. If successful, Garveyism in Liberia meant nothing less than
revolution.57
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Garvey finally raised enough money from UNIA donations by 1924 to begin
preparations for the transport of settlers to Liberia. The rejection by the U. S. Congress
of an American loan in 1922 left Liberia destitute, but in no way diminished AmericoLiberian tenacity for guarding its political domain. Forewarned by the Americo-Liberian
elite that it would require the UNIA to accept only a severely restricted influence in the
nation’s internal affairs, Garvey shipped the first installment of materials for building a
group of camps in Cape Palmas, located in Maryland County at the southernmost point of
Liberia. A group of UNIA technical experts who arrived in Liberia before the shipment
of building supplies, however, were seized by customs officials and faced immediate
deportation. After viewing a copy of the Garcia report with its radical agenda, President
Charles King and other Americo-Liberian leaders had a sudden change of heart toward
the idea of organized settlements of Garvey loyalists in their country. Shortly after the
seizure of the UNIA experts, the Liberian consul general in Baltimore, Ernest Lyon,
issued a formal statement in July 1924 that banned any Garveyite from immigrating to
Liberia. Believing that France or Great Britain would use any pretext to annex Liberian
territory, President King, already in negotiations with Harvey Firestone, Sr., declared in
January 1925 that the republic had no intention of aligning itself with any movement like
Garvey’s that intensified “racial feelings of hatred and ill will.”58
The UNIA’s reversal of fortune in Liberia signaled an end to Marcus Garvey’s dreams
of a Back to Africa movement. Garvey claimed that President King changed his mind
only after the Firestone Plantations Company showed interest in acquiring some of the
same land promised to the UNIA. At the UNIA’s August 1924 convention in New York
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delegates from the Liberia mission characterized President King as a race traitor, and
blamed him for succumbing to pressure exerted by “powerful bullies” France and Great
Britain to head off the threat that Garvey’s brand of black nationalism posed to their own
African colonies. Most of all, Garvey accused his long-time opponent, W. E. B. Du Bois,
for spoiling his plans in Liberia. Convention delegates decried Du Bois as “the greatest
enemy of his race that God Almighty has ever made.”59
More than any other African American in the first decades of the century, Du Bois
articulated the interconnectedness of race, war, prosperity, and imperialism. For Du
Bois, competition between colonial powers France, Great Britain, and Germany for
imperial influence in Africa and elsewhere served as the main cause of World War I.
After struggling for years to advance his own Pan-African movement, Du Bois became
enthralled with Americo-Liberian leadership when he attended President King’s second
inauguration in January 1924, a moment that he considered the greatest in his life up to
that time. Du Bois felt wildly optimistic over what he perceived as the possibility of a
black utopia in Liberia, and later counseled President King on the benefits of reaching an
agreement with Firestone. Liberia could trust neither the French nor British, Du Bois
surmised in his primer to King, because “colored people of the British Empire have no
influence on imperial policies,” and “[c]olored people in France occupy positions of
influence but they have not yet learned to use their positions for the benefit of the colored
race.” On the other hand, investment by white Americans posed the “least danger”
because with it came a promise of fair treatment. Should any problems develop, the
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editor of The Crisis claimed without any basis in fact that “the Negroes of America,” just
then “beginning to understand and sympathize with Liberia,” had “enough political
power to make the government go slowly.”60
To be sure, all concerned parties—France, Great Britain, the U. S. State Department,
Firestone, and middle-class African Americans like Du Bois and Johnson—breathed a
sigh of relief at the UNIA’s failure in Liberia. Garvey, still clinging to the slim hope that
more negotiations might materialize in the future, chose not to go public with charges
that the Americo-Liberians subjected their tribal citizens to forced labor and slavery.61 If
he did so later, no one was listening.
Even as Marcus Garvey appealed his conviction on mail fraud charges and reacted to
his failure in Liberia in 1924, Charles S. Johnson and other members of the Talented
Tenth began charting a course altogether different from radical movements like the UNIA
with its black-nationalist agenda. Johnson’s duties with the Urban League multiplied
when he became the editor of Opportunity: Journal of Negro Life, which made its debut
in January 1923. The sleek monthly magazine, never a threat to equal or surpass the
circulation of the NAACP’s The Crisis, followed the traditional Urban League approach
of educating the public through scientific surveys aimed at improving life for African
Americans and fostering better race relations; before the American racial problem could
60

Guterl, Color of Race in America, 120; W. E. B. Du Bois, “World War and the Color Line,” The Crisis,
9 (November 1914), 28; W. E. B. Du Bois, “The African Roots of the War,” in David Levering Lewis, ed.,
W. E. B. Du Bois: A Reader (New York: Henry Holt, 1995), 650. Du Bois lobbied hard for the
appointment as President Coolidge’s Special Representative and Envoy Extraordinary and Minister
Plenipotentiary to Liberia. Du Bois first enlisted James Weldon Johnson to appeal to Coolidge on his
behalf, an attempt that failed. He then persuaded William H. Lewis, a lifelong Republican, to ask Coolidge
for the favor. See Skinner, African Americans and U. S. Policy Toward Africa, 492-97. David Levering
Lewis claims that in Liberia, Du Bois “came perilously close to imagining himself a pan-African proconsul
empowered to redirect the political course of the continent. No longer the result of a cynical White House
favor arranged at his own request by a powerful GOP stalwart, the mission to Monrovia took on
unprecedented historic and political valence as Du Bois moved among the Liberians.” Lewis, W. E. B. Du
Bois, 120 (quotations), 121. Chalk, “Du Bois and Garvey Confront Liberia,” 135-42.
61
Cronon, Black Moses, 135; Stein, World of Marcus Garvey, 218.

39

be solved, Urban Leaguers reasoned, it must first be understood, even at the cost of
avoiding the type of propaganda and protest that might attract a larger readership.
Throughout the 1920s the need to combat negative stereotypes of African Americans
stood out as a major concern in the pages of Opportunity.62 For his part, Johnson directed
surveys and reported his findings and recommendations in the new journal, albeit to a
much smaller number of readers than he would have wished. While Johnson never
believed that “interracial elitism” could solve every problem, a charge leveled by one
critic at the journal’s limited biracial audience, his decision to introduce black artists and
writers to the white world of New York publishing in 1924 nevertheless pushed
Opportunity in a more literary direction, and in the process helped launch the Harlem
Renaissance.63
The upsurge of public interest in black-themed novels and plays by white authors in
the early 1920s led Johnson to perceive that the time was ripe for maneuvering New
York’s white-dominated publishing firms into finally recognizing that African Americans
had literary abilities of their own. Claude McKay’s book of poetry, Harlem Shadows
(1922), and Jean Toomer’s experimental novel, Cane (1923), set precedents that Johnson
hoped to build on.64 By early 1924, after having lived in Manhattan for three years, he
felt confident enough in his networking skills to reach across racial lines in an attempt to
elevate the status of African Americans through the promotion of their own creative
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enterprises. In the process he and other black leaders hoped to deal a serious blow to the
myth of black inferiority. The arts, as perceived by Johnson, stood out as perhaps the one
avenue to success still relatively unrestricted by race in the technology-driven American
system of capitalism.65 Johnson encouraged black writers to transcend propaganda and
protest, and to work on their own terms based on their own experiences and
understanding of the human condition. Native New Yorker or southern sharecropper, it
made no difference to Johnson: the record of African American struggle and survival in
the United States held important individual meaning out of which truth and beauty could
be extracted. He conveyed the same message in later years, aiming it specifically at
young black Americans to ward off the curse of low self-esteem imposed by a society
that systematically belittled and excluded them.66
Johnson organized the now famous Civic Club dinner on March 21, 1924, as an
evening to celebrate the publication of There is Confusion, the new novel by Jessie
Fauset, literary editor of The Crisis. With a much more ambitious program in mind,
however, he exploited the event by inviting a number of black writers and white
publishers for introductory purposes, both to each other, and to the idea of the New
Negro as proclaimed in a speech by the literary-minded Howard University philosophy
professor Alain Locke. Nearly ten years earlier Locke presaged his concept of the New
Negro when he introduced the term “cultural pluralism.” In a modern society, Locke

65

Ann Douglas, Terrible Honesty: Mongrel Manhattan in the 1920s (New York: Farrar, Strauss and
Giroux, 1995), 323; Charles S. Johnson, “The New Frontage on American Life,” in Alain Locke, ed., The
New Negro: An Interpretation (New York: Arno Press and the New York Times, 1968; originally
published 1925), 278-98; Lewis, When Harlem Was in Vogue, 48, 90-91.
66
Fullinwider, Mind and Mood of Black America, 11-15, 119; Charles S. Johnson, “To Negro Youth,”
Opportunity, 6 (September 1928), 258; Charles S. Johnson, “The Problem and Needs of the Negro
Adolescent in View of His Minority Status: A Critical Summary,” Journal of Negro Education, 9 (July
1940), 344-53; Charles S. Johnson, “An Opportunity for Negro Writers,” Opportunity, 2 (September
1924), 199.

41

believed that cultural separateness could lead only to obsolescence. Cultural pluralism,
as both Locke and Charles Johnson envisioned, allowed African Americans to identify
themselves as a separate group yet be absorbed and accepted like everyone else in the
American system by taking pride in their own particular contributions and customs. As
the evening that marked the beginning of the Harlem Renaissance wound to a close, Paul
Kellogg, editor of Survey Graphic, informed Johnson that he wanted to highlight the new
black mecca of Harlem in an upcoming issue of his journal featuring the work of black
artists and writers. If the Civic Club dinner left invited guests like the NAACP’s James
Weldon Johnson and W. E. B. Du Bois in an upbeat mood, it left the normally reserved
and unflappable Charles Johnson on the verge of euphoria.67
The vibrancy of Harlem, particularly its artistic and intellectual milieu of the mid1920s, mesmerized Johnson and countless others, both black and white. A rooftop
photograph taken at a party for poet Langston Hughes in 1924 captured the camaraderie
and exuberance of the time and place. The closely aligned, smiling subjects of the group
photo included Hughes, Charles Johnson, sociologist E. Franklin Frazier, novelist and
physician Rudolph Fisher, and legalist Hubert Delany, young and confident black
professionals with enthusiasm to burn.68 While Harlem grew increasingly congested with
growing numbers of poverty-stricken African Americans far less appealing to
photographers than members of the Talented Tenth, it also offered a never-ending supply
of bootleg liquor and an unparalleled nightlife that defined the spirit of the Jazz Age. The
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neighborhood’s rollicking after-hours rent parties, though frowned upon and never
spoken of in polite society, often brought together the struggling and the successful, as
the likes of Duke Ellington or Fats Waller might drop in at three a. m. to liven things up
to a fever pitch.69
Out of sociological curiosity Johnson may well have attended a rent party or two, but
he in fact preferred to listen to traditional Negro spirituals, feeling that they best
exemplified the pain and hope of the slaves. As host or guest, he spent many formal and
sedate evenings at gatherings that included performances by black gospel singers.70 Yet,
Johnson liked his whiskey and soda; when an evening’s formalities proved too taxing, the
improvisation of the nearby clubs and cabarets occasionally lured him into the night
along with friends like Langston Hughes and others in his social orbit. Even if they
valued their health too much to attend many rent parties, Johnson and Hughes could still
swing by a club or cabaret and listen to the music of a young Louis Armstrong, newly
arrived from Chicago, or stagger down the street to hear Sidney Bechet belt out the
chorus of “House Rent Blues (The Stomp)” on his soprano saxophone. Most middleclass black leaders in Harlem never found jazz and blues genteel enough to warrant an
embrace, but the new musical forms—as independent as the age of modernity that they
helped usher in—hardly needed their promotion or stamp of approval.71
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In addition to the scientific surveys that he continued to direct for the Urban League
and publish in Opportunity, Johnson poured his energy into seeking out black literary and
artistic talent. As one who never wavered in his understanding of the staying power or
dictates of competitive capitalism, he beat The Crisis and Du Bois to the punch in 1925
when he used Carnegie funds to sponsor a literary contest in Opportunity. The
excitement generated by the contest placed Johnson in the spotlight, a position probably
as enjoyable for him as it was brief. There is no doubt that Johnson the competitor had a
healthy ego, but just as he neither expected nor received any special credit for his central
role in drafting The Negro in Chicago, he never sought the title of “entrepreneur” of the
Harlem Renaissance. Instead he remained quite content to defer to the brilliant Alain
Locke, the “press agent” for the New Negro, and to acknowledge his indebtedness to his
friend, bibliophile Arthur Schomburg, for keeping him abreast of comings and goings in
Harlem society.72
Many negative misconceptions have arisen over Johnson’s tactics and personality
during this period and, with little bearing in fact, have colored subsequent interpretations
of his character and leadership. To be sure, descriptions of Johnson as “manipulative”
and “ruthless” seem more applicable to the Americo-Liberians who would wish him dead
in 1930, and imply an underhandedness that conflicts with the moral and ethical code that
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he lived by, a product of his strict religious upbringing.73 Johnson undoubtedly reveled in
the excitement and competition of Harlem’s literary and intellectual atmosphere, and he
could be overzealous at times when it came to guarding talent that he had a hand in
discovering and nurturing. One of the visual artists promoted in Opportunity, Aaron
Douglas, whose work incorporated and celebrated African culture, recalled being
summoned to a meeting with Johnson. In an uncharacteristic tirade that shocked
Douglas, Johnson lashed out at the “patronizing attitude” of the NAACP’s Walter White.
Johnson was “furious” because he had intended to introduce Douglas to Mexican
illustrator Miguel Covarrubias at the Urban League’s annual party. Covarrubias had
expressed “mad” enthusiasm over one of Douglas’s Opportunity covers and wanted to
meet him. Johnson flew off the handle when he heard that White had a few days before
tried to arrange his own meeting between the two artists. Douglas, who moved to New
York because of Johnson’s encouragement and quickly rose to prominence, also recalled
that “many people . . . took credit for the things that [Johnson] had done,” and that “his
influence was so broad that it was hard to do anything that he hadn’t created, thought out
and . . . engineered.”74 Outspoken black author Zora Neale Hurston, who because of
Johnson’s intervention received a scholarship to Barnard, agreed with Douglas. Hurston
claimed that the Harlem Renaissance was the result of Johnson’s work, and that “only his
hushmouth nature has caused it to be attributed to many others.”75
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Behind the scenes is where Johnson always felt most comfortable and operated most
effectively. Typical of his approach was the way in which he dealt with a situation that
arose in the pages of Opportunity in 1925. This time, it was Walter White who was
angry over black writer Frank Horne’s negative review in Opportunity of The Fire in the
Flint, his novel about black “passing.” White protested privately to Johnson, claiming
that the criticism of his novel did not bother him nearly as much as the “inexperience and
lack of comprehension of the reviewer.” To pacify the NAACP leader, Johnson asked
White’s friend and protégée, black author Nella Larsen, to write a rebuttal, an
arrangement that led to a happy ending not always possible among egos in Harlem in the
1920s.76
One of the most damning, and wrongheaded, personal indictments of Johnson is the
assertion that his style was “more the pose of modesty than modesty itself.”77 In reality,
Harlem’s abundance of black talent in the 1920s humbled the social scientist. The
literary knowledge and intellect of Alain Locke, a Harvard Ph.D. and the first African
American Rhodes Scholar, certainly commanded Johnson’s respect. For many years
Johnson had revered the writing skills of NAACP stalwarts like Du Bois and James
Weldon Johnson, and as a fledgling poet himself he could only marvel at the work of his
friend Countee Cullen, who he hired as a staff member at Opportunity, and that of
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Langston Hughes and others. Moreover, the rarefied air occupied by African American
celebrities like singer Roland Hayes and the titanic Paul Robeson, who thrilled
theatergoers in a revival of Eugene O’Neill’s The Emperor Jones in 1925, and then went
on to perform his powerful renditions of Negro spirituals before international audiences,
left Johnson and other mere mortals breathless. Robeson in particular embodied
everything that Johnson could have wished secretly for himself. His own very modest
college football career cut short by a kidney injury, Johnson came to idolize the largerthan-life Robeson—Phi Beta Kappa, All-American running back, lawyer, singer, actor,
and political radical.78 Charles Johnson kept a low profile by choice during his years in
Harlem in the 1920s, painfully aware of his own limitations but proud of the recognition
of African American cultural achievement that swirled about a movement that he had
helped to create.
Whatever the extent of his personal role in the Harlem Renaissance, by 1927 Johnson
believed that the recent outpouring of creative work by African Americans had
established once and for all an independent black voice free of any hint of the need to
mimic whites; Renaissance work gave meaning to the African American experience and
made it intelligible to white Americans. In his introduction to Ebony and Topaz, an
anthology of black art, poetry, and prose, Johnson asserted with confidence that nothing
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could reverse the momentum that began two years earlier when Alain Locke’s anthology
The New Negro signaled the beginning of the movement.79
Within the next year, however, the Urban League’s diminished economic prospects
led Johnson to consider offers to leave New York and return to academia. When officers
of the Carnegie Corporation voted in 1928 to cut off funding that the Urban League
depended on to publish Opportunity and award cash prizes in its annual literary contests,
Johnson soon decided to accept an offer to direct the Department of Social Sciences at
Fisk University in Nashville, Tennessee.80 While the artistic merits of the Harlem
Renaissance have been a source of ongoing debate—critics have viewed the movement as
too traditional and optimistic as well as too beholden to voyeuristic white interests and
funding—the spirit of black creativity and the new appreciation of African art and culture
that it sparked left a distinct life-affirming imprint on the otherwise vacuous and
reactionary American landscape of the 1920s that white writers like Sinclair Lewis and
H. L. Mencken skewered so mercilessly.81
Indeed, the Harlem Renaissance helped to reverse the traditional way that African
Americans had viewed Africa. Influenced by long-standing negative stereotypes of
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backwardness and savagery, black Americans often felt embarrassed by contemporary
Africa. Through Protestant missionary organizations especially, many considered it their
moral duty to “civilize” and uplift their African brothers and sisters. The Harlem
Renaissance, however, offered a different perspective: black Americans, instead of trying
to remake Africans into a mirror image of themselves, could actually improve their own
lives through a new understanding and appreciation of African art and culture.82
The Renaissance did not automatically wither and die without Johnson’s
organizational and strategic skills; it endured in fits and starts for several years until
finally giving in to the crushing weight of the Great Depression.83 When Johnson left
New York for his new position at Fisk University in the fall of 1928, he carried with him
the same optimism that critics of the Renaissance have found so shortsighted. In fact, he
felt as much impatience for racial progress as any black American. Johnson understood,
like Park, Locke, Du Bois, and others, that racial inequality had no scientific basis. He
also understood that, irrational or not, racial discrimination affected virtually every aspect
of black life in the United States, rural or urban, southern or northern. His optimism
sprang from his sense of the “malleability of human nature” first recognized in his
undergraduate days at Virginia Union. Breaking down barriers that isolated African
Americans from mainstream society, as he tried to do in the Harlem Renaissance, was his
goal. Johnson believed that black isolation bred white contempt, and vice versa, the
problem manifesting itself most acutely in the area of economic competition. Although
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Johnson came to appreciate African art and culture during the 1920s, he felt that any
carryover of African influence in America was negligible; African Americans would
either sink or swim in the system of competitive capitalism.84
Instead of escaping into the mythical world that W. E. B. Du Bois created with his
idea of a racial soul, or into the equally nonproductive realm of Garveyism—both of
which led to militancy and separatism—Johnson felt, much like Booker T. Washington
had previously, that African Americans first had to accept the reality of their position
before they could change it. He applied specifically to African Americans what Harold
Stearns had suggested earlier in the decade to Americans in general: maturation as a
society required as a first step a “self-conscious and deliberate critical examination of
ourselves without sentimentality and without fear.” He also urged a new approach to
education grounded in real-life experiences that would allow African Americans to
master any sense of inferiority and compete with whites in a society undergoing constant
technological change and adaptation. For their part, whites needed to be educated about
black life; white ignorance led to stereotypical views, racial discrimination, and injustice
that damaged the very foundation of democracy.85
From the time that Johnson left Virginia in 1916 until he landed in Nashville in 1928,
experience had taught him that change was inevitable and adaptation to it paramount.
Having studied the impact of the Great Migration in the North, Johnson now prepared to
examine its effects on black southerners left behind in its wake. His departure from New
84
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York was a difficult one. In October 1928 he wrote from Nashville to Countee Cullen,
who had received a Guggenheim Fellowship for study in France and left Opportunity at
about the same time as Johnson, that “[p]ositively no worse days have been experienced
in my whole life than those last weeks” in New York. In addition to “a string of
conscious or unconscious difficulties” came so many “apparently sincere regrets” at his
and Cullen’s leaving that he “almost regretted the decision.” Then, shortly after arriving
“barehanded” in segregated Nashville, Charles, his wife Marie, and their three children,
had to overcome the “shock and utter depression” of having their Hudson automobile
stolen. The sociologist found it “strange” that Cullen had “left this dark murky scene to
wield a free pen” in Paris while he had stuck his head “deeper into it.” Hardly the
idealist, Johnson felt that much of the “business” that he had gone to the South “to see
and feel you could scarcely write lovely poems about.”86
In the 1920s, as Charles Johnson came of age both personally and as a scholar, black
and white Americans wrestled with changes in their society that disrupted the old order of
things. New definitions of blackness and whiteness, conflicting ideas on progress and
civilization manifested in the clash between Victorianism and modernity, and new
technologies that spearheaded the transformation to a mass consumer culture, caused
anxiety among many Americans. Those who took a positive view of the future, like
Johnson, embraced modernity and found hope for liberation in the new order.87
Although restricted from full participation in American society in the twenties because
of his skin color, Johnson was nevertheless a man of his times. He found new inventions
like the radio fascinating and he relished the freedom of movement that the automobile
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age provided. A voracious reader and promoter of the arts, he also liked photography,
motion pictures, and listening to phonograph recordings. Johnson took exercise
seriously—his addiction to nicotine notwithstanding—and played a fairly competitive
game of tennis. Middle-class and well educated, Johnson was exactly the type of African
American that political leaders in Liberia claimed that they most wanted to immigrate to
their country, but in fact scorned if they proved too ambitious once they had arrived.88
In Nashville, Johnson discovered much to his surprise that neither he nor Marie
missed New York as much as they had expected. Social life around the Fisk campus,
according to the cosmopolitan Johnson, was “rather congenial though lacking diversity,
except where this is created.” Although Johnson’s work restructuring the social sciences
department at Fisk, and his commitment to write the report for the National Interracial
Conference, which met in December 1928 in Washington, kept him extraordinarily busy,
he no doubt stayed abreast of developments in Liberia.89 But when he accepted President
Herbert Hoover’s invitation in December 1929 to serve on the League of Nations
commission to investigate allegations of slavery and forced labor in Liberia, he did so
without a firm grasp of the political or physical perils that awaited him. Before 1930, the
nearest that Johnson ever came to Africa was by way of an Aaron Douglas drawing or a
visit to Arthur Schomburg’s vast personal library of Africa-related books and
manuscripts.
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From a personal as well as a professional standpoint, no one in 1929 knew more about
the complexities of race relations in the United States than Johnson. But as to the inner
workings of American corporations or the federal government, he had no firsthand
experience. While Harvey S. Firestone and U. S. State Department officials involved
themselves deeply in Liberian affairs during the mid-twenties, Johnson was busy
conducting sociological surveys and promoting the Harlem Renaissance. Like a blind
cavefish swimming in the darkness, Johnson would have to rely on his instincts to
negotiate the labyrinthine world of Liberian politics. In that regard, however, he placed
himself on the same path already in use by Firestone and the State Department.
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CHAPTER 2
THE GENTLEMEN OF AKRON

Take away from us the motor vehicle, and
I do not know what would happen. The
damage would be more serious and lasting
than if our land were laid waste by an invader.
We could recover from the blowing up of New
York City and all the big cities on the Atlantic
seaboard more quickly than we could recover
from the loss of our rubber. That is how
important rubber is to us.
Harvey S. Firestone, Men and Rubber (1926)

Charles S. Johnson’s 1930 mission to Liberia, like so many aspects of his career from
the time that he left his native Virginia until he arrived at Fisk University, grew out of
circumstances shaped by the political, demographic, and economic sea changes of World
War I. For countless black Americans the Great Migration and the war sparked a
heightened sense of race consciousness that took form and direction in the New Negro
movement and the Harlem Renaissance. The prominence of Afro-Caribbean radicalism
in the rhetoric of Marcus Garvey and the growth of his UNIA made anti-colonialism an
integral part of black protest in the 1920s. Yet, after the war, many black Americans felt
that the idea of self-determination applied as much to their fight against second-class
citizenship at home as to any developments in international affairs.1
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The new, more assertive black attitude, highlighted by militant self-defense during the
1919 race riots, posed a threat to many white Americans. The resumption of immigration
after the war and the severe economic recession of 1920-21 raised white fears of
outsiders and Bolshevik-style revolution. Anxious white Americans responded with a
revamped version of the Ku Klux Klan that sought to protect Victorian values against the
rising tide of modernity. The new Klan cast its hatred not only toward African
Americans but also Jews, Catholics, and immigrants. Congress responded in 1924 with
the National Origins Act, which effectively cut off immigration from Africa, Asia, and
southern and eastern Europe.2 To be sure, American progress and prosperity in the 1920s
meant different things to black and white Americans, the only certainty being that change
in any direction would come in tension and in conflict.
At the international level, however, the United States emerged from the war as the
world’s foremost creditor nation, with unprecedented political prestige, economic power,
and cultural influence. Defeating the threat of Bolshevism in Europe and guaranteeing
the continued economic expansion of American business developed into interlocking
goals for a new group of Republican leaders who rose to power after the armistice.3 As
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Secretary of Commerce from 1921 to 1928, Herbert Hoover in particular charted the
course of American economic foreign policy in the 1920s. During and after World War
I, as chief architect of relief efforts in Europe, Hoover earned praise from every quarter
for his organizing genius and humanitarianism. European recovery and the vital issues of
war debts and repayment of American loans, Hoover and Republican allies like Charles
Evans Hughes and Henry Stimson believed, required peaceful change and international
cooperation, ideas that could best be implemented through Progressive reforms aimed at
enhancing productivity and efficiency. A soft-spoken Quaker and internationalist who
supported the creation of a League of Nations, Hoover urged private investment,
technical assistance, and the opening of new markets for American exports to insure
stability in the new postwar order that he hoped would depend more on bankers and
world trade than political and military might.4
Long before his work in European relief efforts brought him international fame,
Hoover had earned millions in mining and engineering; his business expertise made him
a top choice of President Warren G. Harding’s for a cabinet position in 1921. Many Old
Guard Republicans viewed Hoover as too much of a Progressive, and insisted that they
would accept him as commerce secretary only if Harding named Andrew Mellon as
treasury secretary. Hoover’s own conditions for accepting the job at Commerce required
that President Harding give him a voice in business, agriculture, labor, finance, and
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foreign affairs.5 Efficiency and expertise served as the new secretary’s guiding principles
in his corporate vision for the Department of Commerce. He believed that in the best
interests of American prosperity and international stability the function and goal of the
Department of Commerce should be to assist business leaders and expand American
trade. Secretary Hoover quickly transformed one of the department’s three organizing
bureaus, Foreign and Domestic Commerce, after lobbying for and winning additional
funding, both from Congress and from private citizens. Having established a worldwide
network of fifty Bureau offices to gather and disperse trade and tariff information
between importers and exporters, Hoover borrowed an idea from American corporations
that traded on the international market. He created specialized divisions within the
Bureau based on various commodities like steel, oil, and rubber, and nominated experts
from those fields to head them. As the 1920s progressed, the theory and practice of
cooperative capitalism that Hoover initiated at the Department of Commerce often
blurred the line between public and private in the new age of mass marketing and mass
consumerism.6
Hoover’s single-mindedness of purpose brought him into contact with a number of
kindred souls among American businessmen who shared his ideas on progress,
patriotism, and prosperity. One of them, Harvey S. Firestone, Sr., president of the
5

George H. Nash, The Life of Herbert Hoover: The Engineer, 1874-1914 (New York: Norton, 1983);
Perrett, America in the Twenties, 127-29; John Milton Cooper, Jr., Breaking the Heart of the World:
Woodrow Wilson and the Fight for the League of Nations (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2001),
50-51, 392-93; Joan Hoff Wilson, Herbert Hoover: Forgotten Progressive (Boston and Toronto: Little,
Brown, 1975), 79; William J. Barber, From New Era to New Deal: Herbert Hoover, the Economists, and
American Economic Policy, 1921-1933 (Cambridge and other cities: Cambridge University Press, 1985),
1-64.
6
Kendrick A. Clements, Hoover, Conservation, and Consumerism: Engineering the Good Life (Lawrence,
Kan.: University Press of Kansas, 2000), 9-40; Burner, Herbert Hoover, 161-84; Iriye, Globalizing of
America, 97. Foreign and Domestic Commerce was one of three organizing bureaus within the Department
of Commerce, the other two being Standards and Census. Brandes, Herbert Hoover and Economic
Diplomacy, 3-21.

57

Firestone Tire & Rubber Company based in Akron, Ohio, connected on many levels with
the commerce secretary, but most especially when it came to the need for efficiency and
for the United States to produce its own raw materials. If World War I made Herbert
Hoover famous, it also increased the public visibility of Harvey S. Firestone, and made
him anxious about possible future shortages of raw materials, especially crude rubber.7
In the new postwar era of economic globalization, Hoover and Firestone formed a close
working relationship founded on the unshakable belief that patriotic duty compelled them
to search out American “opportunities” abroad. Indeed, adherence to the creed of
economic nationalism eventually led Firestone to the jungles of Liberia, with the full
support of Secretary Hoover.
“This world, it seems, is full of trouble . . . ,” Harvey Firestone wrote in a letter to his
father during a difficult period early in his career.8 While Firestone certainly faced his
share of trouble in the form of patent disputes, labor strikes, and cutthroat competition,
his story was mostly one of success that paralleled and helped to shape American
economic growth in the twentieth century. Abrupt, obsessive, innovative, and sometimes
wildly erratic, Firestone established his own tire company in 1900, certain that his fortune
would come not from the clumsy, experimental automobiles of the age but from the
irreplaceable horse and buggy.
Born in 1868 on a farm in Columbiana, Ohio, Harvey Firestone considered his father,
Benjamin, as the best businessman he had ever known because, regardless of crop
failures or difficult economic times, he always made a profit at the end of the year. As a
7
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teenager, Harvey found buying and selling livestock more agreeable than farming,
eventually coming to view himself as an expert on horses. After high school, he traveled
to Cleveland for a three-month course at Spencerian Business College, and then became a
bookkeeper at a coal company, a job he quickly grew to hate. After rejecting another
bookkeeping job offered to him by his cousin, Clinton, who owned the prosperous
Columbus Buggy Company, Firestone set out as a traveling salesman. On the road his
products included vanilla extract, “Wild Rose Lotion” for chapped hands, and various
patent medicines that sold poorly and that he had no faith in from the beginning. “[Q]uite
unconsciously,” Firestone wrote, “I turned up the first principle of salesmanship—which
is, that you must thoroughly believe in what you have to sell.” After the rest of the
company’s salesmen quit and his boss went broke, Firestone swallowed his pride and
took the job as bookkeeper previously offered to him by cousin Clinton.9
Before long Clinton transferred Harvey to his buggy company’s Detroit branch, where
in the early 1890s the young bookkeeper showed more interest in sales than in tracking
debits and credits. Finally given a chance on the showroom floor to sell the luxury
carriages, Firestone thrived. The art of the deal became his raison d’être; it would remain
so for the rest of his life. With his savings he invested in horses and was soon selling
them in combination with Columbus carriages. Buyers who wanted a softer ride could
spend an extra $40 and have a set of solid rubber tires attached to the steel-rimmed
carriage wheels. But in the depression of 1893-94, fewer farmers could afford either new
rubber tires or a luxury carriage priced at three times that of competitors like Durant or
Nash, and sales slumped. In 1895 Harvey married Idabelle Smith, the daughter of “half
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patent” flour inventor George T. Smith. A year later the Columbus Buggy Company
went into receivership, leaving Firestone with nothing in the way of savings but filled
with a strong desire to start his own company in the belief that Americans would ride into
the future on rubber tires.10
For the first fifty years after Charles Goodyear invented the vulcanization process in
1839, whereby crude rubber could be toughened by being cut into small pieces, adding
sulfur, and then baking in an oven, items such as medical supplies and waterproof
clothing and shoes comprised most of the rubber goods manufactured in the United
States. Before Goodyear’s invention rubber goods had to be imported from South
America, where they were manufactured from latex tapped in the Amazon River basin.
By 1870 more than fifty rubber factories operated in the United States, all of them in
New England and New York. In that year, however, Dr. Benjamin F. Goodrich chose
Akron, Ohio, an important junction in the old canal system and later in rail traffic, as the
site to build the first rubber factory west of the Alleghenies. Within a year Goodrich,
Tew & Company began making fire hose, and in 1880, reorganized as the B. F. Goodrich
Company, a host of mechanical rubber goods, footwear, druggists’ supplies, and most
prominently, bicycle tires began flowing out of Akron.11
The bicycle craze of the 1890s reinvigorated the rubber industry even in the midst of
the worst depression that the United States had ever faced. Bicycle sales exceeded the
million mark by 1896 and demands for the recently developed single-tube pneumatic tire
10
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soared. Rubber tires for carriage wheels, the market that most concerned Harvey
Firestone, continued as a small part of the overall industry. Few of those involved in
making pneumatic tires for bicycles gave much thought to the carriage business. Tires
for carriages came in the form of long rubber strips with two internal wires running
throughout the entire length that attached to a specially made wheel rim, a system prone
to slippage, cutting, and other problems. Even fewer manufacturers recognized the
connection between pneumatic tires and the many experimental models for self-propelled
vehicles being designed in the mid-1890s. Early examples of automobiles, whether
powered by steam engines or electric storage batteries, were far too heavy to be
supported by single-tube bicycle tires. The popularity of bicycles notwithstanding, for
dependable transportation most Americans in the mid-1890s could envision nothing that
would ever replace the horse-drawn carriage.12
Convinced that any sensible American would prefer the softer carriage ride that rubber
tires promised, a jobless Harvey Firestone in 1896 persuaded a mortgage broker friend in
Detroit to consider going into business with him. The broker knew of a tire shop in
Chicago that had recently shut down operations, and the two men caught the first train
there in hopes of moving in for a quick kill. After a few days they brought in another
partner and, after agreeing to let Firestone borrow to pay for his share, bought the shop, a
former branch of the Victor Rubber Tire Company, of Springfield, Ohio, a major player
in the bicycle business. The new Firestone-Victor Rubber Tire Company was located
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only a few doors away from a rival, the Imperial Rubber Tire Company, an agent that
sold Kelly-Springfield tires. In the period of mergers and consolidation that followed the
inauguration of William McKinley as president in 1897 and the return of national
prosperity, Firestone and his partners jumped at an offer from Imperial to buy it out for
$15,000. News of President McKinley’s recent purchase of three new rubber-tired
carriages for the White House stables signaled American eagerness for a less bone-jarring
ride on cobblestone streets, and filled Firestone with optimism.13
As business boomed Firestone and his partners decided that the opportune moment
had arrived to merge with the powerful Rubber Tire Wheel Company, owned by Edwin
S. Kelly of Kelly-Springfield. With his internal wire patent and introduction of a new
and improved steel rim, Kelly had nearly monopolized the carriage tire business.
Firestone received an offer of $125,000 from Kelly to sell out his share of the two
companies, a sum that seemed fantastic at the time and that he quickly accepted. Had he
waited Firestone could have increased his profits, because Kelly had made another offer
of $250,000 without his knowledge. When Firestone demanded his share of the larger
sum his partners informed him that he had agreed to the lesser amount and could expect
nothing more, a harsh introductory lesson on the unforgiving nature of the business
world. Without legal recourse and fearing that he would be left penniless again,
Firestone accepted a settlement of a little less than $42,000 with the vow that never again
would he allow anyone else to control his fate. Still employed as a salaried manager,
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Firestone resigned while on vacation in Cleveland in 1899, determined to found his own
company.14
By the turn of the century Akron, Ohio, had emerged as the rubber manufacturing
capital of the United States. In the 1890s B. F. Goodrich faced its first serious local
competition after the founding of the Diamond Rubber Company. By 1900 both
companies were making limited quantities of solid rubber tires for automobiles, still
viewing with suspicion the pneumatic model introduced in France by Michelin in 1895.
Soon a total of eight rubber factories operated in Akron, including the Goodyear Tire &
Rubber Company, formed by John F. Seiberling and his brother, Charles, in 1898.
Pursuing his dream of founding his own company, Firestone understood that his future
lay in Akron and, with his wife and new son, Harvey, Jr., moved there in January 1900.15
Before selling out and leaving Chicago, Firestone had acquired a patent for a surer
method of fixing tires to the flared, standardized rims developed by Edwin Kelly. In
Akron, Firestone approached the Whitman & Barnes Manufacturing Company, makers of
“Easy” tires, with a business proposition. Because the “Easy” tire did not fit standardized
rims and Firestone’s did, he suggested that they offer him leases on their New York,
Chicago, and Boston stores, for exclusive manufacture of his tires. Although interested,
Whitman & Barnes hedged, preferring to concentrate on the promotion of their rubber
shoe pads for fire truck and ambulance horses. They instead offered Firestone a
management position and the promise to make tires under his patent and pay him on a
14
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royalty basis. Firestone accepted the offer and within months closed a deal on an option
for Whitman & Barnes’ tire department. A short time later, in the summer of 1900, a
group of Akron businessmen sought out Firestone to demonstrate their patented sidewire
device for a more secure tire fit that would work even on heavy commercial vehicles.
Firestone recognized immediately the new market possibilities, and soon the Firestone
Tire and Rubber Company was incorporated.16
Firestone’s promotion of the Perfect Side-Wire Tire went well enough the first year to
exceed the ability of his small work crew to fill orders, and he soon granted B. F.
Goodrich a license to manufacture and sell his product. Securing short-term loans and
selling stock occupied most of Firestone’s time until he acquired enough second-hand
machinery to begin manufacturing on a larger scale. Early in 1903 the Firestone Tire and
Rubber Company began turning out forty tires a day for both light and heavy vehicles.
The constant supply of rubber used by the company came from Brazil, still considered
the best available, and by necessity Firestone taught himself to determine the quality of
the various grades. In 1904 Firestone showed its first profits at about the same time that
other companies began making larger quantities of pneumatic tires for automobiles. The
number of registered automobiles in the U. S. had grown dramatically over the past few
years. Local automobile clubs also flourished, and prompted the Firestone Company to
advertise the advantages of its solid rubber tires, especially for carrying heavy loads.
Firestone ads reminded buyers that pneumatics were not the only tires that offered a more
comfortable ride, an idea already falling out of step with the times.17
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At the 1904 auto show Firestone viewed tire exhibitions that featured pneumatics, and
he soon realized that he would have to begin manufacturing them if he wanted to capture
his share of the new “pleasure-car” market. The development of a new mechanically
fastened tire, called the “straight-side,” provided Firestone with the opportunity that he
needed. The “straight-side” was an improvement over the old standardized “clincher”
type, a patent owned and guarded fiercely by the Rubber Goods Manufacturing combine.
To make “clincher” tires required a license, but when Firestone applied for one he
learned that suddenly none were available. In order to test the “straight-side” Firestone
bought a Maxwell automobile in New York, had it shipped to Akron, and then traveled in
it for seventy miles to his family’s homestead in Columbiana. In front of a gathering of
family and friends, many of whom had never seen an automobile before, Firestone and
his mechanic gave a demonstration of pneumatic tires that he recalled could have “been
taken as conclusive proof that we did not know anything about them.” A year of
experimentation, however, taught Firestone engineers quite a lot about pneumatics, and in
1905 the company prepared to market its new tires and rims.18
But as Firestone soon discovered, because of the clincher license, no market existed
for his product. In 1905 news circulated throughout the Akron rubber industry that
Henry Ford planned to build two thousand cars at his Dearborn, Michigan, factory and
sell them for the low price of $500 per unit. Ford, like Firestone, was an industry
outsider. Barred from joining the Association of Licensed Automobile Manufacturers, a
group that established a fixed rate for car sales to exclude any fly-by-night hucksters,
Ford identified with fellow maverick Firestone, one of the few businessmen with whom
he stayed on friendly terms. The two struck a deal and in 1906 the Ford Motor Company
18
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began rolling out four-cylinder Model N runabouts on two-and-a-half-inch Firestone
tires. By 1908, with orders for twenty thousand sets of tires to fit the new Ford Model T
as well as sales to other automakers like Maxwell and Peerless, Firestone had established
itself as one of the big four of the rubber industry, along with Goodyear, Goodrich, and
United States Rubber.19
The days when Harvey Firestone could walk through his small plant and celebrate
with workers by showing them the first check received as payment from Ford passed
quickly as the company grew. The profound growth of the auto industry in the following
years propelled Goodyear and Firestone, two firms that from the beginning specialized in
tire making, past rivals Goodrich and U. S. Rubber in production and market share. As
an entrepreneur Harvey Firestone matched the most successful of his competitors in
tenacity, risk taking, and ruthless cost-cutting methods. In 1910 Firestone bought twentythree acres of farmland in South Akron as the site of his company’s first major expansion
effort, an enormous four-story factory of steel and glass modeled on Henry Ford’s
imposing Highland Park auto plant. Now operating the most modern factory in the tire
industry, Firestone automated his production facilities with new machinery, continued
experimentation with new rims and tire designs, which included the introduction of the
innovative cross-tread system, and prevailed in legal suits over patent violations, cases
fought with a personal savagery that surprised other business leaders. In 1912 Harvey
and Idabelle Firestone, along with their four sons, moved into a new brick home
constructed in the middle of a sixty-acre estate. The Georgian-style home, modest by the
19
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standards of Akron millionaires, was christened Harbel Manor by the Firestone’s, a
contraction of the couple’s first names. Now joined inextricably with the auto industry in
general and Ford Motor Company in particular, the Firestone Tire & Rubber Company
underbid Goodyear for the largest original-equipment order of its day, and entered an era
of unprecedented growth, competition, and conflict.20
For Firestone, like other corporate leaders, time and its relation to productivity took on
added importance in the era of automation. Inspired by Frederick W. Taylor’s time and
motion studies—the kind of scientific management distrusted by more traditional
engineers—Firestone hired his own man with a stopwatch and sent him into the factory to
study workers as they built and finished tires. Already suspecting that the time studies
offered them nothing but trouble, machine operators and finishers responded angrily
when management limited their daily wages to $3.50. During the transition period from
handmade to machine-made tires, faster workers had become used to making as much as
$5.00 to $6.00 per day because of the company’s hasty and poorly thought out piece
rates. In February 1913 about one hundred and fifty unorganized workers walked out in
protest, initiating a seven-week strike that spread to other companies in Akron as well as
other cities in Ohio.21
The strike surprised Harvey Firestone, who at first showed a degree of sympathy
toward workers and their grievances. In his early days as a business owner Firestone had
prided himself on knowing the names of each of his employees; he still believed that his
factory offered the best working conditions in the tire industry. Within a few days of the
20
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walkout, however, Socialist representatives and organizers from the International
Workers of the World (IWW) rushed in to stake their claims, immediately alarming
business leaders fearful of the introduction of radical ideas into their ranks of workers.
Firestone and other executives in the rubber industry who flatly opposed union
organization hoped to quell the unrest by offering incentives to workers who stayed on
the job, and allowing those who had left to return without sanctions. But as the number
of striking workers grew and the IWW and Socialists grappled for control while failing to
articulate a set of demands, Firestone and other leaders coalesced into a united front that
refused to grant concessions.22
The stalemate between labor and management eventually led Ohio governor James M.
Cox to search for a compromise through the use of the state board of arbitration. State
senate hearings went badly for workers unable to mount convincing arguments against
their current working conditions and wage scales. Testimony by local business leaders,
including Harvey Firestone, swayed public opinion over to management’s side and
against the strikers. Representatives from the American Federation of Labor and the
newly formed Citizens’ Welfare League also worked to undermine the influence of the
IWW. After incendiary speeches by IWW organizers, a series of defeats in violent
clashes with police broke the spirit of the strikers, who before long began drifting back to
work.23
The labor strike cost Firestone very little in the way of financial loss or negative
publicity; his personal standing in the community could not have been higher. Nor did
the strike cause leaders in the Akron tire business to soften their views on organized
22
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labor. To be sure, Harvey Firestone’s need to stay in complete control only deepened as
his company grew. While some executives addressed high employee turnover rates and
the perceived threat of organized labor by discussing the idea of company unions,
Firestone followed the lead of Goodyear and took steps to ameliorate management’s
relationship with workers through the use of corporate welfare. With more than two
thousand employees by 1913, Firestone increased wages, improved medical care, offered
free life insurance, and encouraged worker investment in company stock. Recreation
facilities that included a large clubhouse, a park, and a baseball diamond were created to
boost morale, and workers were urged to air their grievances through a new personnel, or
“Industrial Service,” department. Not to be outdone by Goodyear Heights, the attractive
planned community across town, Firestone bought a thousand-acre tract of land and
designated it for future low-cost employee housing. By 1916 more than six hundred
workers had made a small down payment and moved into houses in spacious Firestone
Park, its winding streets arranged in the shape of the company logo.24
The struggle between labor and management served as only one of many day-to-day
problems that Harvey Firestone faced in the fast-growing and intensely competitive
Akron rubber industry. The demands for innovation, expansion, and filling orders for
Ford Motor Company at ever lower costs kept Firestone in a constant state of anxiety.
More than anything else, Firestone and other Akron rubber manufacturers worried about
the fluctuating price of rubber which, in 1910 for example, averaged over a dollar a
pound and reached a high of three dollars. Left at the mercy of a syndicate that
controlled the limited supply of high quality latex tapped mainly in the Para province of
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Brazil, tire makers felt an acute sense of helplessness and stress. Having to place orders
for crude rubber six months in advance caused financial headaches for Firestone; the
pressure of buying a year ahead of time was almost unbearable.25
With the successful development of synthetic rubber still decades away, the need to
integrate backwards toward the source of raw materials spurred Firestone and others in
the rubber manufacturing business to begin exploring the possibility of establishing their
own plantations of Hevea brasiliensis, the tree that yielded the highest quality industrialgrade latex. Hevea grew wild in the Amazon River basin, where labor and transport
problems made investment impracticable for American manufacturers, as Henry Ford
learned in his ill-fated attempt to establish plantations there in 1927. Rubber trees, which
include more than three hundred and fifty species that yield latex of lesser quality than
Hevea, need a warm, moist climate year-round in order to thrive. The ideal amount of
sun and heavy rainfall for Hevea cultivation occurs within a belt extending around the
world at latitudes of ten degrees north and ten degrees south of the equator. In South
America, parts of Brazil, Peru, Bolivia, and Venezuela fall within the rubber belt, and in
Africa a number of countries began exporting rubber of inferior quality in the 1800s.
King Leopold II forced natives to gather latex from wild rubber trees in the Belgian
Congo, while the first attempt at planting in Liberia began in 1910. In that year only nine
percent of the world’s latex came from the Far East, where Sumatra, Java, Malaya, and
Borneo had become home to transplanted Hevea. By the beginning of World War I,
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however, the Far East produced more than sixty percent of the world’s crude rubber
output, a dramatic shift that had its beginnings in India in the 1870s.26
In 1872 “loyal servants” of the Government of India commissioned a report that called
for Hevea and other rubber tree species to be introduced as a possible replacement crop
on blighted coffee plantations. The India Office dispatched Robert Cross and Sir Henry
Wickham to Central and South America to collect specimens and issue a report on the
necessary climatic and soil conditions. Hevea seeds smuggled out of Brazil by Cross and
Wickham eventually found their way in 1876 to the Botanical Gardens at Kew near
London. After experiments in cultivation, botanists at Kew shipped seedlings to Ceylon,
where planters had forsaken any hope of ever again making a profit from coffee, a market
that soon shifted to Brazil and weakened that country’s stranglehold on natural rubber
production. Successful tapping of mature rubber trees on plantations in Ceylon led to the
transplanting of Hevea to the Netherlands East Indies, where in 1910 the U. S. Rubber
Company became the first Akron-based manufacturer to establish its own plantation
when it purchased eighty thousand acres of land in Sumatra for the cultivation of five
million trees. But by 1913 most rubber plantations, including those in the Netherlands
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East Indies, were British-owned, and London emerged as the world’s central buying
market.27
The establishment of rubber plantations required huge capital investments in land,
labor, and research; allowing adequate time for rubber trees to develop eliminated any
possibility of turning a quick profit. When full grown, Hevea trees reach a height of
more than sixty feet with a trunk circumference of eight to ten feet. Growing rail straight
as much as six feet in the first year the trees bloom with pale flowers each August. A few
months later pods appear with three speckled seeds that resemble nutmegs. When ready
the outer coverings of the pods burst loudly and spray the seeds in all directions. Rubber
planters found that trees needed about five years of growth before measuring the
necessary eighteen inches around at a point eighteen inches from the ground to be ready
for tapping. Planters also understood that tapping demanded a certain degree of skill on
the part of workers in order to avoid the kind of damage done in the Amazon, where
careless latex collectors damaged or killed many trees by cutting too deeply into the
cambium. Tapping began in the early morning hours when latex, the milky liquid
secreted to heal wounds in the tree’s outer bark, flowed most freely. After cutting a
narrow strip of bark diagonally halfway around the tree deep enough to activate the flow
of latex but shallow enough not to reach the sap in the cambium, workers would insert a
small spout at the lowest point of the incision and place a cup underneath for collection
that took place later in the morning. Each successive day workers would slice away
another strip of bark one-twentieth of an inch wide. Processing, storing, and transporting
crude rubber involved a costly network of laborers and equipment on a scale that few
27
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manufacturers in Akron had the wherewithal to consider realistically before World War
I.28
By 1914 the United States imported more than half of the world’s crude rubber.
When war broke out in Europe in August of that year, Harvey Firestone’s company had a
three-month supply of raw materials. Already nervous because of price fluctuations,
Firestone hurriedly cabled his buyer in Singapore, contacted London, and tried to make
connections in the Dutch East Indies. In a two-week period crude rubber prices rose from
seventy-two cents a pound to $1.15. Then, in November 1914, the British imposed an
embargo to keep rubber imports out of the hands of its enemies. Firestone found the
resulting haphazard increases and decreases in tire prices maddening. Still, his company
did $19 million in business in 1914, with profits of more than $3 million.29
Shortly after Great Britain lifted its embargo in January 1915 contingent on an
American promise not to allow any re-exports to Germany, Firestone signed a contract
with Ford to produce at least forty percent of its tires. By the end of the year the value of
motor vehicles in the war effort, especially trucks, became abundantly clear. Trucks
moved large numbers of Allied troops to the front with an ease unmatched by horsedrawn wagons or clogged railways. The German military attempted to use trucks for
troop and supply transport as well but had a more difficult time, owing to a lack of
replacement tires. In the United States the price of horses shot up as the Allies bought
them to replace battlefield losses. As a consequence American farmers, reluctant to
purchase automobiles before the war because of the high initial cost, became more
28
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willing to invest in a new Model T. Now with almost four thousand employees under his
command, Firestone looked ahead to another profitable year.30
In 1916, as the new president of the Rubber Club of America, it fell to Firestone to
uphold the U. S. guarantee to guard against crude rubber falling into the hands of the
Germans, a responsibility carried out with only one notable exception. The wartime
dearth of available ships caused a decline in imports, and Firestone called for investment
in an expanded merchant marine. He also began his first serious exploration of investing
in his own rubber plantation after Goodyear purchased twenty thousand acres of land in
Sumatra. Reports indicated the desirability of a river valley in Mindanao, the
southernmost island in the Philippines, where Firestone wanted to plant Hevea on fifty
thousand square miles of land. After a public speech in which he cited rubber as the most
important commodity in the world, Firestone learned that during the administration of
Theodore Roosevelt, Congress had limited land acquisition in the Philippines to only
twenty-five hundred acres. Defeated for the moment on that front, Firestone profits
nevertheless increased in 1916, as did his labor force, climbing to a total of eight
thousand. With the opening of Firestone Park and the new clubhouse, as well as
generous stock sales to workers, the company president viewed his “employee happiness”
program as a successful alternative to union organization, one ready to meet any future
demands in a seller’s labor market.31
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The migration of workers to Akron during the war swelled that city’s population and
resulted in a housing shortage that manufacturers met with temporary “villages” that
resembled the “tent cities” of a military base. The number of rubber workers, which
numbered about 15,000 in 1914, grew to an estimated 73,000 by 1920. The city’s
population of 69,000 in 1910 mushroomed to 208,000 ten years later. Italians, Russians,
Greeks, and Austrians displaced central Europeans as the dominant immigrant groups,
while Akron’s black population grew from one to three percent, the largest black increase
in any Ohio city. Still, only a few hundred African Americans found something other
than janitorial jobs in rubber factories. Roman Catholic and other churches grew in
number during the war boom, as did saloons, gambling halls, and brothels. In the frenzy
of war production and full employment, labor unions failed to make any headway in
Akron, where the influence of Socialist organizers waned during the peak years of 19171920.32
When the United States entered the war on the side of the Allies in the spring of 1917,
Harvey Firestone offered President Woodrow Wilson the use of his “factory
organization” for government service, and proclaimed confidently that the rubber
industry stood ready to respond to any demands that might be placed on it. Government
contracts soon poured in, covering everything from wheels for artillery pieces, solid
rubber truck tires, boots, gas mask parts, observation balloons, and a host of other
military necessities. Two-thirds of a record crop of crude rubber found its way to the
United States, where the government soon placed it on its list of licensed commodities
with a price fixed at sixty-eight cents a pound. Re-elected as president of the newly
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renamed Rubber Association of America, Firestone was asked by the War Industries
Board to oversee its crude rubber division, a position that only enhanced the tire
executive’s public image. In the role of superpatriot he led “Preparedness” programs and
promoted Liberty Loan drives. Unused Firestone property was plowed and hundreds of
war gardens planted. Illustrated pamphlets outlining the war garden idea were then
distributed to manufacturers across the United States, a move that brought praise from
Federal Food Administrator Herbert Hoover. The widespread and effective use of
propaganda during the war made a strong impression on Harvey Firestone, who became a
master of such tactics in the 1920s in his fight against Britain’s rubber restriction scheme,
and in his efforts to deflect criticism against his foray into Liberia.33
In order to benefit fully from the economies of scale accessed by construction of his
first factory, Firestone built a second plant in 1917 devoted solely to the manufacture of
tires for Ford. Now on an eight- rather than a ten-hour workday, the company also
employed large numbers of women for the first time. By the end of 1917 Firestone made
the switch to the production of the new and better-wearing cord tires to replace the old
square-woven fabric type, prevailed in a tire-machinery lawsuit initiated by rival Frank
A. Seiberling of Goodyear, and saw his company’s sales increase by a remarkable
seventy-one percent to more than $61 million. Bothered by high employee turnover rates
and absenteeism, Firestone borrowed a sociological technique that Charles S. Johnson,
then in Mississippi studying the dynamics of the Great Migration, might have advised.
He asked his most trusted subordinate, chemist and future company vice president John
33
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W. Thomas, to form a group of investigators to gather life histories from new employees.
Many of the recent arrivals had left their one-mule farmsteads in Kentucky or West
Virginia only to pay high rents to live in attics or storage sheds, or be evicted from rented
homes in Akron that owners had decided to convert into rooming houses. After the
investigators established a clear link between overcrowding and absenteeism, Firestone
persuaded Goodyear and Goodrich to invest with him and create the Akron Home
Owners Investment Company, a group that met with modest success in building new lowcost houses. Labor and housing problems notwithstanding, company profits increased
considerably over the next few years, reaching a high point in 1919. Neither the upsurge
of race riots in the United States in that fateful year nor the threat of Bolshevism in
Europe kept sales from totaling more than $91million, with profits of over $9 million.34
The reciprocal relationship between government and business fostered by American
entry into World War I not only elevated the Firestone Tire & Rubber Company to new
heights in sales and profits but also magnified the public visibility of its chief executive,
something that he welcomed and nurtured. Already with a million dollar advertising
budget, Firestone went to great lengths to showcase the dependability of his products,
whether it meant spending extra funds to develop tires that would perform better in time
trials at the Indianapolis Motor Speedway, or going on a nationwide tour to promote
shipping by truck, a tire market that his company dominated.35 In the heady years of
1918-19 Firestone found that even his attempts to escape the pressures of business for a
few weeks with a vacation generated news that helped his company’s public relations.
His camping trips with Henry Ford and Thomas A. Edison became legendary. Annual
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events that began in 1918 and continued until 1924 when throngs of photographers and
cameramen finally ruined the experience, the camping trips served to connect Firestone
both to the average American and to those who had transformed the world that they lived
in.36
News of the camping trips fascinated the American public. After meeting at a
predetermined location, the group of campers—often including wives and others—would
take off in a small caravan of chauffeured automobiles on backcountry routes selected
and kept secret by Edison. Firestone was put in charge of the commissary, a task that he
carried out with the help of a chef who presented his creations on fine linen and china at
campsites lighted with electricity from a storage battery, one of Edison’s many
inventions. Henry Ford, described by Firestone as a “beneficent human force,” served as
chief mechanic. Firestone especially valued his private conversations with Edison, who
liked “roughing it” and ordered all the men in the group not to shave for the entire trip.
During one such conversation a casual allusion to rubber led Edison to deliver an
impromptu discourse that revealed he knew more about the subject than either Firestone
or his company’s team of chemists. Henry Ford, in moments when he was not scouting
streams and rivers and explaining how they could be dammed for waterpower, enjoyed
climbing trees and challenging the others to footraces. After dinner he would
occasionally launch into anti-Semitic tirades that placed blame for all of the world’s
financial, economic, and social problems on Jews. When Ford repaired a luxury car
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belonging to an obviously wealthy—but apparently non-Jewish—businessman at a public
campsite, the man insisted that the industrial giant accept payment of a few dollars
because he appeared needy. For a salesman with little technological or mechanical
knowledge, being on a first name basis with the iconic Ford and Edison gave Firestone a
stature that others in the Akron rubber industry could not boast.37
In the first months of 1920 business continued much as it had throughout 1919, giving
Firestone little cause to worry. Even if company inventories overflowed with rubber
purchased months before at more than three times its early 1920 market value of fifteen
cents a pound, the government had lifted wartime constraints on production and
automakers predicted their biggest year ever. The number of Firestone employees
peaked at nearly twenty thousand. But long-staple cotton from Egypt, used to make cord
tires, came into short supply and jumped from $1 to $2.50 a pound, causing tire prices to
rise and sales to stall. By midyear sales declined further, yet not enough to make
Firestone change his plans for a three-month family vacation in England beginning in
July. While the tire business picked up a bit in August, farm prices dropped, industrial
buying slowed to a crawl, and retailers cancelled orders at an alarming rate. As the
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national economy sputtered and then sank into a severe recession, urgent cables from
Akron persuaded Firestone to sail for home.38
Upon his return from England Firestone’s company faced indebtedness of more than
$43 million. In New York Firestone met with his executives and assured them that he
would find a way out of the present trouble even if it meant offering his personal
fortune—all in company stock—to stave off bankruptcy. After a weekend of doing
chores and thinking at the family farmstead in Columbiana, Firestone reached a decision
on how to combat the recession. He realized that he lacked the creative genius of a Ford
or Edison but that he did one thing extraordinarily well: sell tires. He summoned his
branch managers to Akron and announced his plan of action. In conjunction with a
massive advertising campaign the price of Firestone tires would be cut by twenty-five
percent, a move that inflicted even more financial harm on Akron competitors, who
languished for another month before also slashing prices. Firestone sales, however,
showed an immediate upsurge.39
The next step toward stabilization included thousands of job cuts, and Firestone
stressed the need to save additional money by curbing expenditures across the board.
Henry Ford, after a meeting with Firestone, decided to follow suit and lower the price of
his cars. He later promised Firestone sixty-five percent of Ford Motor Company business
orders. During the financial crisis Firestone preached efficiency with a religious zeal, a
message that failed to sway some nonbelievers in his company. He wrote in a letter to
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Ford: “Just yesterday I let my superintendent go . . . . I have reached the point where
there is no man around our place, no matter how big, that we cannot get along without if
he does not get into line with our policy.” Although Firestone tried to intervene with
bankers on behalf of rival Frank Seiberling, Goodyear went into receivership in 1921,
and Goodrich and U. S. Rubber struggled to meet high interest rates on short-term loans.
The Firestone company, especially because of its strong market share of the fast-growing
truck tire business, rebounded quicker and avoided the loan problems of its competitors.
In fact, by 1924 Harvey Firestone owed the banks nothing. The company showed no
profits at the close of 1921, but when the recession ended Firestone had taken over first
place in Akron tire production.40
No sooner had business rallied and started to return to normal than another economic
demon confronted Firestone. In 1922 Great Britain adopted the Stevenson Rubber
Restriction Act, understood by Harvey Firestone and Secretary of Commerce Herbert
Hoover as an inchoate evil that threatened the long-term health and well being of the
United States. In Firestone’s mind, the very idea of limiting supplies and manipulating
prices represented a conspiracy of the worst sort that the American public would reject
once they understood its harmful effects. Indeed, over the next few years, his opposition
to the Stevenson Act turned into a personal crusade.41
The recession and drastic decline in rubber prices in 1920 left British planters with
enormous stockpiles of raw materials unwanted by financially strapped Akron tire
manufacturers. With millions of acres of Hevea trees now mature and producing record
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crops, some of the largest planters—and leaders on the London Stock Exchange—had
paid cash dividends of nearly one hundred percent over the previous nine years without
saving any of the surplus. By the end of 1920 their costs per pound exceeded the market
price of crude rubber. Around the same time that Harvey Firestone decided to unload his
overstocked tires by lowering prices, British planters agreed voluntarily to reduce their
production of latex for a year in hopes that limited supplies would result in a jump in
prices.42
The voluntary agreement, however, had only a marginal effect on the cost of rubber.
With its expiration late in 1921, the British Rubber Growers Association turned for help
to Winston Churchill, Secretary of State for the Colonies. Churchill appointed his
financial adviser, Sir James Stevenson, to chair a parliamentary committee of inquiry
composed primarily of association members worried about the future of their plantations.
The committee’s recommendation, not surprisingly, called for stabilizing the price of
crude rubber by regulating and limiting the tonnage exported. Churchill, soon to vacate
his position after a Liberal Party defeat by the Tories, urged Parliament to accept the
Stevenson Act not only because of its salutary effect on the British colonies and the rate
of exchange but also as an important means for paying the nation’s war debt to the United
States. Understanding the need for solidarity to make Stevenson’s plan succeed in the
long run, Churchill lobbied Dutch planters in the Netherlands East Indies to join in but
they recoiled at the idea of any form of restriction. Still, when the Stevenson Act went
into effect in November 1922, crude rubber prices rose immediately from fourteen to
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thirty-seven cents a pound, a development that alarmed and angered Harvey Firestone
and Secretary Hoover.43
By 1923 American manufacturers consumed seventy percent of the world’s crude
rubber production, an amount so large that even a one-cent increase per pound translated
into extra yearly costs in the millions. The Firestone Tire & Rubber Company alone used
more than ten million pounds of latex every month. Harvey Firestone, unlike other
members of the Rubber Association of America who welcomed the idea of stabilization,
worried most that the Stevenson Act would become permanent, forcing prices to everhigher levels. Artificial constraints on exports, Firestone believed, ran afoul of market
demands, and could undermine the security of the United States in case of a national
emergency. Moreover, he felt that an increase in the price of rubber was in reality a tax
that could only end up penalizing American consumers. Firestone declared that no
government had the “moral right” to authorize such a “monopoly,” and that the time to
break it up was “now.”44
Initially, Firestone considered asking the U. S. Government to issue a protest to Great
Britain over the Stevenson Act, a plan that the Rubber Association of America
discounted. Instead, the association asked for and received assurances from British
rubber growers that they would abide by the rules of fair play, an anemic response that
outraged Firestone. He next toyed with the idea of forming a $100 million plantation
investment company, and urged British rubber manufacturers—ignored by Stevenson and
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less than enthusiastic about his scheme—to demand repeal of the act. By this time,
however, Firestone had friends in high places and enlisted their help in his fight.
Firestone had known President Warren G. Harding since his days as lieutenant governor
of Ohio, and his acquaintance with Secretary of Commerce Herbert Hoover dated from
World War I. With their help and that of Senator Medill McCormick of Illinois,
chairman of the Foreign Relations Committee, Firestone called on Congress to
appropriate funds for a scientific survey to identify new areas where Americans could
produce their own supplies of crude rubber.45
As soon as Secretary Hoover announced his support for the survey, Firestone launched
into a national campaign with the slogan “America Should Produce Its Own Rubber.” To
anyone who would listen he denounced foreign restraint on trade and trumpeted the
benefits of American-owned rubber plantations. But his target audience, the growing
number of American automobile owners, showed little interest as long as the price of
tires continued to drop. So Firestone invited leaders from the automobile and rubber
industries to a conference in Washington, D. C., in February 1923 to get his message out.
The Rubber Association of America, increasingly irritated with Firestone, advised its
members not to attend. On the second day of the conference, after speeches by Senator
McCormick and Secretary of Agriculture Henry Wallace, word came that Congress had
appropriated $500,000 for the survey. As Firestone continued his speaking tour in the
weeks that followed, the Rubber Association began its own publicity campaign to stifle
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his alarmist cries, described as bordering on “hysteria.” Indignant at the insult, Firestone
resigned from the association.46
Important technological developments continued in Akron even as Firestone fought
his pitched battle against the Stevenson Act. A major breakthrough came in 1922 when
Firestone introduced new “gum-dipped” cords, which more than doubled tire mileage.
More significantly, gum-dipping provided the additional strength that allowed engineers
to next create the “balloon” tire, which revolutionized the industry. The balloon,
marketed in 1923, replaced the narrower and much less forgiving high-pressure tire; it
offered a more comfortable automobile ride because of the addition of an air chamber
that required lower pressure. The larger width of balloon tires also required the use of
one and a half more pounds of rubber per unit, an important development in light of the
Stevenson Act’s restriction quotas. Double-page color ads in The Saturday Evening Post
announced the new tires and Firestone lecturers advised dealers on how to make the
necessary changeovers to wider rims, a service offered free to the public. In the new era
of improved roads automobile sales continued to climb and the balloon tire became the
industry standard.47
Before completion of the federal survey on new rubber lands, Firestone initiated his
own series of investigations. Early in 1923 he persuaded his friends Ford and Edison to
begin exploring possibilities for creating American sources of rubber. At his winter
home in Fort Myers, Florida, Edison undertook experiments with various plants that he
46

Wolf and Wolf, Rubber, 225-26; Lief, Firestone Story, 147-51; Lief, Harvey Firestone, 233; Harvey
Firestone, Jr., “’Americans Should Produce Their Own Rubber,’” in Firestone, Romance and Drama of the
Rubber Industry, 74-76.
47
Lief, Harvey Firestone, 193-200; Lief, Firestone Story, 137-43; Babcock, History of the United States
Rubber Company, 175-76; Nevins and Hill, Expansion and Challenge, 396-97; Allen, House of
Goodyear, 76-77. Emblazoned across the top of Firestone’s double-page ad for balloon gum-dipped cords
was his motto “America Should Produce Its Own Rubber,” and a reproduction of his distinctive signature.
The Saturday Evening Post (April 12, 1924), 108-9.

85

hoped might produce latex on the North American continent, and Ford began eyeing the
Tapajóz Plateau in Brazil. Firestone, still desirous of gaining a foothold in the
Philippines, sent his manager from Singapore, along with a small staff, to report on
conditions there in May 1923. The group found climatic and soil conditions excellent,
but the independence movement had destabilized the political situation and undermined
any chance of reforming land laws. Firestone insisted that “capital must have assurance
that it will be properly protected,” at best a shaky proposition in the Philippines. Surveys
of Mexico, Guatemala, and Panama indicated either similar degrees of political unrest or
problems with fielding an adequate labor supply. For all of his expenditures and sense of
urgency, Firestone came away empty-handed in his first efforts to locate a suitable area
for new plantations.48
In October 1923 Firestone turned his attention to Liberia after receiving some
intriguing information from Mark Felber, his public relations representative in
Washington with an office in the Munsey Building. Felber informed Firestone that he
had met with Walter F. Walker, who had lived in Liberia for sixteen years and served
there as Secretary of the Treasury from 1917 to 1920. “He is a man of dark complexion,”
Felber wrote, “a native of Alabama and very brilliant, especially considering the fact he is
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of the negro race.” Walker had already consulted with State and Commerce department
officials and spoke highly of agricultural conditions in Liberia, where “you could get
practically anything you desired” and “the first big concern could have a monopoly.”
President King, according to Walker, “has for some time leaned to British interests but
now seems to have had a change of heart and is perfectly willing to cooperate with
American interests in an endeavor to put Liberia on the map again.” Walker reminded
Felber that the Colgate Company, the only corporation then actively engaged in Liberia,
dealt in palm oil and had no stake in the crude rubber business.49
Firestone, his curiosity aroused by Walter Walker’s salesmanship, soon cabled
Solomon Porter Hood, the American Chargé ďaffaires in Liberia. Hood’s favorable
report prompted Firestone to begin assembling a survey team for a trip to the black
republic. He summoned Donald A. Ross, a Scotsman with experience in Malayan rubber
cultivation, and placed him in charge of the expedition. Next, Firestone selected his
trusted personal secretary, William D. Hines, a former newspaperman then running the
company’s public relations office, to assist Ross.50 In December 1923 Ross and Hines,
with letters of introduction from Walter Walker, arrived in the seaside capital of
Monrovia, a town with a population of no more than seven or eight thousand—the
Liberian government had never conducted a census. Because of a formidable sandbar
that blocked Monrovia’s natural harbor, ships docked a mile or so offshore and
49
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disembarking passengers had to be lowered into surfboats. Kru oarsmen, renowned for
their maritime skills, would then row the new arrivals through punishing ocean waves to
the waterfront, or Waterside, a native community of shacks at the foot of Cape Mesurado,
the high bluff upon which settlers founded Monrovia. A climb along a winding path led
up to government offices on Ashmun Street, one of the black republic’s two paved roads.
Among the rundown houses with rusted rooftops of galvanized iron, visitors often noted
that the architectural use of columns and wide verandas gave Monrovia the appearance of
a small town in the American South. Only one automobile, a Ford Model T owned by
President King, could be found in the entire country.51
In addition to Liberia’s ideal weather conditions for crude rubber cultivation—hot, dry
seasons interspersed with months that produced an annual rainfall of more than two
hundred inches along the coast—a fifteen-mile trip inland from Monrovia gave Ross and
Hines even more cause for optimism. There they inspected the Mount Barclay plantation
with its two thousand acres of mature Hevea trees overgrown with bush but ready for
tapping. A company owned by British colonial author and entrepreneur, Sir Harry
Johnston, began developing the Mount Barclay plantation in 1910 but abandoned it
during World War I, whereupon the Liberian government took control of it. Ross saw
immediately that leasing Mount Barclay would provide Firestone with an ideal laboratory
for experimentation with Hevea.52 In a country without motor vehicles and nothing more
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than footpaths for roads, Ross and Hines next searched for sites close to navigable
waterways. They determined that land near the Du River, in thick jungle about forty
miles from Monrovia, could be cleared and brought into plantation use. Another site on
the Cavalla River in Maryland County, two hundred and forty miles southeast of
Monrovia, also appeared promising. The surveyors took it for granted that Liberia’s
native population, estimated anywhere between 500,000 and one million, could easily
provide more than enough laborers for plantation work. Shipping to and from Liberia, at
only half the distance of the Far East, would save Firestone time and money. Ross’
report to the company president could not have been received more positively.53
In the spring of 1924, as Harvey Firestone began making plans for what he hoped
would be his company’s first major overseas development, Americo-Liberian leaders
found themselves at a crossroads. During World War I, Liberia’s already weak economy
suffered a serious blow when German and British shipping companies curtailed their
import and export trade with Monrovia. Liberia’s decision to side with the Allies in 1917
led to the expulsion of German traders who for several decades had been responsible for
much of the nation’s commerce. Crippled by the loss of customs revenues, the republic
defaulted on a 1912 loan that had its roots in the recommendations made by Emmett J.
Scott and the Taft commission.54
In 1912 France, Germany, Great Britain, and the United States formed an international
receivership to administer a private loan of $1.7 million, and to provide oversight for its
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repayment with interest, scheduled for completion in 1952. An American General
Receiver along with a group of financial advisers—positions designated by the President
of the United States and submitted to the Liberians for approval—were placed in charge
of the collection of customs revenues in the black republic. Also, three African American
military officers, led by Colonel Charles Young, were designated to reform the Liberian
Frontier Force, the poorly trained militia created a few years earlier by President Arthur
Barclay to guard against boundary encroachments and to bring law and order to unruly
natives in the hinterland. Colonel Young discovered that the Frontier Force, placed in
1911 under the command of district commissioners with almost unlimited power and
very little supervision, had been unpaid and unfed for months. As a consequence,
soldiers wreaked havoc on natives, stealing their food, taking women and children as
“pawns,” and forcing men to flee from their villages into the bush. In 1915, an uprising
in Maryland County by the Kru—from the beginning the most rebellious of Liberia’s
native tribes—had to be put down with the help of an American gunship. The Kru revolt
led the U. S. State Department to scold the Liberians and to issue demands for a host of
reforms, in particular the adoption of an “open door” policy.55
In 1921 President King traveled to the United States and lobbied for a $5 million loan
to bail out his government from bankruptcy. After prolonged negotiations, the State
Department offered to back the loan if Liberia accepted a “Finance Commission”
composed of twenty-two Americans with extraordinary powers to oversee the republic’s
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administration of native and military affairs, and to take control of nearly all government
expenditures. President King accepted the stringent conditions but the U. S. Congress
voted against the loan in 1922. Afterward, King attempted to institute a number of
reforms and flirted with Marcus Garvey’s UNIA as a quick fix to his country’s economic
woes. Finally understanding that Garvey’s plans called for empowering Liberia’s tribal
citizens, a course most harmful to Americo-Liberian self-preservation, King turned his
back on the UNIA in 1924 and agreed to pursue an “open door” policy toward foreign
trade and investment, one of the reforms that the U. S. State Department had insisted on
in 1915 and again in 1921 as Liberia sought its American loan. Most urgently, French
encroachment on disputed territory along the border with Ivory Coast had created a crisis
that Liberian leaders believed could only be ended by American intervention.
Welcoming a large American corporation, King felt, could only enhance his position visà-vis the State Department in his protests over French boundary violations. The choice
that King had to make between Garvey’s UNIA and Firestone, especially when
comparing financial bona fides, came as a relatively easy one.56
Harvey Firestone probably became aware of Marcus Garvey’s plans in Liberia in early
1924 when W. E. B. Du Bois, in Monrovia for President King’s second inauguration, met
with Donald Ross. He may well have become acquainted with the UNIA, however, as
early as 1922. In the previous year, the Ku Klux Klan made its first appearance in Akron,
where it quickly became a force in local politics and served as a powerful voice for
Anglo-Protestant rubber workers. When the Klan attempted to hold its first mass rallies
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in 1922, a representative from the UNIA arrived in Akron to issue a protest. Yet,
throughout the Klan’s reign in Akron—it won its first local elections in 1923, reached its
zenith in 1925, and collapsed abruptly in 1928—Firestone and other rubber
manufacturers, fearful of labor stoppages or worse, honored a strict vow of silence.57
Still at war with the Stevenson Act and frustrated by needed reforms in the
Philippines, Firestone was buoyed by Ross’ upbeat report on Liberia. Additional reports
from Ross, who stayed on in Liberia at Firestone’s request, depicted a setting rife with
both risk and potential. In a February 1924 letter to Firestone, Ross noted that Sidney De
la Rue, the American Financial Adviser in Liberia, was “particularly definite on the point
that if financial assistance is given to the (Liberian) Government the spending of the
money must be in the hands of men appointed by the lenders.”58 A few weeks later, in
early March, Ross spoke with a State Department official who said “if Harvey S.
Firestone could arrange for a loan of $2.5 to $5 million to wipe out Liberia’s outstanding
indebtedness and promote needed improvements (docking facilities, wagon roads,
sanitation programs), Mr. Firestone would virtually be the Government.” The State
Department official added, “Liberia looks to America for assistance, and if someone in
America grasps the opportunity now the move will result in rich returns to the someone
taking the step.”59
The thought of crowning himself emperor and declaring “L’état c’est moi” in Liberia,
a nation with an annual operating budget of less than $2 million, held little appeal for the
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major stockholder of the Firestone Tire & Rubber Company. In reality, the republic’s
constitution barred white immigration and landowning. Still, what Firestone had heard
sounded promising enough. Business involved risk taking, something he had never shied
from, and he proceeded in Liberia against the advice of Amos C. Miller, his longtime
friend and legal counsel. Miller quoted Firestone when he reminded him “capital must
have assurance it will be properly protected.” The economic and political environment in
Liberia, as Miller understood it, offered many things but protection was not one of them.
Perhaps the company could make a small investment in Central or South America, but
never in Liberia. Miller also pointed out how the image of natives working on rubber
plantations in Africa conflicted with Firestone’s idea of Americans producing their own
rubber. But no matter how thick the irony, in April 1924 Firestone gave the go ahead to
Donald Ross to begin negotiations with the Liberian government for the lease of the
Mount Barclay plantation plus a million acres of additional land, and the promise of at
least three hundred thousand laborers to work them.60
In May, as Firestone negotiations proceeded in Liberia forty-two hundred miles away,
a Commerce Department conference on “the present crude rubber situation” convened at
the Lotus Club in New York. Secretary Hoover attended the conference, as did Firestone
and representatives of most of the major rubber manufacturers. With the department’s
crude rubber survey nearly completed, Hoover felt it necessary to lay “certain facts”
before the industry. A discussion of the Philippines outlined the political difficulties of
investment there, particularly because of the Moro Province independence movement that
60
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had arisen in Mindanao. Frank Seiberling, who founded a company under his own name
after his unpleasant departure from Goodyear during the 1921 recession, and Firestone,
“asked detailed questions regarding labor, etc.” in the Philippines. Hoover then told the
group of the probability that, because of the Stevenson Act, a difference of one hundred
thousand tons between production and consumption of crude rubber might occur in 1930,
and that “the lines of production and consumption would cross in 1928.” He cautioned
the conferees that “the shortage would undoubtedly be felt before that time,” and urged
them to start buying and storing rubber as soon as possible, thus bringing the price down
to a level “which would stimulate new planting.”61
When the group returned after adjourning for lunch, Firestone declared, as if no one
had heard it before, that “he had been for America producing her own rubber.” Firestone
explained, apparently with Amos Miller’s words ringing in his ear, that his motto did not
necessarily mean in the United States or even on American territory, but considering that
Americans consumed so much of the world’s rubber “we ought to control a larger
percentage, even under foreign governments.” He “was willing to do his part, but felt the
industry, backed by the Government, should aid.” Fully aware by now of developments
in Liberia, Hoover asked how the Government could help. Firestone replied that the
United States might sign a treaty with the Philippines to develop its southern islands, or
that similar arrangements could be made in Central or South America. Frank Seiberling
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then spoke up and easily crushed Firestone’s idea when he noted, “that the whole trend of
political thought in this country was not to interfere in any way with foreign relations.”62
As the discussion probed deeper into how to prepare for future cost and supply
problems, Firestone suggested a manufacturers buying pool that would purchase the
entire output of crude rubber from the Far East or “a fixed portion of the output of new
plantations” at thirty-five cents a pound for the years 1930-35. A Commerce Department
official then suggested the advantages of acquiring land in areas already under cultivation
and providing for the future with “extensions on reserve land, which could be done at
approximately half the cost of large new openings.” With an ace up his sleeve and a
straight face, Firestone “then reversed his former statement, when he said that America
should produce her own rubber, even under foreign governments, and he now said that he
favored solely new planting in the Philippines or on the American continent.” Asked if
the different approaches could be dovetailed, Firestone claimed that “he couldn’t
dissipate his energies; when he had a thing to do, he was obliged to concentrate on it to
be successful.”63
Although no one in New York that day discussed Liberia, within weeks of the Lotus
Club meeting Firestone reached a tentative settlement with leaders in Monrovia. On June
19, 1924, after wrangling over the cost of leasing the Mount Barclay plantation, the
Liberian government finally agreed to fix its rent at $6000 after the first year with an
option of a ninety-nine year lease. Firestone would be charged a rubber export tax of two
62
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and half percent, and allowed to select one million acres of land at five cents an acre for
the first six years with the understanding that the Liberian Government would assist in
securing and maintaining an adequate supply of labor, about fifty thousand workers per
year. Another agreement called for Firestone to make harbor improvements at a cost to
the company of no more than $300,000. The Firestone planting agreements, after review
and signing in Akron, would then be submitted for approval to the Liberian legislature,
scheduled to meet in December. The idea of a loan, although uppermost in Firestone’s
mind, received no mention during the negotiations.64
The loan question came up, however, when Amos Miller paid a visit to the U. S. State
Department in July. Miller, accompanied by two other members of the company’s legal
team, discussed the recent planting agreements, and informed Assistant Secretary of State
Leland Harrison, that Firestone might be willing to arrange a private loan of $5 million
through one of its fiscal agents, perhaps the National City Bank of New York, provided
that “all the revenues of Liberia were assigned to the service of the loan,” and if the
Liberians would agree to allow the President of the United States to designate
“Americans to collect and disburse these revenues.” Miller wanted to know if the State
Department would “appoint the officials in question, and . . . assume the obligations and
duties set forth in the 1921 loan agreement.” The Assistant Secretary of State replied that
the Department would consider the matter, and pressed the Firestone legal team on some
details of their plans in Liberia. Miller told him of the need to build roads, improve the
harbor, and of the possible need for thirty thousand workers the first year. Sanitation and
64

Lief, Firestone Story, 153; Chalk, “Anatomy of an Investment,” 17-18; Buell, Native Problem in Africa,
II, 820-21; I. K. Sundiata, Black Scandal: America and the Liberian Labor Crisis, 1929-1936
(Philadelphia: Institute for the Study of Human Issues, 1980), 37-38. On the original agreements, see “The
Liberian Secretary of State (Barclay) to Mr. W. D. Hines, June 19, 1924,” Foreign Relations, 1925, II, 36973.

96

health programs would be necessary, “as all forms of tropical diseases are rampant, and
the average life of the white man in that territory was very short.”65
Harrison then wanted to know why Firestone chose not “to secure the necessary
safeguards” through provisions in the planting agreements, to which Miller replied that
“they had in mind the failure of this government to accord what they considered adequate
protection of American interests in Mexico.” Firestone would not even have “the
protection of the Monroe Doctrine in Liberia.” As a result, Firestone needed to obtain
“some definite control over the administrations of the Republic of Liberia.” The
company already had “rubber men” in Liberia who had issued “favorable” reports, and
the belief in Akron was that if “they were not interfered with” success was almost
guaranteed.66 In his recommendations to Secretary of State Charles Evans Hughes,
Harrison noted that if the Department had no objection after reviewing the proposed
contracts and loan agreement, it “would lend appropriate support” so that Firestone
“might have a fair and equal opportunity to carry out his project in Liberia,” but that “the
Department could not, of course, actually participate in the negotiation of the contracts in
question.”67
Without waiting for an official decision by the Liberians, the Firestone Company
launched a land clearance program along the Du and Cavalla Rivers and began its
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rehabilitation of the Mount Barclay plantation.68 In August the Universal Negro
Improvement Association sent a petition to Liberia that warned against acceptance of the
Firestone concessions. The UNIA viewed Harvey Firestone as nothing less than a
dictator waiting for the right moment to administer a coup d’état in Liberia. Garvey’s
organization suggested that Firestone would ultimately “seek the usurpation of the
government, even as has been done with the black Republic of Haiti,” and that Liberians
should reject the concessions and “guard most jealously the freedom and integrity” of
their “dear country.”69 Ironically, Americo-Liberian leaders believed that their rejection
of Garveyism served as a step toward that very goal.
Still bothered by the fleecing that he had received at the hands of his Chicago partners
at the beginning of his business career, Harvey Firestone obsessed over protecting his
investments. As early as April 1924 he informed the U. S. State Department that he
considered a loan by the United States to Liberia as his best form of security in West
Africa. “There is no question in my mind,” Firestone wrote later, “that for the long pull
the best interest of Liberia, America and ourselves will be served by the U. S. having a
substantial interest.”70 When a State Department official asked William Hines in early
November “if the Firestone concession was contingent on an American loan to the
Government of Liberia,” he learned that although “it had been the original hope of Mr.
Firestone to make sure of American financial support for the semi-bankrupt Liberian
Government prior to investing heavily in Liberia, he had now decided to go ahead with
his concession and take up the loan question subsequently.” Firestone, according to
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Hines, wanted to wait until after the upcoming U. S. Presidential election of 1924 before
trying to interest members of Congress in “reviving” the loan plan of 1921. Hines
reminded the State Department official that it would take at least five years before any
proceeds would begin to appear in Liberia. Until then, “Mr. Firestone would be
gambling with a heavy capital investment in case he had no assurance that the Liberian
government might not go to pieces in the next few years.”71
In December, as the date drew near for the Liberian legislature to convene, Firestone
personally lobbied Secretary of State Hughes for the Government’s “moral support and
approval” of his undertaking in Liberia.72 At a meeting in Washington, Hughes
expressed his appreciation for an independent American supply of rubber, but informed
Firestone not to have any “misapprehension” about the relationship between the U. S. and
Liberia. Although Hughes had urged Congress to approve the 1921 loan, he felt troubled
when he noticed the new provision that Firestone had inserted in the “proposed
arrangements” submitted to the State Department that called for obtaining a loan either
from the Government or from private parties. Hughes feared that it might be construed
by the Liberians as a chance to reopen the question of a United States loan and told
Firestone that he should make it clear that “the proposed provision involved no committal
on the part of this Government.” Furthermore, the U. S. had “no special relationship or
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obligation to Liberia,” and “could not assume more extensive responsibilities” in
connection to a private loan.73
Even more problematic for Hughes, Firestone wanted “protection and support in the
future” from the State Department. Hughes, while sharing the economic vision that
Herbert Hoover and Firestone had for the United States, “would not and could not
commit his successors in office in such a matter.” Although the historic policy of the
State Department had been to lend “proper support of a diplomatic character to the just
claims of its citizens,” Hughes underscored the fact “that there was no question of a resort
to force.” Firestone thanked Hughes for the meeting and once again suggested the
importance of “a free source of supply of rubber to American interests.” Furthermore, he
“pointed out the great advantages which would undoubtedly accrue to Liberia if his
proposition went through,” and claimed that he had no intention “to pirate or promote
that country for purely selfish ends.” On that note, Hughes had some advice for
Firestone. News of the “attitude of certain of the Company’s representatives” in Liberia
had reached Hughes through William R. Castle, chief of the State Department’s Western
European Division. In “a personal way,” Hughes alluded to the need of using “great tact
and judgment” with the Liberians. “A kindly and understanding attitude,” Hughes
offered, “would have an important responsive effect, and would also avoid the possibility
of unfortunate backfires in this country.”74 Indeed, as Charles S. Johnson discovered in
1930, Liberians placed unusual importance on ceremony and graciousness—the act of
saying “Good morning” or “Good evening” in Liberia held a significance that few
Americans could imagine.
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Before the meeting ended, Firestone, despite what he had just been told and against all
odds, indicated that he still hoped for a U. S. loan to Liberia. The provisions of the 1921
loan, he believed, would give his interests the protection that they needed. A private
loan, as Firestone learned earlier, would “include refunding the 1912 loan.” Therefore, it
was his “understanding” that “this Government would not object to assuming a similar
relationship to that now existing in the 1912 loan.” Hughes “referred to his previous
remarks in that connection, and again emphasized the importance of the agreement being
fair and equitable to the Liberian Government.” In other words—and contrary to much
of the criticism over the years directed at the company’s enterprise in Liberia—the State
Department, although sympathetic, was not about to “modify” its policies for the sake of
Firestone.75
Although important in relations with the buying public, experience had taught
Firestone that the use of “great tact and judgment”—common elements in international
diplomacy—was not all that essential when it came to dealing with competitors. His
Chicago partners had shown little diplomacy when they swindled him out of what he felt
was rightfully his, and he had made the decision to slash prices during the 1920 recession
without regard to the well being or sensitivity of others in Akron. For Firestone, entry
into Liberia represented more than just another business deal; establishing rubber
plantations in the black republic signified progress and civilization, broad-ranging
subjects that merited unusual attention in the United States throughout the 1920s.76
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Moreover, wages paid to native workers and the building of new roads could help
modernize Liberia by opening a new market for Ford automobiles and Firestone tires. If
the Americo-Liberians could not understand the benefits to their country that Firestone’s
capital investment would bring, then he would move on and a find a better situation
elsewhere. His means for introducing the idea of a loan to the Liberians contained
nothing that even resembled diplomacy.
Within a few weeks after convening in late December 1924, the Liberian legislature
voted in favor of the three planting agreements with Firestone and authorized President
King to enter into final negotiations. When word reached Akron of the decision,
Firestone cabled King and asked him not to adjourn the legislative session until William
Hines could return to Liberia for ratification of the agreements. Firestone offered to pay
the salaries of legislators forced to work overtime but King ignored his request. The
president told the legislators to go home and then left on a trip to the hinterland. In the
meantime, Hines returned to Liberia and found President King’s Cabinet running the
government. Much to the surprise of Cabinet members, on closer inspection of Article
IV of Agreement Number Three, the million-acre concession, they found that a new
clause had been inserted. Clause “k” stipulated that, for the agreements to go into effect,
the Liberian Government had to accept a loan “of not less than two million dollars and
not more than five million dollars” based on the same conditions of the 1921 loan
rejected by the U. S. Congress. Most Liberian political leaders had not wanted the 1921
loan to begin with, and the mistaken thought that Harvey Firestone would appoint
officials to administer the country’s internal affairs caused an uproar in Monrovia.77
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On January 14, 1925, the day after the Liberian legislature agreed to the planting
agreements without the knowledge of clause “k,” Firestone had told Hines in a letter that
Liberia would be better off if it accepted the loan because, as he saw it, “The country
cannot become prosperous without money and the only way you can get the money into
Liberia is to send it there.” Later in January, Firestone received word through his man at
the Bank of Manhattan that the British Government had shown interest in his plans in
Liberia and wanted to know more. Firestone instructed his banker to tell the British that
he “is going in for the production of crude rubber.” His skimpy reply said nothing about
the loan.78
Tense months of negotiations followed as Liberians debated clause “k.” In April 1925
Liberian Secretary of State Edwin Barclay informed Hines in a letter that, as “a matter of
fundamental policy,” his government “in no circumstances will place itself under
financial obligation to your Company.”79 Eventually, considering their financial needs
and desire for American help in deflecting the French menace on their border with Ivory
Coast, President King and his Cabinet agreed that, with some changes, they could
stomach accepting the loan. In order for the loan to be administered through an
institution separate from his company, Firestone created the Finance Corporation of
America (“Harvey under a more sonorous name”), which operated through its fiscal
agent, the National City Bank of New York. In June, a few months before Secretary of
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State Barclay’s trip to the United States to finalize the loan agreement, Firestone wrote to
Thomas Edison: “I now have the matter practically closed in Liberia.”80
In August 1925, Secretary of State Barclay, a “man of deep color” according to
Firestone, arrived in the United States and one month later signed the Loan Agreement in
New York. In October, Firestone boasted to his son, Elmer: “I closed a concession with
(Barclay) for a million acres of land for 6¢ an acre . . . .” The “banker’s loan” was “made
through our State Department, which gives us full control over Liberia, that is, all their
finances . . . . So you can see we are well protected from a Government standpoint on
going into Liberia.”81
A rift developed, however, in January 1926, after President King objected to “giving
over both the customs and internal revenues” of his country to outsiders. The Liberian
legislature then added an amendment to the agreement that allowed it to negotiate a
refunding loan for retirement of the present loan. Firestone fought the amendment,
fearing that the Liberians in a few years might try to refund the loan with the French or
British, who would then dismiss American financial advisers and replace them with their
own.82 In February 1926, as the price of rubber continued to rise under the Stevenson
Act, Firestone wrote to William Castle: “I am not in humor to negotiate as we did before.
They must accept agreements without a single change . . . our only alternative is to
80
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withdraw with the exception of agreement number 1, Mount Barclay, with as little
embarrassment and expense as possible.” A white American educator making a survey in
Liberia, James L. Sibley, suggested to philanthropist Anson Phelps-Stokes, that Firestone
“needs to employ some diplomacy.” He also noted that while the loan agreement had
never been finalized, Firestone went ahead with developments in Liberia, paying a
thousand natives a month in cash, “a new experience for them.” In the fall of 1926, an
irate Firestone suspended operations in Liberia and called home his son, Harvey, Jr., only
a few years out of Princeton and president of the newly formed Firestone Plantations
Company. The deal was off.83
Yet, only weeks later, after a State Department official in Liberia suggested to
President King that the defeat of his country’s main chance for solvency would fall on his
shoulders alone, the legislature approved the loan in an act of December 8, 1926. More
months of haggling took place over a number of issues that required amendments to the
original agreement, mostly concerning salaries of financial advisers designated by
President Calvin Coolidge. In the end, the loan agreement called for the Finance
Corporation of America to issue forty-year bonds at seven percent, and Liberia agreed
that it would not refund the loan for a period of twenty years or make any other loan
unless given approval by the American Financial Adviser. Firestone later reduced the
interest to four and a half percent, a diplomatic move that pleased the Liberians.
Company vice-president and legal counsel Amos Miller, however, objected so violently
83
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to the whole scheme that Firestone personally bought out his hefty share of
stockholdings. In July 1927 the loan went into effect and the Firestone Plantations
Company was officially up and running.84
Now involved in earnest in the crude rubber growing business, Firestone believed that
in Liberia he had secured the ironclad agreements necessary to achieve the kind of order,
efficiency, and financial protection for the future that both he and Herbert Hoover so
coveted. Firestone’s anger at the British for their 1914 crude rubber embargo turned into
seething hatred after passage of the Stevenson Act; establishing his own plantations in
Liberia allowed him to thumb his nose not only at the British but also at his rivals in the
Rubber Association of America. Propaganda techniques that worked during the war
proved effective once again in deflecting criticism at home against his demands for
concessions in Liberia, or so he thought in 1927. Firestone’s autobiographical Men and
Rubber: The Story of Business, written in collaboration with Samuel Crowther and
published in 1926, served as a treatise on his personal philosophy as well as a
justification for searching out raw materials in foreign lands. Even an African American
leader as anti-colonial as W. E. B. Du Bois preferred Firestone over Marcus Garvey in
Liberia.85
From the mid-1920s until his death in 1937, the decision to establish ties with the
Republic of Liberia would be both a blessing and a curse for Firestone. Like Herbert
Hoover, who had few dealings with African Americans until the Mississippi River flood
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of 1927, Firestone paid little attention to people of color; he allowed them to sweep the
floors of his factories in Akron but higher-paying, skilled positions remained closed.
Apparently referring to Liberia, Firestone noted in Men and Rubber, “We have found the
Negro particularly adapted to handling our raw materials.” Yet, for all that Firestone
probably knew or cared, the Harlem Renaissance might have taken place in sixteenthcentury Holland. While his company made efforts over the years to understand and
accommodate native culture in the black republic, Firestone viewed Americo-Liberians
as adolescents in need of adult supervision. By 1930 officials at the U. S. State
Department had similar feelings about Firestone and his representatives in Liberia.86
Before the explosive issue of forced shipments of native Liberian workers to cacao
plantations on the Spanish-owned island of Fernando Po surfaced in the late 1920s,
America’s racial divide rendered a personal visit by Charles S. Johnson to the Firestone
offices in Akron highly unlikely. With the exception of their individual pursuits of order
and efficiency, the multimillionaire and the black sociologist had almost nothing in
common in the new age of economic globalization. But Firestone’s search for
“opportunities” abroad in the new post-World War I order inadvertently brought to light
the issue of forced labor and slavery in Liberia, and led him to cross paths with Johnson.
When Firestone wrote to his father in the 1890s that the world seemed “full of trouble,”
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he had no idea that long after achieving success in the tire business, his own actions in the
1920s would help touch off an international crisis and only add to those troubles.
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CHAPTER 3
“THE PERSISTENT WEAKNESSES WITHIN”:
LIBERIA, THE U. S. DEPARTMENT OF STATE, AND THE ROAD TO
INVESTIGATION

The love of liberty brought us here—
the want of cash keeps us.
Anonymous Americo-Liberian, 1930

The stressful negotiations with Firestone in the mid-1920s marked the end of one
chapter of tension and conflict and the beginning of another in the history of the Republic
of Liberia, a nation born out of the calamity of American slavery. Harvey Firestone’s
haste to establish his first large-scale overseas operations, fueled as much by his antipathy
toward the British and the Rubber Association of America as by his very real fear of
being left without raw materials in the event of another international crisis like World
War I, led him to focus only on Liberia’s fiscal shortcomings without understanding any
of the underlying, fundamental problems that had existed there from the 1820s onward,
and that threatened to tear the country apart in 1930. The political and social chasm
separating the dominant Americo-Liberian minority that settled in Monrovia and towns
along the coast from the disenfranchised but assertive African majority that lived
upcountry only widened in the 1920s, a dilemma that few outside of the black republic
cared much about until the coming of Firestone. The republic’s failure to subdue its
tribal majority in a manner as thorough as that of its neighbors—the British in Sierra
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Leone and the French in Ivory Coast—left it vulnerable to allegations in the late 1920s as
grave as they were ironic; namely, that a member of the League of Nations founded in the
name of liberty by former slaves and free people of color not only condoned but also took
an active role in subjecting its own citizens to forced labor and slavery.1
The genesis of the American Colonization Society (ACS), the agency responsible for
creating Liberia, grew out of an environment filled with tension and conflict. Two
groups with opposing views founded the ACS, originally known as The American
Society for Colonizing the Free People of Color of the United States, in 1816. Split
between those who wished to rid the U. S. of the growing number of manumitted slaves,
and those who wanted to abolish slavery altogether, the ACS followed a cautious path in
formulating its objectives. Pressured by slave owners the ACS eventually chose not to
address the slavery question or even mention it again, but to involve itself with the
removal from the United States of free blacks only.2
In 1787 black immigrants from Great Britain, under the direction of anti-slavery
advocate Granville Sharp, set up a colony in Sierra Leone on the coast of West Africa.
After buying land from native chiefs, the immigrants, along with slaves recaptured from
ships in the Atlantic Ocean intercepted by the British Navy, established the capital of
Freetown. Using Sierra Leone as its model, the ACS sent two representatives to the coast
of West Africa in 1817 to find a suitable location for a new colony. The ACS agents
visited Freetown, and then spoke with African chiefs on Sherbro Island, about 170 miles
1
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northwest of Cape Mesurado, the future location of the Liberian capital of Monrovia. A
favorable report on the possibilities for settlement on Sherbro Island led to widespread
publicity in the U. S. and the founding of new branches of the ACS. The U. S. Congress
gave the ACS added power in 1819 when it appropriated funds for transporting slaves
recaptured on the high seas directly to West Africa. Many free people of color and
abolitionists criticized the ACS for doing nothing about slavery, and for catering only to
slaveholders worried about the growing number of manumissions. Indeed, over the
course of the next few decades, some six thousand immigrants to Liberia arrived as a
result of promising their masters that if manumitted or allowed to purchase their own
freedom they would leave the United States for West Africa.3
The area chosen by the ACS for resettlement offered a political and social setting free
from European influence and ripe for colonization. But the same reasons that made the
land for two hundred and forty miles between Sierra Leone and Ivory Coast so politically
attractive also spelled economic trouble from the beginning. Europeans had bypassed the
Grain Coast because of its lack of natural resources like rubber, ivory, and palm oil, and
because trade routes and junctions were located elsewhere, mainly along rivers in Sierra
Leone and the Sene-Gambia region. After the arrival of Portuguese sailors in 1461 until
the demand for slaves grew in the eighteenth century, some trade between the coast and
the interior took place but it was limited mainly to rice, from which the area received its
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name, and African, or Malaguetta, pepper. Although European interest waned again after
curtailment of the British and American slave trade, the intertribal rivalries and hostilities
fostered by involvement in the business of human chattel remained for many years.4
Rather than any hint of centralized organization that might cause political headaches
in the future, ACS agents discovered at their chosen site in West Africa only loose
confederations of native tribes too factionalized to mount serious resistance to
colonization. In the previous three centuries the migration of more highly developed
natives from the savanna led to whatever political and military alliances existed among
tribes encountered by Americo-Liberian settlers in the 1820s. Divided intro three major
language groups—the Kru, Mande, and West Atlantic—native tribes in nineteenthcentury Liberia had developed from at least sixteen and as many as twenty-eight different
ethnic backgrounds. The Kru inhabited the coastal region in southeastern Liberia and
adjoining areas in Ivory Coast, where they shipped out with European traders and earned
acclaim for their sailing skills. Tribes in their language group included the Grebo, Dey,
and Bassa, among others. In northern Liberia, Mande-speaking tribes like the Vai,
Kpelle, and Gio settled among descendants of the area’s original inhabitants, the Kissi
and Gola of the West Atlantic linguistic group. The Dyula, nomadic traders from the
savanna, brought Islam to northeastern Liberia and converted the Vai to its teachings.
Yet, for all of its ethnic diversity and the fact that no dominant political structure like that
imposed elsewhere by the more advanced Ashanti or Yoruba ever developed, a strong
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degree of shared cultural traditions emerged among the different tribes, the result of
migration, intermarriage, warfare, and slave raiding.5
In addition to establishing a refuge for former slaves the ACS had larger, more
ambitious goals. Influenced by the considerable financial donations of Protestant
religious groups, the Methodists in particular, the ACS determined to use its own agents
and black immigrants as instruments for converting Africans to Christianity. The ACS
therefore selected its first group of settlers based on their moral integrity and religious
convictions. Few of the immigrants were literate and none had any political or
organizational skills. Moreover, the ACS had never actually settled immigrants
anywhere and provided the first group with no training or plan on what to do once they
reached Sherbro Island. Questions about the land, climate, and native culture went
unasked. From a legal standpoint, it also remained unclear exactly what type of
governing relationship would exist between the new settlement, the ACS, and the United
States.6
In February 1820 eighty-six black immigrants and two ACS agents boarded the frigate
Elizabeth and docked near Sherbro Island the following month. Greeted by the rainy
season, disease and death soon followed, forcing survivors to retreat to the safety of
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Fourah Bay in Sierra Leone.7 Another expedition in December 1821 led by physician Eli
Ayres and U. S. naval lieutenant Robert F. Stockton succeeded, quite by accident, in
acquiring two islands in the Mesurado lagoon, and a narrow, sixty-mile long strip of
coastland christened as Liberia in the following year.
Appointed by the ACS to take control of the urgent situation that faced survivors at
Fourah Bay, Ayres enlisted the help of Stockman, the commander of a gunboat escorting
a ship carrying another group of settlers to Freetown. Intent on finding suitable land for a
new colony, Ayres and Stockman sailed south along the coast to Cape Mesurado, where
they encountered the native leader of the local slave trade, an unpleasant Dey chieftain
known as King Peter. After days of tense “palaver,” or parley, the Americans finally
reached an agreement with Peter when Ayres pointed a pistol at the chief’s head and then
made a loud denunciation of slavery. In return for nails, gunpowder, iron bars, rum,
umbrellas, and walking sticks—whatever items could be scavenged from Stockton’s
ship—and a promise that the newcomers would not interfere with the slave trade, Peter
allowed the ACS to settle colonists on the islands near Cape Mesurado, and for sixty
miles along the coast. Viewing providence at work, Ayres immediately began
assembling settlers for the move to Cape Mesurado.8
King Peter, because he had no authority to sell the land or any understanding that he
had done so, soon drew the ire of other native chiefs who learned of his foolishness.
When Stockton and Ayres attempted to go ashore with the new colonists, Peter’s men
interfered and forced the group to take refuge on a tiny island controlled by John Mills, a
7
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mulatto slave trader. As another rainy season began, Peter ordered the colonists to leave.
Ayres, however, learned that an older Dey chieftain, King Bristol, felt less hostile toward
the Americans and had long-term grievances against Peter. When Bristol understood
what Peter had done, he declared that a binding deal had been made and that the colonists
should have their land without delay. Dissent against Bristol’s order carried a guaranteed
punishment of a severed head attached to the end of a sharpened pole. Anyone
unconvinced could view the body of another Dey chieftain then lying in state along the
coast, the most recent protester against a Bristol decree. Allowed to remain for the time
being, the colonists suffered on what came to be known as Providence Island for another
eight months before help arrived.9
In August 1822 another group of settlers, led by Protestant missionary Jehudi
Ashmun, landed at Cape Mesurado. In the meantime Peter had formed an alliance with a
host of other chieftains and prepared to attack the colonists. Totaling one hundred and
thirty, of which only twenty-five or thirty could bear arms, the colonists endured bouts of
yellow fever and withstood numerous assaults by native warriors in the weeks that
followed. Starving and weak from fever, they survived until supplies and new colonists
sent by the ACS reached them in1823 and again in 1824. Amid more battles with
natives, slave traders, and each other, the colonists managed to construct a few buildings
and finally received long-awaited legislative guidance from the ACS. Slaveholder and
leader in the ACS, Robert Harper, decided to call the Cape Mesurado settlement Liberia,
from the Latin liber for “freeman.” Monrovia, the capital, was named in honor of
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President James Monroe. As the ACS envisioned it, Liberia would become a thriving
agricultural experiment as well a force for bringing Christianity and civilization to
Africa.10
Until 1841, a Board of Managers of the Society, headquartered in Washington, had
final say when it came to laws governing the new colony of Liberia. The ACS placed the
colony under the rule of white American governors and a council elected by settlers.
Adult male settlers who purchased a plot of public land gained the franchise in Liberia.
In 1832 the ACS faced a crisis when it sent more than a thousand new immigrants to
Liberia after the passage of stringent laws against free people of color in the American
South. Within a year of arriving in Liberia, miserable conditions led to the deaths of 262
of the new settlers, a development that brought harsh criticism aimed at the ACS and the
colonists. As a result, several state chapters withdrew from the ACS and established
independent societies that founded separate colonies in Liberia. The Maryland
Colonization Society, founded by Robert Harper, acted first when it established the
Maryland in Liberia colony in Cape Palmas in 1833. Additional independent colonies
were created by societies from New York, Pennsylvania, Louisiana, Mississippi, and
other states. Each of the separate colonies, with the exception of Maryland in Liberia,
was eventually absorbed into the newly created Commonwealth of Liberia in 1839.11
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With the death of Thomas Buchanan in 1841, Liberia saw the last of its white
governors appointed by the ACS. Until declaring independence in 1847, the colonists
more or less ruled themselves. Between 1839 and 1847, the commonwealth period, a
legal system was created and colonists filled positions modeled on the executive,
legislative, and judicial branches of the U. S. Government. Assailed by abolitionists and
facing financial difficulties, the ACS drifted away from active involvement in the
colony’s internal affairs in the 1840s. Colonists were left to fend off territorial
encroachment by the French in 1842 and again in 1845 as best they could, and to initiate
their own treaties with native tribes that eventually stretched the Liberian coastland from
the mouth of the Mano River in the west to the Cavalla River two hundred and forty
miles to the east.12
Attempts at collecting customs duties grew into one of the most serious economic
issues facing the Liberian governor, Joseph J. Roberts, a settler appointed to his position
by the ACS after the death of Thomas Buchanan. In 1845, the captain of a British
merchant ship refused to pay customs duties on the grounds that Liberia was not a
sovereign state. Governor Roberts ordered the confiscation of the British ship, which in
turn led England to send a gunboat and haul away one of the colonists’ ships to Sierra
Leone. Roberts then appealed to the ACS for help, but Great Britain rejected the
argument that humanitarian concerns and historical bonds with the United States held any
significance in international law. Because the United States had no intention of claiming
Liberia as a colony, the ACS had little choice but to urge the commonwealth to declare
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its independence. With a constitution that virtually duplicated the U. S. Constitution, the
Republic of Liberia joined the sovereign nations of the world on July 23, 1847, and
finally gained recognition by the United States in 1862.13
By 1867, when immigration dropped off after the American Civil War and emancipation, nearly 19,000 colonists—free people of color, manumitted slaves, and recaptive
Africans—had made the transatlantic voyage from the United States to Liberia. From the
often unskilled and illiterate “settler elite” emerged a handful of no more than about
twenty families that assumed prominence in all of the important administrative positions
along the coastal strip. With roots in the United States rather than in Africa, the
Americo-Liberians consciously set themselves apart from the tribal majority that
surrounded them. Monogamous, English-speaking Christians, the Americo-Liberians
wore Western-style clothing, owned land individually instead of communally, and built
houses that resembled those found on southern plantations. They spurned food favored
by the Africans such as sweet potatoes, cassava, and native grown “country rice,” unable
or unwilling to stray from the typically American diet of flour and cornmeal, beef and
bacon, and rice harvested in the United States. Strangers in their own land, the settler
elite associated manual labor in general and agriculture in particular with slavery. As
they struggled to govern themselves the Americo-Liberians focused all of their energy on
the politics of survival, a process that dictated the maintenance of power at all costs, and
that fostered disdain for natives tribes that they viewed as uncivilized and therefore
beneath them.14
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With their strong Christian backgrounds, settlers found native practices of animism
particularly disturbing. But secret societies like Poro for boys, and Sande for girls,
played a central role in tribal society. Native boys had to be initiated into Poro as a rite of
passage for acceptance by their tribe. At an isolated “bush school,” a Big Devil, or head
of the local Poro, subjected groups of boys to ordeals designed to bring about their
spiritual rebirth as men. In the past, human sacrifice and cannibalism were integral parts
of Poro rituals. Breaking the secret laws of the society was punishable by death. Fertility
served as the main purpose of Sande society for native girls. Other secret societies with
totems like the Leopard, Snake, or Baboon, committed ritualistic murders and often ate
the flesh of victims in order to acquire magical characteristics, practices that struck fear
in the hearts of both Africans and Liberians.15
Yet, over time, Americo-Liberians adopted many native customs and superstitions for
their own purposes. For instance, leaders in Monrovia commonly used the native trial by
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sasswood ordeal as part of their legal system. In tribal life, witchcraft was blamed for
any type of illness, accident, or discomfort. A diviner, usually the village medicine man,
determined who had committed a crime or used witchcraft, and demanded a confession.
If no confession was forthcoming, the accused would be forced to drink a toxic mixture
prepared from the bark of the sasswood tree. In the rare cases where the poison caused
the accused to vomit, innocence was established. On the other hand, death reflected guilt.
Americo-Liberians found the trial by sasswood ordeal quite useful in prosecuting petty as
well as capital crimes.16
In the 1840s and 1850s, both by treaties with native chiefs and by force of arms, the
Americo-Liberian settlers extended their control over the land and indigenous peoples
along the Atlantic coast, and forced the closure of the local slave trading business. In
exchange for promises of protection and new schools, native Africans agreed to respect
the sovereignty of the Liberian Government and the supremacy of its laws. Because
Americo-Liberians viewed African culture as barbaric and therefore hardly worth
preserving, they embarked on a native policy that demanded complete assimilation before
the granting of any political or social privileges. To participate in Liberian society,
Africans had to sever all ties with their tribes and adopt the ways of the settlers, the exact
opposite of cultural pluralism. One method of doing this was through an apprenticeship
system that allowed African children to live with settler families and receive a Western
education. Recaptive Africans, known as “Congoes,” also used the apprenticeship
system as a route to assimilation, and grew to identify closely with the Americo-Liberian
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elite. Another common method of assimilation was through intermarriage. The limited
numbers of those assimilated either through the apprenticeship system or intermarriage,
however, never posed a serious threat to the Americo-Liberian hold on power.17
Almost always desperately poor and dependent on imports for survival, the settler elite
attempted from the 1850s into the 1870s to venture beyond Monrovia and the coast, and
establish its influence further upcountry for trade and security purposes. Especially
needed was farmland to produce crops impossible to grow in the poor soil along the coast
drained by millennia of torrential rains. Exploring parties into the rugged native
hinterland managed to plant the Liberian flag in new territory and establish a few remote
outposts, which stretched the nation well beyond its original boundaries. But without
any military presence or funds for administration, the financially strapped AmericoLiberians soon learned that they were nearly powerless to control developments very far
beyond the forty-mile wide strip of coastline where the 1847 constitution applied.18
What little administrative control the settlers could impose on natives in the hinterland
came through occupation of all of the politically appointed positions in the new counties
and districts mapped out in the 1850s. A superintendent oversaw the new counties—
Montserrado, Grand Bassa, Sinoe, and, in 1857, Maryland—with the help of a County
Council comprised of officials from the departments of Education, Treasury, Internal
Affairs, and Public Works. Along with the new districts of Cape Mount and Marshall,
the Liberian Government established villages designated as “civilized settlements.”
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Recognized as townships, the civilized settlements were administered by a commissioner
appointed by the county, and assisted by a tax collector, a roads administrator, and other
minor officials. African villages, often located next to the townships, had no official
status in Liberia. A new policy that attempted to ban centuries-old trade between native
villages and European merchants caused anger and confusion among African chiefs.
With limited supervision from far off Monrovia and no military force to back them up,
county administrators often found themselves at odds with a native population that
outnumbered Americo-Liberians a hundred to one.19
From the founding of Liberia in the 1820s, health care and education posed
monumental problems in an environment that killed immigrants at a frightening rate.
Only a few physicians, generally of questionable competence to begin with, were ever
available in the republic at any one time. Moreover, many Americo-Liberians held native
medicine in higher esteem than professionally trained doctors. Missionary organizations,
first the Methodists and Baptists, followed by all of the major Protestant denominations,
attempted to fill the void in education by establishing schools in settlements along the
coast. But without proper funding and because of high mortality among administrators,
they had only a marginal effect. Americo-Liberian leaders, having tried and failed to
establish their own school system, encouraged the missionaries in their work of
converting natives to Christianity and in their attempts at education. Cooperation
between the missions and the government suffered a grievous blow in 1874, however,
when an Episcopalian bishop supported a rebellion by Grebo tribesmen that required
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American military assistance to put down. Thereafter, Americo-Liberian leaders, many
of whom sent their children to private schools in Europe or the United States, restricted
missionary work among Africans. By 1930, health care and education remained at best
rudimentary in Liberia.20
From the 1880s, when the “scramble for Africa” began among European colonial
powers, into the 1920s when Firestone arrived, the inability to occupy and control land
claims in the hinterland threatened the annexation of Liberian territory and led to further
conflict between the government and its tribal citizens. In 1884, the Berlin Conference
tried to regulate new European claims on African territory by requiring evidence of
“effective occupation.” Realizing that claims staked out in the previous decades during
hinterland explorations could not stand up under scrutiny by the French or British, the
Americo-Liberians rushed to embark on a number of ambitious programs to help their
cause. As the settler elite believed, new townships, railways, highways, and military
posts, as well as measures intended to gain the cooperation of native chiefs that included
a stipend system and promises of representation in legislative decision making, would
strengthen Liberia’s hand against the Europeans. Nothing came of the plans, however,
and both Great Britain and France annexed portions of Liberian territory by treaty
agreements in the 1880s and 1890s.21
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By the turn of the century Liberia began forming a closer relationship with Great
Britain in hopes that it would deter the French from claiming additional land along the
boundary with Ivory Coast. The British had shown good faith in honoring the boundary
between Sierra Leona and Liberia once a treaty had been signed, and in the early 1900s
the settler elite arranged back channel agreements with Britain for help in carrying out
reforms in tax collection and the judicial system, and for creating a militia capable of
guarding the republic’s territorial integrity. With the agreements and the establishment of
the British Bank of West Africa, the only major financial institution in Liberia, Great
Britain tried to stabilize the black republic in hopes of forging a buffer between Sierra
Leone and the French colony of Ivory Coast. At the beginning of the twentieth century,
the Liberians in effect began practicing their own brand of colonialism in the hinterland,
a policy that caused anger among tribal citizens and pushed them into closer trade
relations with the French and the British.22
The first serious effort at reforms intended to convince the French and British that
Liberia sovereignty extended across the hinterland came after the 1904 election of Arthur
Barclay as president. With the luxury of a four-year presidential term instead of the
traditional two-year terms served by his predecessors, Barclay outlined an ambitious
program intended to make Liberia function as a “national organism.” In 1865, Barclay
left his native Barbados at the age of eleven, and immigrated with his father to Liberia. A
member of the True Whig Party that rose to dominate Liberian politics in the 1870s,
Barclay had held nearly all of the major political positions in his adopted nation before
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being elected president for two successive terms. Over time he took note of Great
Britain’s use of indirect rule in Sierra Leone and how it managed, with a minimum of
expenditures and personnel, to dictate policy in the hinterland and control the native
population. Barclay’s new plan called for the recognition of African settlements as
townships, and for new hinterland districts divided along ethnic lines. Native chiefs
chosen by traditional means headed the townships, while Americo-Liberian
commissioners appointed by the president oversaw the new districts.23
After a few years under the new arrangements, the Liberian Government tried to exert
its power over the clan, the most important native organization in the hinterland, by
requiring legislative approval of clan chiefs. Several towns with close kinship ties made
up a clan, with chiefs generally chosen from the oldest settlement and central location for
the settling of disputes through palaver. Going one step further, the Americo-Liberians
created the position of paramount chief to oversee units of several clans. Although chiefs
were invited to Monrovia to discuss tribal problems, and Liberian officials made visits to
the hinterland, President Barclay’s plan met with much less success upcountry than in
areas closer to the coast.24
During his first term as president, Barclay renegotiated a loan arranged in 1871
through a London banking firm that had delivered to Liberia only about $100,000 out of a
promised sum of $500,000. Sir Harry Johnston’s Liberia Development Company
arranged the new 1906 loan of $500,000 through another British financial firm. Most of
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the loan went toward building roads to and from Johnston’s Mount Barclay rubber
plantation, with the rest earmarked for paying off Liberia’s floating debt. Because
repayment of the loan depended on customs revenues, the British demanded that it
appoint European customs inspectors and financial advisers. By 1908 the Liberian
Development Company had gone broke and British officials clashed with Liberian
district commissioners. Additional help, the British promised, would be forthcoming if
Liberia established a frontier force commanded by Europeans. President Barclay, who
had tried to avoid the use of force to implement control over the hinterland, came to the
realization that the intractability of certain native chiefs and the ongoing boundary
disputes with the French could not be remedied without a well-trained militia.25
Armed with British-made rifles and commanded by a British army major, Robert
Mackay Cadell, the Liberian Frontier Force (LFF) was formed to maintain law and order
upcountry and to serve the local needs of district commissioners. Cadell, however,
despised Liberian district commissioners, and brought in Africans from Sierra Leone to
serve in the LFF under British officers that he appointed. Tension between Cadell and
Barclay’s government grew as the LFF commander made it a point to ignore orders from
Monrovia. In February 1909, Cadell turned the LFF against Monrovia, a revolt put
down with surprising ease by a poorly trained Americo-Liberian militia. In the aftermath
of the revolt, Barclay rescinded previous agreements with the British and turned to the
United States for help.26
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The arrival of the Taft Commission later in 1909 and its report on needed reforms,
most conspicuously in the LFF, set the stage for the U. S. Government’s first official
plunge into Liberian politics by helping to arrange the 1912 loan and supervising its
administration. Yet, with every effort at increased control over the hinterland came more
tension and conflict between Americo-Liberian rulers and natives, who staged numerous
uprisings against the government in the first two decades of the twentieth century.
American involvement in Liberia’s internal reforms, rather than bringing order and
efficiency as intended, only resulted in more chaos and violence by unintentionally
convincing rebellious natives that rescue by white rule was near at hand. Although tribal
citizens suffered defeat and reprisals with each rebellion, their unrest formed a steady
progression of troubles that became untenable by the end of the 1920s.27
Because they had no major export crop, in order to generate revenue AmericoLiberians exploited their vast supply of native laborers by contracting them to work
abroad. From the era of slave trading, the export of native labor had been an important
source of income for native chiefs. In the nineteenth century, after abolition of the slave
trade, tribal chiefs continued to export native labor, receiving “head money” from
shipping companies and plantation owners in other parts of Africa. From time to time,
the Liberian Government also granted concessions to Europeans for the recruitment of
native labor. In the early 1900s, the Americo-Liberians gave in to farmers who
complained that labor exports damaged their ability to run their plantations, and tried to
ban further recruitment. But the need for workers on cacao plantations on the Spanish-
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owned island of Fernando Po, a thousand mile journey from Liberia along the coast to the
Bight of Biafra, led to a change of attitude in Monrovia.28
Despite earlier accusations of abuse on Fernando Po, the Liberian Government signed
an agreement with Spain in 1914 for the export of native workers to the island. Indeed,
as early as 1912, Richard C. Bundy, the American chargé d’affaires in Liberia, sent the
U. S. State Department a detailed report on abuses in the contract labor system, and the
republic’s woefully inadequate record keeping. Although the 1914 agreement imposed
safeguards against mistreatment and exploitation, the system depended entirely on the
honesty of Liberian agents and the Spanish Consul. With a payment to recruiters of five
dollars for each worker brought into service—usually young, illiterate Kru, Bassa, and
Grebo men from the counties of Grand Bassa, Sinoe and Maryland—the Fernando Po
agreement generated temptations for compulsion that district commissioners and native
chiefs proved unable to resist. Contracted for up to a year, many workers spent far longer
on Fernando Po. Those fortunate enough to make it back to Liberia alive often had their
wages confiscated or had to pay arbitrary fees imposed by recruiters or district
commissioners, leaving them with nothing to show for their labor abroad.29
Beginning in 1916, Monrovia imposed an annual hut tax of a dollar per year on
natives, one of the reforms suggested by the Americans. Village chiefs were designated
to collect the tax and turn the money over to district commissioners, an arrangement open
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to widespread abuse and corruption. Even after the arrival of American financial
advisers, and with an American-trained LFF, district commissioners showed little selfrestraint as they intimidated, humiliated, and imprisoned native chiefs, replacing the most
difficult of them with docile figures who commanded no respect in local villages.
District commissioners coerced native chiefs into supplying men free of charge for
whatever projects that required manual labor—road building in particular—and
demanded the free use of porters for travel by hammock across the rugged Liberian
countryside. Within a short time, white American officials in the hinterland grew to have
as much disdain for Americo-Liberians as their British counterparts had previously.30
An ugly affair that caused tension to reach the breaking point between American
officials in Liberia and leaders in Monrovia occurred in 1920. An American official in
the hinterland, T. C. Mitchell, accused an Americo-Liberian district commissioner, B. Y.
Sandemannie, of forcing natives to work as slaves on government land that he used
illegally as his own private plantation. Mitchell notified Monrovia that he had dismissed
Sandemannie from his post, and that he had ordered him to appear in the capital. On
Mitchell’s orders, another American official placed Sandemannie in chains for the
twelve-day trip to Monrovia. After arriving in the capital, Sandemannie, who had close
personal connections to a number of Americo-Liberian political leaders, complained to
newly-elected president Charles King that Mitchell’s behavior served as evidence that
white men wanted to control Liberia, an accusation that the local press seized upon
immediately and compared to conditions in the Jim Crow South. King responded by
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placing restrictions on American officials in Liberia, a move intended to force them out
of the country. After punching an Americo-Liberian who swore at him and blocked his
path on a Monrovian street, Mitchell eluded police by seeking asylum at the American
legation. On the following day, President King coaxed Mitchell out of the legation with
an invitation to a meeting, and then had him arrested, tried, and fined. King’s retaliatory
measures and Mitchell’s own disputes with his subordinates in the hinterland resulted in
the departure from Liberia of the entire group of American advisers in 1921.31
Another incident in the same period of time demonstrated the remarkable resilience of
the Americo-Liberian political system to any type of fundamental reform. Soon after his
appointment by President King as secretary of the interior, James W. Cooper began
operating a private plantation upcountry with unpaid labor supplied by natives and wives
of troops in the LFF. American officials informed King of the problem, who dismissed
Cooper and then called for an investigation. Cooper was never brought up on any
criminal charges, however, and a few years later returned to his cabinet position.
Typically, Americo-Liberians, with their strong family connections and fear of losing
political control, were immune from any sort of punishment. Removal from one
government job and transferal to another was the process usually employed by the settler
elite for dealing with the transgressions, no matter how serious, of their own tightly knit
group.32
To be sure, Charles Dunbar Burgess King, who served as president of Liberia
throughout the 1920s, never strayed from the unwritten rule of nepotism that guided his
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nation’s political leadership. Tall and dignified in appearance and manner, King
epitomized the image of Liberian aristocracy with his peculiar upturned mustache, horn
rimmed eyeglasses, and formal attire of gray pinstriped slacks, top hat, and tails. King
was born in Freetown, Sierra Leone, in 1875 to recaptive Yoruba parents who sent him to
local elementary schools, and then on to Liberia College in Monrovia. Before his
inauguration as president in 1920, he had served as attorney general, and as secretary of
state. When it came to public speechmaking and international diplomacy, King displayed
a style smooth and polished; his gift for progressive rhetoric helped to placate competing
interest groups and made him appear as a magnanimous and benevolent leader concerned
about the welfare of all in his nation’s multicultural society.33
In private, however, King showed a less congenial side, particularly toward Liberia’s
tribal citizens. His attitude toward the Kru rebellion of 1915 is especially revealing.
Well before 1907, King’s first year as attorney general, an Americo-Liberian politician
named Samuel A. Ross used the LFF at his command in Sinoe County to exact whatever
personal financial gain he could from Kru, Bassa, and Grebo tribesmen. Through exports
of young native workers, fines, coercive tax collection, and wholesale pillaging of native
people and resources, Ross inflamed the tempers of local tribes. The hanging of a Kru
chief along with five other natives in 1911 on Ross’ orders set the stage for further
trouble. In 1915, the Kru, who never accepted the legitimacy of the Americo-Liberian
government, declared their independence and staged a revolt that spread among towns on
the coasts of Grand Bassa and Sinoe counties. On the promise of reform in its native
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policy, Colonel Charles Young, the African American officer in charge of the LFF,
granted Liberia’s request for military assistance from the United States. The appearance
of the warship U. S. S. Chester quickly ended Kru resistance. But instead of reform,
reprisals included the hanging of forty-two chiefs and the killing of a number of
prisoners. When natives appealed for mercy, Charles King, as secretary of state,
suggested to Liberian president Daniel E. Howard that harsh crimes deserved harsh
punishment. The Liberian government then outlawed the owning of firearms by the Kru
and the rest of the native tribes, and declared it illegal for anyone to travel upcountry
without a permit, making future exploitation and retribution all the easier.34
As President of the Republic of Liberia, Charles King in 1921 initiated direct rule of
the hinterland after earlier promises of tolerance and justice for natives. King divided the
coastal strip into six counties and the hinterland into five districts. New regulations
called for fair treatment of natives and imposed fines and other forms of punishment
designed to end corruption by government officials. Tours of the hinterland by President
King allowed native chiefs to air their complaints against district commissioners. But
until the replacement of American officials who departed after the Sandemannie affair,
natives actually lost the type of protection provided by colonial rule in neighboring Sierra
Leone and Ivory Coast. Indeed, President King’s reforms brought new responsibilities to
district commissioners, which included the procurement of native laborers from village
chiefs for public works projects, most notably the construction of new roads and
buildings. Compulsory labor recruitment for government service, perfectly legal under
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Liberian law, required tribal citizens to be away from their villages for a few months each
year. District commissioners, however, still largely unsupervised by Monrovia despite
the new regulations, subjected natives to much longer periods of service and required
them to supply their own tools and food. Native chiefs who failed to turn over enough
workers could expect fines, beatings, and other forms of intimidation. Workers unable to
keep up a steady pace because of crude homemade tools or illness received similar
punishment. Also, in addition to the onerous hut tax, natives were forced to pay an
education tax for new schools, whether the buildings were ever brought into service or
not. For natives, brutality in tax collection, arbitrary fines, and imprisonment without due
process, came as the cost of reform in Liberia in the 1920s.35
Maryland County, where Firestone began development of its Cavalla plantation in
1924, evolved into one of the most troublesome political units in Liberia under President
King. The superintendent of Maryland County, Allen N. Yancy, had received his
appointed position through his friendship with Edwin Barclay, a shrewd politician and
nephew of former president Arthur Barclay. Actively involved in the labor export
business, Yancy shared his profits from head monies with other Americo-Liberian
officials. His tyranny in imposing fines and extorting money, food, and labor from
natives ranked second to none in the black republic. Nor was Yancy above committing
murder when it served his purposes.
In 1923, Yancy used the hostility that had been brewing for years between two local
tribes to coerce more native laborers into shipping out to Fernando Po, a series of events
35
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that had long-term repercussions. During the previous fifteen years, the use of a
contested jungle pathway that led to and from the coast resulted in the murder of seven
Grebos by the Krus of Po River. Tuweley Jeh, a Grebo paramount chief, brought the
issue of the killings to Superintendent Yancy, who told him to stop complaining and take
action. When the Grebos struck back and killed three Po River people, Yancy extorted
£160 from Jeh for legal services before declaring that the chief had won his case. After a
delegation of Po River people complained to President King, Jeh was summoned to
Monrovia, where he was fined £300, imprisoned, and forced to turn over those who had
committed the murders. Yancy offered to intervene on the condition that Jeh would
provide 500 workers for shipment to Fernando Po. Local chiefs rejected Yancy’s
proposal, but after the burning of two villages and threats of more fines, they eventually
complied. Finally allowed to return home, Jeh discovered that Yancy had issued a call
for more laborers. When Jeh refused Yancy’s request, he was taken prisoner and workers
were rounded up by LFF troops, who then sacked the town of Julucan. The LFF marched
village elders from Julucan to Yancy’s farm, and forced them to labor there pending the
delivery of the full complement of workers. In 1927, King made Yancy his vicepresident.36
As President King and the Liberian legislature sparred with Firestone over the loan
agreements in May 1926, an assistant professor from Harvard University’s Department of
Government arrived in Monrovia for a brief stay that, at least on the surface, appeared
innocent enough. In fact, Raymond Leslie Buell’s visit to Liberia’s capital laid the
36
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groundwork—quite accidentally—for the 1930 League of Nations inquiry into forced
labor and slavery and the end of the King administration. Sponsored by Harvard’s
Bureau of International Research, Buell, a native Californian barely thirty-years-old,
spent the better part of a year making research sojourns to a number of countries for a
“report on the condition of the African.” Looking for “some good dope” on the Firestone
loan agreements and involvement of the U. S. State Department, Buell discovered in
Liberia what he believed to be the international crime of the century.37
Upon his arrival in Monrovia, Buell received a “surly” reception by Americo-Liberian
officials. A meeting with President King smoothed matters over, however, and freed
Buell to go “nosing about” for the next few weeks and “break into the Firestone secrets.”
After learning “all the details” of the Firestone negotiations, Buell became “disgusted
with American policy” in Liberia. He suggested in letters home that the United States
and Firestone had “forced the plantation system on Liberia when the other governments
in Africa are trying to keep it out of their colonies because it invariably leads to
wholesale forced labor and to the uprooting of native life.” Moreover, the U. S. had
“virtually forced” the five million dollar loan on Liberia, which “nobody here wants” and
agreed to only because American investment would bring American protection. Buell
declared that Firestone “could get his concession in no other territory in Africa,” as if the
Akron tire magnate had gone shopping around the continent for a deal, and that he did
not believe that “economic imperialism was as bad with us until I came here.” Buell then
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promised to “raise the deuce with our State Department and bankers” upon his return to
the United States.38
Having already made up his mind about the situation in Liberia without spending even
a moment upcountry, Buell nevertheless went on to express strong opinions on
government and education in the black republic. While hardly anti-colonial in his
perspective, the young Harvard professor sympathized “with the ideal of Negro
independence in at least one part of the world.” Judged against American standards, he
admitted that “things are of course bad,” especially Liberian schools, but that the
“average intelligence and savoir faire” of government officials ranked above other
colonies that he had visited. The Liberians, according to Buell, “had succeeded in
assimilating aborigines to a much greater extent than the Creoles of Sierra Leone.”
Although Buell found no evidence of a single saw mill or laboratory in Liberia, he
believed that with the proper educational system “these people would eventually be able
to run their own show.” Because the government would “never be able to put in the right
type of educational system,” and because the Protestant missionaries lacked funds and
were “too divided, too weak and too unpopular,” Buell suggested that it was up to the
United States to help advance Liberian education, “not by forcing money in the form of
loans and industrial oppression,” but by “developing some real intellectual and moral
standards.”39
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Buell’s main point of contention over Firestone’s labor agreements with the Liberian
government centered on the company’s wildly exaggerated 1924 estimate of the need for
three hundred thousand workers once the entire development of one million acres came
under development. In reality, the Firestone Plantations Company never employed more
than twenty thousand workers at any one time before 1930. Another problem for Buell
rested with Liberia’s creation of a Labor Bureau, which operated under the Department of
the Interior. The Labor Bureau had, in fact, been created in 1912 but did not become
active until 1926, when the government attempted to stem the tide of workers to the
Firestone plantations. The enabling legislation for establishing the bureau required the
witnessing of contracts and strict record keeping of transactions, wages, and labor
conditions. Labor agents, appointed by the President, would collect fees from employers
for each laborer supplied. Employers also had to pay fees to native chiefs and headmen.
Upon recognizing the act’s endless possibilities for abuse, legislators added a section that
made it clear that compulsion could not be used to secure workers.40
From the beginning Firestone claimed that its success in Liberia would depend on “a
permanent and contented labor force.” In 1926, however, the Liberian government,
needing native labor for roadwork and porterage, imposed new regulations for the
recruitment of workers, and forced a concession from Firestone. Through the Labor
Bureau, Liberia would supply two thousand workers from each of its five counties in
return for payment from Firestone of one cent to the government, one half cent to chiefs,
and one half cent to paramount chiefs for each day of work performed under the
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arrangement. But before long Firestone added its own amendment to the agreement that
allowed it to recruit and employ any workers who presented themselves without first
receiving permission or registering with the government. Also, Firestone demanded that
its labor force be free to bargain for terms and conditions of employment, and that
workers be allowed to sever their relationship with the company whenever they chose.41
During land clearance and start up operations in 1926, Firestone hired about ten
percent of its work force through government recruiters. When the Liberians made it a
practice of confiscating at least fifty percent of native wages, many workers became
angry with the company and began associating it with corruption. Before long, the
government shifted control of labor recruitment from the Labor Bureau to the district
commissioners, who demanded a fee of one half cent per day for each worker supplied to
Firestone. Confusion and misunderstanding followed to the point that Firestone
abandoned the arrangement after about four months. In Buell’s mind, Firestone, not the
Liberian Government, became the culprit in the forced labor controversy.42
Several months after Buell vacated Africa for the comforts of Europe, Liberia became
a signatory to the International Slavery Convention held in Geneva, Switzerland, in
September 1926. In its desire to put an end to the traffic in African slaves and build on
an earlier report that it had commissioned in 1924, the League of Nations extended its
purview “to prevent forced labour from developing into conditions analogous to
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slavery.”43 Little did leaders in Liberia know at the time that their official support of the
convention’s aims, even without ratification, would come back to haunt them. For while
Americo-Liberians paid only lip service to the convention’s articles, an African American
who had lived in the black republic for many years, Thomas J. R. Faulkner, considered
far more seriously the corrosive effects of forced labor and slavery.
In April 1927, Charles King ran for an unprecedented third presidential term as the
True Whig Party candidate. The main political opposition to King came from Faulkner,
who revived the long moribund People’s Party and ran on a platform that stood in
contrast to virtually every entrenched ideal of the True Whigs. A native of North
Carolina and an engineer by profession, Faulkner had moved to Baltimore and married a
woman from that city before immigrating to Liberia in the 1880s. Once established in the
black republic he became an entrepreneur with many diverse interests and ambitious
plans that threatened the Americo-Liberian status quo. Faulkner ran a hotel, installed a
telephone system, and opened an ice plant before turning to politics during World War I,
when he was appointed mayor of Monrovia. When he tried to bring electricity to
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Monrovia, he claimed: “I appealed to the commonwealth for permission, and they sent
me to the secretary of state. When I appealed to him, he sent me to His Excellency the
President, who directed me to the legislature, which began the same circle again.” Tall,
muscular, fearless, and honest beyond reproach, Faulkner was described as not only “the
most useful man in the country” but also “[t]he most hated and one of the most lonely
men in the republic . . . .”44
Opposition to the True Whig Party, as Faulkner well understood, carried inherent
reprisals and guaranteed failure at the polls. Without any chance of success, Faulkner
placed his own safety in jeopardy and campaigned as the People’s Party candidate. If
elected, he promised to limit presidential appointive powers and provide for native
representation and education, measures entirely unacceptable to the True Whigs. Charles
King, an expert in political rhetoric, countered with his own pledges of equality in
education, cooperation with natives, and noninterference in tribal government. With
perhaps six thousand registered voters in Liberia, election returns shocked even the most
jaded political observers. Faulkner received 7,000 votes to 235,000 for King. In Bassa
County, which had no more than 3,000 registered voters, 72,000 ballots were cast for
King. Indeed, the 1927 presidential election in Liberia ranked as the most rigged in
modern history, a record that stood into the 1980s. During the “hot” campaign underway
in April, Raymond Buell fired off a letter to Faulkner and inquired, “Was the election
honestly held?”45 Faulkner, his sense of protest honed during his youth in the United
44
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States, resolved to bring his own case as well as the forced labor issue to an international
audience, a mission that eventually led him to Geneva and the League of Nations.
Raymond Buell’s own sense of mission and need for affirmation led him to seek out
Reed Paige Clark, former American chargé d’affaires in Liberia, and ask that he read and
comment on the portions of his new book that dealt with the Firestone agreements.
Clark, newly appointed consul general in Mexico City, congratulated Buell on the work;
he was especially pleased with the author’s “marked sympathy” toward Liberia, and
restraint in “making statements to which the Liberians can take serious exception.” On
the other hand, Clark noted: “You do not treat Firestone so sympathetically!” Instead of
Buell’s “rather pitiless” and at times “drastic” criticism, Clark wished that the Harvard
professor could have understood Firestone’s point of view. He believed that the planting
and loan agreements represented “an eminently fair compromise,” considering “some of
the demands advanced from time to time by both sides!”46
Clark then proceeded, line by line, to comment on Buell’s work dealing with Liberia
and the Firestone agreements, a very small part of the massive, two-volume The Native
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Problem in Africa, published in April 1928. Without access to the draft sent to Clark, it
is impossible to know exactly what Buell originally wrote. But when compared with the
published version of the book, Clark’s comments provide strong clues. For instance,
Buell apparently claimed that the U. S. State Department sent Clark on official business
to Akron to meet with Harvey Firestone. Clark’s response to the charge is significant. “I
was emphatically not assigned to go to Akron,” Clark wrote. “I did so voluntarily as any
man in his senses would have done in the circumstances. It was as important for me to
know Mr. Firestone and his attitude . . . as it was to know the Liberian Government. If I
served any useful purpose . . . it was because I did understand and appreciate the
arguments of both sides.” In another passage, Buell made a reference to Solomon Porter
Hood, the former American minister in Monrovia, that did not sit well with Clark, who
urged: “Please do not say this about Hood! The statement is true enough but to make it
won’t help anybody.” As to Buell’s attack on Firestone for insisting that Liberia not be
allowed to refund the loan for a period of twenty years, Clark asked: “Why give our
friends abroad fuel for criticism? Why not let them find this argument for themselves?
He continued, “Isn’t Firestone entitled, because of his huge prospective investment, to
adequate protection of it?”47
Curiously, Clark made no reference to the most controversial and potentially
damaging of Buell’s charges that appeared later in The Native Problem in Africa;
namely, that Firestone’s demand for 300,000 native workers would, by necessity, result
in a need to use forced labor, and that the Liberians accepted the $5 million loan only
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because the U. S. State Department promised to help deflect French designs on Liberian
territory. Considering the scrutiny reflected in Clark’s suggested changes, it is likely that
Buell simply omitted the material. At about the time that Clark made his comments, a
colleague of Buell’s at Harvard, George Grafton Wilson, submitted a copy of the same
material for circulation at the U. S. State Department. But advance notice of Buell’s
work caused barely a ripple of controversy among State Department officials, even
though they had learned that the author planned to disclose that “Firestone owns the
Finance Corporation of America.” In fact, in November 1927, the State Department
decided to withhold criticism of Buell’s book “so as not to lead to its further sale.”48
Much like Firestone at the Lotus Club meeting, Buell apparently appreciated the
effectiveness of withholding important information for a more appropriate time in the
future.
In the months leading up to Buell’s bombshell, the State Department began receiving
new reports of recent problems with forced labor in Liberia. From the American
Legation in Monrovia in January 1928, American minister William T. Francis cabled
William R. Castle, now the undersecretary of state, about an incident of forced labor
“which may cause considerable trouble for Liberia and incidentally embarrass the
Firestone interests.” The incident involved the former Postmaster General Reginald
Sherman, who stumbled upon and then heard protests from a group of about three
hundred natives in Sinoe Country being held in a barracoon for shipment to Fernando Po
on orders from Samuel Ross. Sherman contacted Monrovia but Secretary of State Edwin
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Barclay “blocked” instructions to release natives who had not volunteered for the trip.
The British chargé d’affaires then heard the news and informed the British Foreign
Office. Also, Firestone had been barred from labor recruiting in the district behind Sinoe.
Francis reminded Castle that in 1924, before the formation of the League of Nations’
Temporary Slavery Commission, the British had raised the issue of forced labor in
Liberia, a charge that the Americo-Liberians responded to with an order prohibiting the
shipment of workers from Grand Bassa County for a period of six months. But “now that
Firestone is in,” Francis wrote, “I should hate to see the question reopened.”49
Alarmed by the news from Monrovia, Castle wrote to Francis a few weeks later and
suggested that the attitude toward the natives “of the thousand or so people who really
control Liberia . . . might lead to a very unpleasant investigation on the part of the League
of Nations or some other inquisitorial body.” Although a report by the League would
“have no binding control,” it would have the potential to “seriously injure Liberia in the
eyes of the world and would make it much more difficult for the United States to be of
assistance to the Liberian Government.” Castle then singled out the need for reform in
the Frontier Force and cited Harvey Firestone, Jr., in Liberia at the time, as “the best type
of young American man” to make the Liberians realize, if anything could, that “the
Firestone interests must be the salvation of their country.” Liberia also needed to
understand, according to Castle, that renewed British interests in developing crude rubber
49
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plantations in Africa posed a serious threat to the nation’s labor supply which, if “greatly
divided,” might result in “the possible withdrawal of Mr. Firestone.” Castle believed that
“European interests which are exhibiting such a desire of wanting to go into Liberia”
were doing so mainly to “interfere with the Firestone Plantations” and “prevent the
development of rubber to an extent which would interfere with their monopoly.” If the
British or French drove Firestone out of the black republic, Castle theorized that he could
see no other solution “than the loss to Liberia in no very distant future of their
independence.”50
The publication in April 1928 of Buell’s The Native Problem in Africa and its
indictment of American policies in Liberia, while not coming as a complete surprise to
William Castle, nevertheless increased his concerns about the international image of
Firestone and the U. S. State Department. Castle had good reason to be uneasy,
considering the range of Buell’s contacts. By mobilizing influential friends in the League
of Nations, the World Peace Foundation, the People’s Reconstruction League, and a host
of other groups that shared his sentiments, Buell could generate a powerful swell of antiAmerican opinion with the forced labor issue. Even more troubling were Buell’s public
broadsides. Castle’s personal dislike of Buell, who had resigned from Harvard earlier in
1928 to become research director of the Foreign Policy Association, grew in intensity in
the months that followed.51 After Buell repeated his charges against the American loan
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and Firestone’s alleged systematic use of forced labor in a May 1928 article in The
Nation, Castle wired Francis in Monrovia and outlined a plan of action.
In light of Buell’s “critical attitude,” Castle suggested to Francis that “an attempt may
be made to shoulder Firestone and even the Department” with the “undesirable
conditions” that existed in Liberia. The undersecretary of state had received assurances
that Firestone “sincerely desires to treat the laborers properly” but that “the methods of
the Liberian Labor Bureau . . . have a tendency to result in conditions analogous to those
of forced labor and are likely at some time to draw the well-merited censure of civilized
opinion.” When that day came, Castle believed it imperative that the State Department
and its legation in Monrovia should “be in a position to show beyond question” that
“American influence has been exerted so far as has proved possible against such
conditions.” Castle then instructed Francis as a first step to write a detailed memorandum
on the situation in Liberia. For assistance, Castle directed the American minister to the
articles of the 1926 Slavery Convention, and reminded him that Liberia had signed but
not yet ratified them. Because the State Department had recommended to Congress that
the United States accede to the articles, Francis should also report on Liberia’s attitude
toward ratification. Castle repeated his belief that Firestone made it a point “in his
treatment of labor to avoid any charge of peonage or forced labor,” but if Francis learned
of any inappropriate behavior on the part of the company, he should report it forthwith.52
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When Castle learned that Buell planned in August to chair a conference on Africa at
the Williams Institute of Politics in Williamstown, Massachusetts, he not only continued
to make arrangements to defend the State Department’s stance on Firestone and Liberia
but also took measures to discredit the former professor. In July, Castle thanked the
American Consul in South Africa, Charles E. Macy, for information that cast a shadow
on Buell’s character and integrity. Macy, in Castle’s opinion an “accurate, thoroughly
conscientious and reliable man, not . . . given to exaggeration,” relayed a story about
Buell’s short stay in Dakar, Senegal, where after only a few days he managed to depart
with a good deal of confidential information obtained while alone in the governor
general’s office.53
Although Macy’s news confirmed Castle’s negative opinion of Buell, the
undersecretary of state could hardly believe that the former scholar “would show so little
sense of honor as to look at the confidential papers of another man.” Even if Buell had
an excellent reputation as a “historian and an economist,” Castle noted that “it was a great
relief” to Harvard when he resigned. The Native Problem in Africa, in Castle’s
estimation, was “ a great disappointment” and “little more than a propaganda document
. . . full of misleading statements.” With Buell on board, the Foreign Policy Association
would become, as Castle surmised, “more anti-the-American-Government than ever
before.” Because of his “curiously twisted mentality,” Buell’s only “ray of hope” rested
with the fact that he had recently married George Grafton Wilson’s secretary, “a young
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woman of very unusual intelligence,” and a “much stronger character than Buell himself”
who “will eventually tone down his radical opinions.”54
Castle then wrote to Wilson and repeated the story of their “friend” Buell’s “startling”
use of private documents. If the story held true, Castle felt that Buell “is certainly not a
man we should want to have in Harvard College if the question ever arose of his return.”
He wondered if “it might not be wise to send a circular instruction to our people, warning
them that Buell should not be introduced enthusiastically on any further trips he may
make . . . .”55 Through back channels, Castle also contacted Thomas Jesse Jones, the
director of the Phelps-Stokes Fund and chairman of the Advisory Committee of
Education in Liberia, and enlisted his help in launching a preemptive strike against Buell
at the upcoming Williamstown conference. Finally, working with the knowledge that
Firestone’s William D. Hines had already discussed the matter in Liberia, Castle advised
that President King prepare a press release refuting Buell’s allegations, and send it
directly to the Associated Press. Castle, at this time acting secretary of state in the
absence of Frank B. Kellogg, informed the American legation in Monrovia that a strong
denial by King would generate “wide and favorable publicity in the American press,”
especially if received “while Buell’s charges are still fresh and before there has been time
for editorial comment.”56
In late August 1928 amid a “background of anti-imperialistic arguments,” and to the
“surprise” of Raymond Buell, Thomas Jesse Jones spoke on the second day of the
Williamstown conference and assured those in attendance that they should have
54

Castle to Macy, July 19, 1928 (quotations), HHPL.
William R. Castle to George Grafton Wilson, July 19, 1928 (quotations), Box 10, Castle Papers, HHPL.
56
William R. Castle to American Legation, Monrovia, Liberia, August 18, 1928 (quotations), 882.5048/4a,
RG-59, NA. Harvey Firestone, Jr., also served on the board of the Advisory Committee of Education in
Liberia. Sundiata, Black Scandal, 42-46, 87.
55

148

“practically no cause for apprehension” about native exploitation in Liberia. Jones
praised Firestone’s enlightened policies “free from the old abuses of forced labor,” and
cited the eminent fairness of the loan agreements. He noted Firestone’s progress in the
previous two years in Liberia which included, among many other improvements, the
introduction of health services, new roads and transportation facilities, the founding of an
industrial school, and a hydroelectric power plant. Jones thanked the U. S. State
Department for its “wisdom and patience, not only during the Firestone negotiations but
also through all the years of Liberian history.” Without the “genuine interest” of the
State Department, Jones claimed, “Liberia would long ago have succumbed to the inroads
of its powerful neighbors and to the persistent weaknesses within.” The New York Times
noted that Jones “was able to put in the defense ahead of the attack” of Buell, who
“expected to lead off the discussion tomorrow with a criticism of both the Firestones and
the American Government.”57
As advertised, on the day following Jones’s presentation, Buell unleashed his assault.
He “severely criticized” Herbert Hoover, then the Republican presidential nominee, and
the State Department, for encouraging Firestone’s venture in Liberia, a move that had
caused the United States to engage in “economic imperialism” for the first time in
territory that fell outside of the Monroe Doctrine. Firestone, according to Buell, paid
native chiefs to recruit workers for the company, a situation that he described as
“virtually slave labor.” Because of the Firestone agreements, the State Department,
unless it departed “radically” from its policy in Latin America and China, appeared ready
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to “defend American capital in and American control over Liberia against impairment
from within or without.” Buell charged that the secret agreements might in time “make
Liberia another Haiti or Nicaragua.” In the entire history of international relations, he
found it difficult to find “a better example of secret diplomacy, in the worst sense of the
word.” He then urged the replacement of the Firestone agreements with a new
international loan sponsored by the League of Nations, one similar to those extended to
European nations after World War I.58
In the days after Buell’s speech, Castle, Firestone, and President King fired back with
press releases of their own.59 A full month after blindsiding Buell at Williamstown, and
while he waited for the confidential memorandum from Francis in Monrovia, Castle still
felt it necessary to condemn the research director of the Foreign Policy Association. In
response to a request by Christian A. Herter, editor of the Boston Independent, for “any
lowdown” on Buell, Castle claimed that after the State Department “very freely” showed
him documents relating to Liberia, his use of them proved “thoroughly unfair, since he
quoted only such bits as seemed to fit in with his preconceived theory” and that “by
inference suggested there was a lot more which would have been really dishonest.”
Castle then repeated the Dakar story, a “sort of thing . . . so utterly dishonest and tactless
that I cannot feel Buell is a man to tie up to.” With the presidential campaign underway,
Castle promised Herter that he would be glad to speak in Boston on behalf of Herbert
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Hoover, and that it might be worthwhile to educate some of the “high brows” there “who
had strange ideas about American foreign policy.”60
In March 1929, after his inauguration as president, Herbert Hoover named Henry
Stimson, a man who had no such “strange” ideas about American foreign policy, as the
new secretary of state. As abrupt and decisive as Harvey Firestone, although far more
sophisticated, Stimson brought a wealth of experience to his new post. He served as
secretary of war from1911 to 1913, commanded a field artillery unit as a colonel in
World War I, and in 1927 acted as a mediator in Nicaragua before accepting the
appointment of governor-general of the Philippines. A native of New York City and
graduate of Yale and Harvard, he left a thriving law practice to return to government.
With William Castle as assistant secretary of state, Stimson inherited a strong degree of
continuity vis-à-vis Liberia; indeed, everything in the State Department pipeline to the
black republic had originated at Castle’s desk.61
Unlike Herbert Hoover, who wanted to minimize American political and military
entanglements around the globe and rely instead on an economic approach, the activist
Stimson took a more positive view of using all the means at his disposal for furthering
American interests abroad. He favored a strong American presence in the Caribbean and
Latin America, whereas Hoover wanted to end the American occupations of Nicaragua
and Haiti. Faced with problems in political hotspots like Mexico and the Philippines, and
60
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anxious about the militaristic rumblings in Japan, Hoover and Stimson sometimes clashed
over policy; within a few years their views evolved in fundamentally opposite directions,
particularly in regard to neutrality and American non-membership in the League of
Nations. Both men, however, favored a firm approach toward Great Britain, whether in
the area of debt repayment or in regard to British holdings abroad that impinged on
American interests. In the case of Liberia, Hoover and Stimson acted in complete
accord.62
On March 22, 1929, four months before dying from yellow fever in Monrovia,
American minister Francis submitted his long-awaited confidential memorandum on
slavery and forced labor in the black republic. Francis claimed that he had no desire to
injure the government but rather “a hope that some method or means may be found . . . to
save the country from itself.” He had no doubt that “the policy pursued by prominent
officials of the Government in trafficking in forced labor is destined to bring Liberia
grief.” If the forced labor issue received enough publicity, Francis worried that the
country might be “crucified on the altar of public opinion.” He wondered why those
engaged in the business could not see the “breakers ahead,” unless they had become
“money-mad” and “so calloused that they have lost all sense of right and wrong.”
Moreover, Francis gave the republic no chance for success “until the United States, or
some other Government equally as friendly, picks it up and shakes it into a realization of
its stupidity.”63
Over the course of eighty-six pages, Francis built what amounted to an open and shut
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case against Ross, Yancy, and others with connections to Charles King. The
memorandum, by the American minister’s own account, left no doubt that “the officials
of the Liberian Government have knowledge of, are engaged in, and are making large
sums of money by the exportation of forced labor which has developed into a condition
analogous to slavery.” Francis also made “inquiry and investigation” into whether or not
the Firestone Plantations Company had “engaged in securing involuntary or forced labor
. . . and the information obtained indicates that it has not.” Devastating in its range of
details, Francis’ lengthy reply to Castle’s request from the previous summer served as the
basis for the State Department’s course of action in Liberia throughout the rest of 1929.64
Other news in the memorandum added an air of mystery and suspense that made
Castle nervous. Francis referred to a shadowy figure known as Dorothy Moll and
showed some concern about the “uncertainty” of her purpose in Liberia. Moll had made
at least one previous trip on board a Spanish ship with laborers bound for Fernando Po,
and left again in the same manner in December 1928. By early March 1929, she had yet
to return to Liberia. Some believed Moll worked for the German government or for
private German interests, while others regarded her as a “soldier of fortune.” No one,
with the possible exception of President King, placed any credence in her assertion that
she worked for the Associated Press. In Francis’ opinion, “Mrs. Moll is a secret agent
employed by some individual corporation or government,” and at the very least her
knowledge of forced labor shipments and “her presence in Fernando Po bodes no good to
Liberia and may . . . result in publicity at some future and perhaps not distant date.”65
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As Castle digested the news from Liberia a week before Stimson took command of the
State Department, Francis busied himself compiling a few more interesting tidbits for his
superiors in Washington to contemplate. In April, the American minister in Monrovia
claimed in another cable that Yancy had recently jailed ten chiefs who had failed to
supply men for Fernando Po, and then ordered the Frontier Force to conduct a raid.
Francis noted that the Cape Palmas region, where Firestone’s Cavalla plantation was still
in the developmental stage, had been “quite thoroughly drained of laborers,” a situation
that prompted Yancy to attempt to coerce men away from jobs with the rubber company.
The district commissioner in Cape Palmas, according to what Francis had learned,
received ten shillings for each worker supplied to Yancy. In January and February of
1929, Yancy had sent 574 men to Fernando Po for £9.0.0 each. The report from Cape
Palmas that Francis based his information on also indicated “Yancy and Ross pay
president of the republic for privilege.”66
A month later, in May 1929, Assistant Secretary of State Castle received the kind of
news that he knew was sure to come in time but that he nevertheless found most
disagreeable. Francis sent word to Castle that Thomas Faulkner had recently left on a
cargo ship bound for Hamburg, Germany, and that he planned to proceed to Geneva and
issue a formal protest to the League of Nations against forced labor in Liberia.
Afterward, Faulkner intended to air his complaints on behalf of Liberia’s natives during
an extended trip to the United States. Although Francis promised “a quiet but careful
observance of and a full report . . . on Mr. Faulkner’s movements” in Geneva, Castle saw
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that the State Department would have to move quickly if it wanted to soften the blow
about to fall.67 Faulkner, armed with his own knowledge and evidence of forced labor in
Liberia, was perhaps the one man that the Department knew that it could not influence;
indeed, it made no effort to do so.
Instead, Castle met with the secretary of state and warned him of the impending storm
of criticism once the forced labor issue broke in the press. Castle had already drafted an
official telegram to Liberia that could be sent whenever Stimson decided to sign his name
to it, a response designed to insulate Firestone and the State Department against any
charges that might arise.68 On June 5, 1929, Francis sent another telegram with
information from a Barber steamship line representative who had informed him of the
shipment of one hundred native laborers from Monrovia bound for Libreville, Gabon.
Profits of the shipment amounted to about $2000, and because it “may entangle American
line in slavery intricacies,” Francis requested “immediate instructions” on how to
proceed.69 With time running out before Faulkner’s June meeting with League of
Nations Secretary-General Sir Eric Drummond in Geneva, Stimson acted almost
immediately. He cabled the American legation in Monrovia the evening of June 5th and
directed Francis to “formally present the following note to the Liberian Government,”
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four tersely worded pages intended to arouse the attention of even the most complacent
officials in the black republic.70
Stimson’s telegram, delivered on June 8, informed the Liberians that receipt by the
U. S. State Department of several reports “bearing reliable evidence of authenticity . . .
definitely indicate that existing conditions” in labor shipments to Fernando Po had
resulted in “a system which seems hardly distinguishable from organized slave trade and
that in the enforcement of this system the services of the Liberian frontier force and the
services and influence of certain high government officials are constantly and
systematically used.” Stimson also pointed to similar objectionable practices used in the
country’s interior and that it might be impossible “to withhold the governments of the
world” from considering some form of “effective affirmative action” if Liberia failed to
make necessary reforms. “It would be tragically ironic,” Stimson warned, if Liberia
succumbed “to practices so closely akin to those which its founders sought forever to
escape.”71
Because of the “century-old friendship” between the United States and Liberia,
Stimson was certain that the republic would take all appropriate measures to address the
problem: namely, “prompt ratification” of the Slavery Convention; “material alteration
or radical change” in the agreement with Spain on Fernando Po; a “rigorous investigation
of forced labor conditions throughout Liberia”; reorganization of the Frontier Force and
the administration of labor in the interior; and “prompt and condign punishment of all
persons, regardless of their position,” who took part in “the development of forced labor
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conditions so closely resembling slavery and so repugnant to the moral sense of
mankind.” If the republic took the State Department’s advice it could “vindicate its good
name” and “eliminate a condition which if continued threatens grave consequences to
Liberia.” William Castle, the linchpin in the entire process, recognized—without irony—
that the instructions were “pretty direct interference in the internal affairs of another
country.”72
The lightning bolt from Washington stunned President King but had less of an impact
on Secretary of State Edwin Barclay, who told Francis after receiving the June 5th note:
“This is an old story.”73 In a few days the King administration’s formal reply to Stimson
denied any wrongdoing cited in the “evidently exaggerated and uninformed” reports
received by the U. S. State Department. Indeed, Liberia welcomed an “on the spot”
investigation by “a competent, impartial and unprejudiced commission.” A surprised
Francis respectfully urged his superiors to accept Liberia’s offer “without delay,” and to
consider the appointment of Emmett J. Scott to serve on the commission.74 Why
President King so quickly acceded to Stimson’s request for an investigation is not
entirely clear. King and his advisers apparently felt that they could delay and disrupt the
process long enough to avoid an official inquiry, or at least make arrangements to cover
their tracks in a way that would quell any negative findings. Also, King more than likely
trusted that his top adviser, a medicine man feared by natives and Americo-Liberians
alike for his powerful magic, could cast a spell strong enough to ward off the
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investigation.75 In any event, the State Department’s maneuverings had hooked King,
and neither Stimson nor Castle intended to let him wriggle loose.
On June 20, 1929, Thomas Faulkner issued his protest to the League of Nations
Council in Geneva. Faulkner cited Liberia’s abusive system of using native labor for
government roadwork, and the “more pernicious activity” of forced labor shipments to
Fernando Po, a practice that went on with “impunity.” Although Yancy and Ross were
named as the principal beneficiaries of profits from forced labor, Faulkner also cited
Secretary of State Edwin Barclay and Secretary of Public Works John L. Morris as two
key government officials who received a cut of the proceeds. Faulkner claimed that his
main reason for appealing to the League was his desire to avoid “bloodshed and a lot of
poor, innocent people being killed.” Because President King believed himself “immune
from harm or influence in his demeanor as a self-instituted dictator of the little republic,”
Faulkner wanted to prevent “what is sure to come if the League of Nations, of which
Liberia is a Member, does not in a friendly way interpose and stop this oppression of the
native people—that is a bloody fight or a revolution.”76 While Faulkner viewed the
matter from an entirely different angle than officials at the U. S. State Department, his
appeal to the League nevertheless sought the same goal in regard to the use of forced
labor in Liberia and its export to other parts of Africa.
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After contacting the American ambassador in Spain and giving him instructions to
inform the Spanish government that the United States had no intention of including it in
the investigation pending in Liberia, Stimson wired Francis in Monrovia with a message
for President King. The Secretary of State thanked the Liberian government for its swift
approval of a commission of inquiry, a move that he felt demonstrated the republic’s
determination to confront the problem of slavery and forced labor and “to do its part in
eradicating these evils for all time.” To that end, Stimson suggested that the commission
“be composed of one Liberian member, one American member and one European
member representative of general international interest in this question.” As to the
Liberian member, Stimson felt it “desirable” that someone without connections to the
government be chosen. For its part, the United States would “be disposed to recommend
a man of the type of Emmett Scott.” Stimson suggested that the League of Nations could
assist in finding “a suitable nominee” for the third member of the commission.77
A day after informing Stimson that he believed findings by the commission “will be
thwarted by any Liberian members,” American minister Francis, scheduled to depart
Liberia in July, became ill with yellow fever and was replaced by the legation’s viceconsul and third secretary Clifton R. Wharton.78 On June 28, a little more than a week
after Faulkner’s proclamations in Geneva, Wharton contacted Stimson with news that
Edwin Barclay had received a note from the League of Nations Bureau of Labor but that
the Liberian secretary of state “would not comment thereon.” Wharton also spoke with
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President King, who wished to remind the Americans that under the articles of the
Slavery Convention “forced labor may be exacted for public purposes.” King told
Wharton in private that the State Department’s “original representations were very
severe.” After Stimson’s second note outlining commission membership, King was “still
considerably worried” but believed that such a course was “absolutely essential.”79
In mid-July, a few days before the death of William Francis, Stimson cabled the
American legation in Monrovia with the State Department’s views on the scope of the
investigation. Stimson thanked Liberian secretary of state Barclay for the nature of his
government’s response to previous suggestions, and noted that the appointment of an
international commission of inquiry “will have an effect upon the opinion of the world
that cannot but redound to the prestige of the Liberian nation.” In view of the “sweeping
nature” of the allegations and the “wide credence” that they had gained, however,
Stimson thought it necessary that the terms of reference should include the matter of
shipments to Fernando Po, the Congo, and elsewhere, as well as the use of forced labor
within Liberia. The personnel of the commission, rather than the “technical” terms of
reference, stood out as the more important factor for Stimson. In that regard, the
commissioners should have the “broadest possible powers.” Stimson then advised that
the Liberian Government make a public announcement “that it has been disturbed by
reports regarding labor conditions” within its boundaries, and that it would appoint a
commission of inquiry as a way of preventing “such misconceptions from gaining further
headway.” Upon receiving a reply from the King administration, Stimson instructed the
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legation to inform the Liberians that the U. S. State Department planned to ask Emmett J.
Scott to serve on the commission.80
Over the course of the next few weeks, Stimson was jolted both by the death of
William Francis and by a featured report in the Baltimore Afro-American of Faulkner’s
charges that President King and other high government officials in Liberia profited from
forced labor. As the State Department and the Liberians negotiated the commission’s
terms of reference—Monrovia originally wanted Firestone included in the
investigation—Wharton cabled Stimson with news that King’s Cabinet felt that the
president had acted unwisely and was “now seeking the best way out.” From what
Wharton had gathered, he posited that the “government will try hard to maintain a
position of complete ignorance of any slave trade by its citizens and subjects that may
later on be found by the Commission.” In the meantime, Samuel Ross had left for
Germany, and Allen Yancy had been in Monrovia making “efforts to cover up tracks.”81
As discussions dragged on and forced labor shipments continued to flow out of
Liberia, the U. S. State Department kept Harvey Firestone informed of developments. At
the end of a cable to Wharton with proposed changes to the terms of reference, Acting
Secretary of State Joseph P. Cotton noted in strict confidence that “[t]his telegram has
been seen by Firestone.” In his correspondence with the State Department, Firestone
agreed that the future of the black republic depended on its acceptance of the terms as
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outlined, and that he “would prefer to abandon any further interest in Liberia rather than
become involved in any way in the alleged forced labor and slavery situation.”82
The forced labor controversy no doubt concerned Firestone, but it was only one of
many problems in Liberia that distracted him and fed his resentment toward leaders in the
black republic. With the demise of the Stevenson plan in 1928 crude rubber prices
declined to the point that the Firestone Plantations Company decided in 1929 to scale
back operations and cut its work force in Liberia. Further reductions in the work force
after the 1929 planting period harmed Liberian revenues and led to mounting tension and
conflict between Firestone and the King administration. A clash between the U. S. State
Department and President King over the authority of American fiscal officers in the
weeks preceding Stimson’s June 5th note only made matters worse. To be sure,
Firestone’s primary concern throughout the forced labor controversy rested with Liberia’s
difficulty in the collection of its customs revenues, funds designated for repayment of the
1926 loan. Firestone had little regard for the League of Nations, an organization that he
viewed suspiciously as nothing more than a means for safeguarding British imperialism.83
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No longer able to project his anger directly at the British for the deviousness of the
Stevenson plan, Firestone found convenient substitutes in President King and the
Americo-Liberians.
In September 1929 the King administration and the U. S. State Department finally
reached agreement over the commission’s terms of reference. The terms empowered the
commission to ascertain if slavery as defined by the 1926 Slavery Convention existed in
the republic, and if leading citizens or government officials encouraged or participated in
the practice. The question of compulsory labor, either for private purposes or for
shipment to Fernando Po and other parts of Africa, also came under the commission’s
purview, as did the use of the Frontier Force for recruiting it. In order to carry out their
inquiry effectively and issue a report with recommendations for reform, commissioners
were given the power to subpoena documents and summon witnesses. Projected to begin
its work as early as possible in 1930, the three-person international commission of
inquiry into slavery and forced labor in the Republic of Liberia was tentatively allotted
two months to complete its job and an additional month to make its report. The
appointment of commission members remained as the only hurdle left in the process.84

December 19, 1928 (quotation), HC. On Firestone and the League of Nations, see Sundiata, Black
Scandal, 51.
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The commission’s terms of reference were as follows: “(a) Whether slavery as defined in the antislavery convention in fact exists in the Republic. (b) Whether this system is participated in or encouraged
by the Government of the Republic. (c) Whether and what leading citizens of the country participate
therein. (d) To what extent compulsory labor exists as a factor in the social and industrial economy of the
State, either for public or private purposes, and, if it does exist, in what manner it has been recruited and
employed, whether for public or private purposes. (e) Whether the shipment of contract laborers to
Fernando Poo under the terms of arrangement with Spain, or shipment of such laborers to the Congo or any
other foreign parts is associated with slavery, and whether the method employed in recruiting such laborers
carries any compulsion. (f) Whether the labor employed for private purposes on privately owned or leased
plantations is recruited by voluntary enlistments or is forcibly impressed for this service by the Liberian
Government or by its authority. (g) Whether the Liberian Government has at any time given sanction or
approval to the recruiting of labor with the aid and assistance of the Liberian Frontier Force or other
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In Geneva, M. A. Sottile, Liberia’s permanent delegate to the League of Nations,
issued a formal proposal on September 16 for a commission of inquiry composed of one
American, one Liberian, and an international member to be appointed by the League of
Nations. In conversation with Wharton in previous weeks, President King expressed
concern over Faulkner’s allegations, and inquired if the United States had determined that
it would appoint Emmett Scott to the commission. King then claimed that his only desire
was that the U. S. not select “a Garvey man,” or anyone sympathetic to the Universal
Negro Improvement Association. Wharton assured King of the improbability of anyone
connected to the UNIA serving on the commission, and then inquired whom the president
had in mind as the Liberian member. King replied, in strict confidence, that he was
considering his father-in-law and former president of Liberia, Arthur Barclay, if in fact
“the old man” would serve.85
Shortly before Sottile made his proposal to the League Council, King again asked
Wharton about Emmett Scott, and made a vague reference to a rumor that the Howard
University treasurer had played some role in the failed 1921 loan other than urging the
U. S. Congress to approve it. Unsure what King was “driving at,” Wharton wondered if
the president was “worried and wants to know Dr. Scott’s present attitude towards
Liberia or else wants definite information as to whether or not Dr. Scott would be
recommended.” If the latter were the case, Wharton deemed King’s inquiry to be “of a
most serious and dangerous nature.” King finally confessed to Wharton that he
of the International Commission of Inquiry, 5, 7 (quotation). Wharton had suggested earlier that two
months was not enough time to carry out the investigation, and that commissioners should be “empowered
to issue subpoenas duces tecum and to compel witnesses to bring government records, etc.” Clifton R.
Wharton to the Secretary of State, July 24, 1929 (quotation), 882.5048/52, RG-59, NA.
85
International Commission of Inquiry, Report of the International Commission of Inquiry, 5; Clifton R.
Wharton to Secretary of State, August 13, 1929, p. 3(quotations), 882.5048/88, RG-59, NA. Amid other
League news, the Associated Press announced on September 26, 1929, that Liberia had made a formal
request for an investigation. See, for instance, New York Times, September 26, 1929, p.9, c. 2.
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understood how “to continually call attention to the necessity of an impartial man, ask
that one type of man not be appointed and then ask information about another, basing the
question upon a rumor, may lead the United States Government to believe that his
Government is fearful of the outcome of the investigation.”86
In the end, King had no reason to be concerned about Emmett Scott. After trying to
persuade him for more than two months to accept the appointment as the American
member of the Commission, the State Department finally gave up on Scott, who cited an
important “transitional period” in the financial affairs of Howard University as his reason
for declining the position. Running short of time to appoint someone who could be ready
to leave for Liberia in January 1930, Stimson and Castle in November 1929 began to look
more closely at Scott’s recommendation of Charles S. Johnson to serve on the
commission.87
Several days after the Liberian legislature ratified the articles of the Slavery
Convention, William R. Castle cabled Charles S. Johnson on November 26th and urged
86

Clifton R. Wharton to the Secretary of State, September 16, 1929 (quotations), 882.5048/111, RG59,NA.
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If Johnson could not serve, Scott suggested Charles H. Wesley, a black history professor at Howard.
Emmett J. Scott to William R. Castle, September 19, 1929, 882.5048/128,RG-59, NA. Stimson, at the
suggestion of Henry Carter, an official in the office of Western European Affairs, urged President Hoover
to nominate Henry L. West, a white journalist and, since 1916, president of the American Colonization
Society, if Scott declined. Henry L. Stimson to Herbert Hoover, October 24, 1929, Presidential Foreign
Affairs: Liberia, Box 99, HHPL; Henry Carter to William R. Castle, October 22, 1929, 882.5048/116, RG59, NA. Castle, on the other hand, was not so sure about West. He noted that West “is a pleasant little
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R. Castle to Henry Carter, November 18, 1929 (quotation), 882.5048/130, RG-59, NA. As a last resort, the
State Department would even consider W. E. B. Du Bois who, “[i]n spite of the radicalism and bitterness
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R. Castle, November 18, 1929, 882.5048/130, RG-59, NA. Henry L. Stimson to Emmett J. Scott,
November 2, 1929, 882.5048/118, Emmett J. Scott to Henry L. Stimson, November 15, 1929 (quotation),
882.5048/124, RG-59, NA. Scott, a member of the Colored Voters’ Division and of the Republican
National Committee, Campaign of 1928, expressed concern to White House secretary Lawrence R. Richey
in June 1929 about “Anti-Administration propaganda” in the black press. Scott then offered to discuss an
approach that was followed during the Coolidge years. Emmett J. Scott to Lawrence R. Richey, June 5,
1929, and Scott to Walter L. Newton, July 17, 1929, President’s Secretarial File, Box 84, HHPL.
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him to consider President Hoover’s invitation to serve as the American representative of
the commission. Castle offered a per diem allowance of fifteen dollars, and a salary of
$250 per month from the time that Johnson left Nashville for a mission now projected to
run five months. The government would also pay the salary of a personal secretary
selected by Johnson. Castle urged Johnson to accept the appointment because an honest
and thorough investigation of the forced labor issue in Liberia “would have a most
valuable effect on all other parts of the world where such conditions exist.” Furthermore,
Castle suggested that serving as the American representative “on such an important piece
of work” would be “something which you would always feel to be one of the very
important incidents of your life.” The State Department had “a great deal of material” for
Johnson to study and needed a quick reply, as Castle believed that the League of Nations
was waiting to hear about the appointment of the American commissioner before
selecting its own delegate.88
Johnson received Castle’s telegram on December 2nd upon his return from trips to
Texas and Georgia. While honored to be considered and “favorably disposed” to serve
on the commission, Johnson informed Castle that he first had to consult with university
and foundation officials about “temporary release from certain commitments” before
final acceptance. At the time, Johnson had in the works three projects for the Social
Science Research Council, and two others for “important Foundations.” Everyone
agreed, however, that “the commission contemplated by the State Department should
take precedence,” and Johnson accepted the appointment officially on December 6, 1929.
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William R. Castle to Charles S. Johnson, November 26, 1929 (quotations), 882.5048/215a, RG-59, NA.
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Even if Emmett Scott notified him beforehand about his recommendation, and there is no
evidence that he did, the quick turnaround between nomination and acceptance indicates
that the Fisk sociologist may not have considered realistically the consequences of an
extended stay in Liberia, a country with a reputation as a graveyard for foreign visitors.89
In Liberia, American chargé d’affaires Wharton spoke with Secretary of State Edwin
Barclay, who “made no comments on the nomination of Johnson.” Wharton cabled
Stimson, then in England preparing for the London Naval Conference scheduled to begin
in January 1930, and claimed that because of the delay in the nomination of
commissioners, Barclay had hinted that Liberia might consider an independent
investigation of its own. Stimson then hurriedly wired to Switzerland “for the purpose of
expediting the League nomination.” Searching for a representative from a country
without African colonial possessions, the League, after prodding from Stimson,
nominated Sigvald Meek, a Norwegian jurist with experience as a prosecutor in the
Belgian Congo.90
In the meantime, a report by J. P. Moffat, the U. S. State Department’s chief of
Western European Affairs, outlined “a first line of attack” for the commission to follow,
which included the observance of labor shipments to Fernando Po, a trip into the interior,
and an audit of the financial records of recruiting agents. He believed that it did not take
a “prophet” to foretell that the Liberian member, Arthur Barclay, would not agree with
any report that disparaged the Liberian government. Indeed, Moffat claimed, “Life for
89

Charles S. Johnson to William R. Castle, December 2, 1929 (quotations), 882.5048/149, RG-59, NA.
Johnson to Castle, December 6, 1929, 882.5048/152, RG-59, NA. James L. Sibley, a white American
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him would not be worth living if he were to do so.” Because the League member “may
only report generally that conditions might be improved,” Moffat urged that the
American member issue a minority report and “not hesitate to describe fully conditions as
he finds them.” Liberia, according to Moffat, “is attempting to prove that a country can
be run by colored people and are making a mess of it to the dissatisfaction of every man,
white or colored, who has an interest in the welfare of the colored people.” Although he
felt it “quite possible” that the republic could eventually “run its own affairs,” the United
States was probably “building on sand” in Liberia. In Moffat’s estimation, AmericoLiberians may have been entrusted “too early with complete political liberty,” for up to
the present time the nation had shown itself to be “characterless.”91
In late December, after being accompanied by Emmett Scott to a meeting in Akron
with Harvey Firestone, Jr., and William Hines, Johnson contacted J. P. Moffat in
Washington. As his first choice for a personal secretary, Johnson submitted the name of
John Matheus, an African American teacher at West Virginia Collegiate Institute, and a
former winner of an Opportunity prize in poetry. Arthur Schomburg served as the
American commissioner’s second choice. Johnson then asked Moffat for copies of a
number of documents to supplement what the State Department had already given him,
such as the Firestone loan agreements, and arranged for a meeting in Washington the
following month.92
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J. P. Moffat to William R. Castle, December 16, 1929 (quotations), 882.5048/183, RG-59, NA.
Johnson also requested financial and customs data from Liberia, a copy of the report of the 1909
commission, information on the Labor Bureau and the Frontier Force, articles of the Slavery Convention,
and Faulkner’s charges filed before the League Council, among other items. Because of his “unfamiliarity
with official governmental procedure,” Johnson asked Moffat other questions which had “a bearing more
upon personal orientation: 1. What should be my relation to the American Chargé d’Affaires, and to the
American Legation in Liberia? 2. Will the Commission be guests of the Liberian Republic in any other
than an official sense? 3. To whom shall the official report be made, and if it should become desirable to
make a minority report would it be made or filed with other than the Liberian Republic? 4. Is the
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As 1929 came to a close, Raymond Buell wrote to Secretary of State Stimson in
response to a State Department query on his thoughts about commission procedure.
Buell, however, offered little that had evaded either Stimson or Castle. Even so, one idea
stood out amid Buell’s advice on compiling documentary evidence and other
fundamental procedures. Unable to move beyond his original views, Buell suggested
that, although it was “entirely possible that a perfectly voluntary system of recruiting is
now being followed,” the commission should not forget to include the Firestone
Plantations Company in its investigation. As far as the commissioners named for the
League of Nations inquiry, Buell made no comment.93
Far across the Atlantic Ocean in Monrovia, President King had a response quite
different from Buell’s when he learned that the United States and the League had named
their commission representatives. In order to protect themselves from the upcoming
investigation, King and several members of his Cabinet, alleged to be active participants
in the Alligator Society, took the unusual step of sacrificing a goat. The sacrifice,
according to tradition, should have been a human one. When a boatload of native Krus
drowned in waters off Monrovia, it was “generally felt that the alligator was dissatisfied
with the goat.”94 Although knowledge of the King administration’s dependence on
superstition and the occult in decision-making may not have affected the State

connection of the League of Nations with the inquiry made explicit in any article which should be known
about?” Charles S. Johnson to J. P. Moffat, December 30, 1929 (quotations), 882.5048/204, RG-59, NA.
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Graham Greene, after a discussion about secret bush societies with a white physician in Liberia, wrote in
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because they believed.” Graham Greene, Journey Without Maps (New York: Doubleday, 1936), 173-74
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Department’s opinion of Liberian leadership—it could not fall any lower—it might well
have caused it to exert pressure on different, and perhaps more vulnerable, points than
those eventually chosen.
Convinced that Americo-Liberians would never take it upon themselves to make the
reforms necessary to stabilize the republic so that it could develop and prosper, and
unwilling to delve any deeper into its internal affairs, the U. S. State Department chose to
steer Liberia onto an uncharted course in the hope that it might lead—no one knew how
exactly—to substantive change. After the stock market crash of October 1929, protecting
American corporate interests like Firestone took on added importance for officials at the
State Department. The approach taken by Secretary of State Henry Stimson and
Assistant Secretary of State William Castle allowed them to both address the forced labor
issue on humanitarian grounds, and protect the image of the State Department and
Firestone. The selection of Charles S. Johnson seemed to Stimson and Castle a safe
choice to carry out the inquiry into the forced labor controversy. Yet, neither Stimson
nor Castle truly understood what Johnson’s mission meant to Liberia’s tribal citizens, or
the calamitous effects that his objectivity and scholarship would have on the republic’s
political future.
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CHAPTER 4
“TO SEE CLEARLY AND SIFT WISELY”:
CHARLES S. JOHNSON IN LIBERIA

West Africa is the land where God came
to learn to wait. And then wait a little longer.
Denis Johnson, “The Civil War in Hell” (2001)

For Charles S. Johnson, the first few weeks of January 1930 were given over almost
completely to the “adjustment” of research projects then in process, as well as leaving
instructions for administrative duties so that “no serious results” would occur in his
protracted absence from the United States. Concerned with what he would be leaving
behind, and without adequate time to prepare for what lay ahead, he gave little thought to
the fundamentals needed for surviving an extended stay in Liberia. On January 10, less
than two weeks before the beginning of the London Naval Conference, and as Firestone
began to pressure President Charles King for reform in Liberia’s customs collections,
Johnson left Nashville for New York and a brief visit to the State Department in
Washington. Scheduled to sail from New York on January 29 aboard the S. S. President
Roosevelt, Johnson had to accept third-class accommodations because objections from
white American passengers denied his securing anything better.1
As Johnson began packing for his trip, he felt troubled because he could find “no
guides to equipment or clothing, or medicines, or the myriad precautions for the tropics at

1

Charles S. Johnson to J. P. Moffat, December 30, 1929 (quotations), 882.5048/204, RG-59 (National
Archives, Washington, D. C.) Hereafter cited as RG-59, NA; Charles S. Johnson to Arthur Schomburg,
January ?, 1930, in David Levering Lewis, When Harlem Was in Vogue (New York: Alfred A. Knopf,
1981), 256; New York Times, January 29, 1930, p. 16, c. 6.
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this distance.” The only practical advice came from “those lonely adventurers who have
wandered into these far parts of the Earth.” He found their advice wanting, however, “in
that it recalls only the freakish remnants of experience. Never the essential steps of
preparation.” In his new “upside-downness of life,” he could only sort and guess “far
into the night.”2
At the State Department, Johnson examined records that dealt with Liberia and met
with, among others, Raymond Buell, Anson Phelps-Stokes, Harvey Firestone, and
Harvey Firestone, Jr. Earlier, the State Department had arranged an itinerary for Johnson
that included trips to London, Paris, Bern and Geneva “for the purpose of consultation in
connection with your mission.” While Johnson gathered facts and listened to conflicting
points of view in Washington, it is doubtful that he received any useful information on
day-to-day techniques for survival, considering that Harvey Firestone had never visited
Liberia, and Raymond Buell had never spent any time in the country’s hinterland. On the
other hand, Harvey Firestone, Jr.’s knowledge of Liberia did not extend far beyond the
country club-like company headquarters at the Harbel plantation on the Du River.3
In New York again after his trip to Washington, Johnson went out of his way to fulfill
a commitment made months earlier. A few days before his departure for Europe, a
fatigued Johnson made a trip to Bronxville to deliver a speech “to a polite girls seminary
or rather Junior College, on a favorable theme.” Kept waiting in the school’s office until
a student worker finally sent word that someone named “Johnson” wanted to see the
dean, the African American sociologist eventually made his way to the assembly hall to
be met by “two hundred curious faces, some interested, some mildly and politely
2

Charles S. Johnson, “African Diary,” 1, (quotations), Folder 15, Box 88, Charles S. Johnson Papers
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scoffing, some obviously bored.” Later, an exhausted Johnson recalled the day “as an
almost dead loss in the task of getting prepared” for the longest and most difficult journey
of his life. As he tried to fall asleep he heard his wife, Marie, at the sewing machine, her
fingers flying “as in a spell.” But he made no protest, noting, “that gown is not nearly so
important as something else, but it represents a promise and one of those curiously
intimate interests which no amount of necessity would provoke one to question.”4
The next day brought “a mass of details still unattended,” which included “more
instructions to the staff, more purchases, more interviews, telephone calls, money matters
to arrange, telegrams to send and the farewells.” At a bon voyage party that night
Johnson marveled at the presence of nearly all of the friends that he had made in New
York during the exciting years of the Harlem Renaissance. Guests included James
Weldon Johnson, Alain Locke, Walter White, Aaron Douglas, and a physician who urged
the guest of honor to pack a supply of quinine pills, something that, astonishingly,
Johnson had not thought of previously. Two more parties suggested “the going for a long
time . . . not all were certain whether this was for a month, three months, a year, or for
years.”5
Charles S. Johnson and his personal secretary, John Matheus, sailed from New York
on January 29, 1930, and arrived in Plymouth, England, on February 5. While Johnson’s
assignment was far different from his only previous transatlantic voyage, when in 1918
he wore a U. S. Army uniform, confusion still ruled the day. On January 30, the New
York Times announced Johnson’s appointment to the League of Nations commission,
4
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scheduled to meet in Liberia the first week of March. The report also announced the
resignation of the elderly Sigvald Meek, who “did not wish uselessly to endanger” his
health “by a stay in Liberia during the rainy season.” Because the League Council might
have to wait until its May session to appoint a new commissioner, the report claimed that
no inquiry would be likely before the end of the year. In Monrovia on February 13,
Henry Carter, the impassioned white chargé d’affaires who began his work in midDecember 1929, wrote to Secretary of State Stimson and asked when Johnson planned to
leave New York. Carter, whose assignment in Liberia was designed “to coincide . . .
with the duration of the forced labor investigation,” expressed concern over a local report
that Johnson had postponed sailing from New York for two months after Meek’s
resignation. Acting Secretary of State Joseph P. Cotton then hurriedly wired Carter with
the incorrect information that Johnson had left on January 22.6
Searching for a “first clue” in London to begin his mission led Johnson to the
International Institute of African Languages and Cultures. At a glance he believed, “The
problem of native labor in Liberia seems . . . to be inseparably locked with the structure
of native life—social customs, religion, laws.” Johnson wanted to meet Diedrich
Westermann, an expert on the Kpelle in Liberia, and editor of Africa, the Institute’s
6
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official journal. “Westermann is, of course, out of England,” Johnson discovered, but
through Westermann’s assistant, Dorothy Brackett, a meeting was arranged with Polishborn, British anthropologist Bronislaw Malinowski, then a professor at the London
School of Economics. Malinowski, a founder of the “functional” school of anthropology,
agreed to meet with Johnson that evening in front of the bulletin board at Victoria
Station, and then later to arrange for a longer discussion. Arriving early, Johnson waited
until the appointed time, whereupon Dorothy Brackett appeared and told him that
Malinowski had a change of plans, and requested a dinner meeting at the apartment of
Captain George Henry Lane Fox Pitt-Rivers, near Buckingham Palace. Through
Brackett, Malinowski informed Johnson not to be upset with the captain’s “brusqueness”
or anything that he might say, since he had “ideas sometimes considered odd.” Johnson,
his interest piqued, made “a rapid mental picture” of a “sun-beaten soldier with readymade and not too flattering opinions of natives—imperialistic and bluff.”7
Later, “in the shadow of Buckingham Palace,” Johnson reached the captain’s address,
a “small but finely made structure, like the prototype of some of the recreated tiny
apartments in Greenwich Village.” A “surprisingly stalwart” French maid greeted
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Johnson at the door and directed him upstairs to the library, where he mistook the
youthful and “almost fragile” figure of Pitt-Rivers, dressed in a “blue, double-breasted
lounge suit,” for Malinowski. As the two smoked the captain’s custom-made cigarettes
and endured moments of awkward silence, Pitt-Rivers finally asked, “Did Malinowski
say something about your going to Africa?” The question, much to Johnson’s relief, at
least allowed him to explain his mission. Afterward, he learned that, contrary to his
preconceived ideas, the captain was quite sensitive about the question of native life in
Africa, particularly as it concerned British colonial possessions. After another lull,
Johnson asked “if this is the Pitt-Rivers associated with anthropological writings.” The
captain replied nervously and haltingly as he extracted a small volume from a bookshelf
and then, with some confusion and “almost apologetically,” noted that his grandfather
had written several books and founded the Cultural Museum at Farnham, and his father
had done some writing but since then the only Pitt-Rivers “who had connected himself
with any volumes on anthropology was probably himself.” Indeed, Johnson had read the
captain’s Clash of Culture on the voyage from New York.8
While sipping vermouth and smoking another cigarette, Johnson heard Malinowski
enter downstairs and speak in French to the maid. Soon the anthropologist hastened into
the library and launched immediately into the “midst of the subject.” “In any approach to
the questions in hand,” he began, “our sympathies are first with the natives . . .” an
8
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approach never discussed by the U. S. State Department. After firing off questions about
the terms of reference, Malinowski confessed that his knowledge of Liberia was quite
limited. Although he would have to leave after dinner, he believed that they could “get
an understanding of the question,” and then meet the next morning at his home near
Primrose Hill Road.9
On the following day, Malinowski wasted no time in setting down the points to be
clarified: the exportation of labor; the presence of Firestone; the use of labor by
Government agencies; and adoption and pawning. The anthropologist asked so many
questions that Johnson wondered “whether I am interviewing him or he me.” Because
neither of the two men had any direct knowledge of Liberia, most topics fell into the
category of “something to be inquired into.” Asked about his methodology, Johnson
relied on his advice from the State Department and suggested, “first, getting documents,
then selections of sections for intimate visits inland, combining of sociological inquiry
with the terms of reference,” and “later hearings on the basis of such evidence as is
disclosed.” Malinowski regarded Johnson’s approach as “sound.” As their meeting came
to a close after mid-morning cake and wine, Malinowski mentioned that, as a Pole in
England, he felt a deep connection with minorities. Also, according to the professor,
England seemed more “generous” toward its colonies than any other nation, and Liberia
might “require some sort of impartial white tutelage.”10
While the ongoing London Naval Conference necessarily limited interview
possibilities, Johnson, and presumably Matheus, nevertheless managed to meet with at
9
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least two officials from the British Foreign Office who had been stationed in Liberia,
several diplomats from the League of Nations, and Sir Frederick John Dealty Lugard, “a
high authority on matters of colonial administration and native development,” who
provided a letter of introduction to the governor of Sierra Leone.11 After concluding his
business in London, Johnson used a letter written on official commission stationery as
“an excuse for seeing the expatriated sons of the pen sojourning in Paris,” namely, his
friend Countee Cullen. Hardly an expatriate, Cullen had received a Guggenheim
Fellowship for study at the Sorbonne. Cullen showed Johnson around Paris where they
met up with mutual friend Paul Robeson, then at the peak of his fame in Europe after a
sold-out singing tour and starring role in Othello in London. Johnson’s stopover in Paris,
unbeknownst to the State Department, had no connection with his mission but was purely
for recreational purposes, a brief furlough and chance to catch his breath that received no
mention later on in his minority report.12
From Paris, Johnson traveled to Bern, Switzerland, where he met with U. S. State
Department officials before moving on to Geneva, the international headquarters of the
League of Nations. Secretary-General Sir Eric Drummond, whom Johnson would meet,
had followed a policy of restraint throughout the 1920s in dealings with the United
States, the League’s most conspicuous nonmember. While not bound by any of the
peacekeeping organization’s decisions, the United States still actively participated in
many League conferences as the 1920s progressed, particularly in regard to armaments
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and commercial subjects, or, as in Liberia, whenever it suited its purposes. When it came
to settling international disputes or measures to prevent war, however, the U. S. adhered
to its own course and refused to collaborate with the League.13
In Geneva, Johnson’s interview with Drummond “revealed the embarrassment of the
League following the sudden resignation of Judge Meek.” But after “full and satisfactory
references” by the former governor of South Africa, Drummond was confident that
Meek’s replacement, British physician Cuthbert Christy, could successfully fill the role.
While Drummond felt “a bit provoked” over Meek’s last second resignation due to health
concerns and Liberia’s rainy season, sixty-six-year-old Christy, a veteran of numerous
medical missions in the tropics, had assured him that “the rainy season should place no
important barriers in the way of work in the hinterland.” The League had wished to
avoid appointing anyone from Great Britain, but after failing to persuade candidates from
France and Switzerland, Drummond felt relieved that Christy, a man of “independent
judgment,” had accepted after such short notice. As to the prospect of traveling to
Fernando Po in order to investigate conditions there, the League would need an invitation
from the Spanish Government, and “it was left to the result of the Inquiry to determine if
such were necessary.”14
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Johnson then traveled to Rotterdam, Netherlands, where he was scheduled to depart
for Africa on February 21. His short stay in the port city evoked some unusual prejudices
in the normally even-handed scholar. In a letter to Countee Cullen, he asserted, “. . . in
Switzerland and Holland a mighty attempt is made . . . to avoid intelligibility thru barks,
snorts, and sneezes.” Johnson claimed that when he “did what was playfully referred to
as ‘studying’ German” in his school days, he always carried in the back of his mind “the
notion that this race of adults tried to talk like children.” Johnson’s letter to Cullen also
displayed a sensitive side normally kept hidden from others. After asking a “Dutchman”
in Rotterdam to locate a telephone number for him, Johnson became “so disgusted” that
he returned “forthwith” to his ship and buried his head in his pillow.15
Except for the list of documents and receipts that Johnson acquired, his two weeks in
Europe served more as a means for fulfilling formal obligations than it did toward
collecting any solid information that he could use in Liberia. Johnson’s interview with
Malinowski no doubt reinforced his sympathetic attitude toward the black republic’s
tribal citizens and helped shape his ethnographic approach to the investigation, but
nothing observed or learned during the two weeks could have prepared him for what lay
ahead. During the four-thousand mile voyage to Liberia, Johnson felt a sense of
adventure as well as a certain degree of trepidation in the face of what his “cheerful
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friends” had “conspired” to make him believe was “the most malarial quarter of the dark
continent.”16
A week out to sea Johnson’s ship called at Tenerife, “once an outpost of civilization”
in the Canary Islands. On shore waiting to buy postage stamps from an “advance guard”
of street venders, Johnson revealed his Victorian sensibilities in imagery that he recalled
from a manuscript by Martinique-born writer Rene Maran. Johnson remembered a
passage where Maran “talks of Tenerife and the lady with the rose in her mouth and one
thing and another which no gentleman would ever speak to a lady, and how all this was
interrupted by the shrill blast of the steamer’s whistle.” But at sea again after departing
Tenerife, his thoughts drifted away from “rose laden lips and language and stringed
music” to the more practical problems of “trying to get this damned sun helmet to feel
like a hat (in the privacy of my cabin, of course),” and shaking out his “little white
suits.”17
As the voyage continued down the West Coast of Africa, Johnson, no marine biologist
to be sure, sighted a passing “school” of whales, and noticed that the ship’s captain had
already “donned white suit and helmet.” In order to pass the time, Johnson observed:
“One gives himself over to reading,” something “still possible and pleasant.” After
finishing Albert Schweitzer’s On the Edge of the Primeval Forest, with its warning not to
trust the “treachery of the sun,” Johnson became “head conscious” and resolved “to wear
something.” Between Cape Verde and Gambia on the long voyage he reminded himself
16
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“it is time to start taking the quinine.” At midnight the ship passed Dakar, Senegal,
without stopping and Johnson noted, “Soon Sierra Leone and the ponderous duty of a
visit to the Governor. These visits become much alike now.”18
On the evening of March 5, after navigating “an oily sea” in an atmosphere “heavy
and bit depressing,” the ship dropped anchor in the waters off Freetown, but too late for a
visit to the Government House. Waiting to go ashore, Johnson had “a session of mutual
photography” with fellow passengers before the captain told him that he had just seen the
sociologist’s name in a copy of the African World newspaper under the heading “Slavery
Investigation.” Johnson then returned to his reading and noted, “Buell has my attention
at the moment.” After nightfall a group of Kru natives rowed their way to the ship and
Johnson, along with Matheus, a “husky young German,” and a “strutting Dutchman” with
a “trilling lisp,” climbed down a ladder in the dark to the awaiting surfboat for the trip
inland. When they reached the stone steps of the dock, Johnson took his first step in
Africa.19
Immediately, one of the Kru boatmen, a young man named Kofi, offered to act as a
guide for the group, and Johnson drew his initial impressions of Freetown from the seat
of a Ford touring car. He noticed a “Catholic Church, the Church of God, a woman
crying over death in the street, Syrian merchants . . . and on the curb a derelict white
man.” While waiting in the car in front of the City Hotel, Johnson wondered at the
approach of “a black, careless woman” with a missing front tooth. Although unfamiliar
with “the plan,” Johnson felt a “distinctly individualized repulsion” at the woman’s
overly friendly manner and “looseness.” She addressed the Dutchman with a word that
18
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sounded like “Daddy.” Surprised, Johnson made a “mental note” of it for his “racial
attitude study.” When the man reached his hands out and tried “to begin a conversation
in underworld banter,” the woman suddenly noticed Johnson, who was “not flattered.”
She said, “Hello, Daddy,” repeating the words “as if she was sure she was making me
feel Harlemese . . . I love you, Daddy, you my color.”20
The American commissioner made his official entry into Monrovia on the morning of
March 8, 1930, the same day that former president William Howard Taft died. Johnson
and Matheus, having arrived before seven a. m., waited on board the ship and presented
their passports to Liberian customs officer Henry Cooper, who then introduced his son,
the chief clerk of the Liberian State Department, referred to as “the bright one” by
natives. Outside on deck the personally honest but politically troublesome Thomas J. R.
Faulkner stopped Matheus and mistook him for Johnson. American Chargé d’Affaires
Henry Carter then appeared and reintroduced the Coopers, but failed to present Faulkner,
who had to make his own introduction. Carter said to Johnson, “Hope you brought your
helmet.” With one of his frequent migraine headaches brewing, Johnson waited as a
group of native boys gathered his twenty-two pieces of luggage, and then climbed down
into a surfboat that bore a United States flag. Manned by a dozen skilled Kru rowers, the
boat easily made its way around the formidable sandbar that had shifted and lengthened
over time and that prevented ships from entering the harbor, a problem that Firestone had
promised to address but soon gave up on as too expensive Upon reaching the waterfront
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“thick with spectators” who studied the landing with great interest, Carter mentioned
ominously to Johnson, “They came down to look you over.”21
Shortly after going ashore, Johnson learned that because no accommodations had been
arranged he and Matheus would have to take temporary quarters at the home of Clifton
Wharton, on leave from Liberia until the end of the investigation. On the waterfront
Johnson met with Firestone’s Donald Ross and William Hines as well as a group of
American financial advisers, and Bishop Robert E. Campbell of the Protestant Episcopal
Church, whom he had interviewed earlier at the State Department in Washington. He
then had to board a surfboat once more for a return to the ship to gather his belongings, a
trip much rougher than the earlier one. Already with a headache and nearer to “sea
sickness . . . than any time before,” Johnson had a difficult time reboarding as a rope
broke and the surfboat swerved away from the ship “suddenly, perilously.” After making
his way to the smoking room, he met Charles King’s aide-de-camp, Colonel T. Elwood
Davis, who informed him that the president happened to be away from the capital but
would return in a few days. Davis also mentioned the circulation of a rumor in Monrovia
that the “American commissioner had come in on one boat and left immediately on
another.” In fact, rumors flew fast and thick in the seaside capital because the Liberian
Government had said nothing to its citizens about the investigation.22
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Other spectators on the waterfront that morning who went unnoticed by Johnson, but
who took an especially active interest in the investigation, included President King’s
friend and adviser Dr. Cole, and Didwho Twe, an “intensely tribal-minded Kru” and
subject of a host of rumors himself. Cole, who claimed to have prognosticated the 1898
Sierra Leone revolt by measuring the line of flight of a group of carrier pigeons and
“reading the message in the stars,” was in attendance to document the exact hour and
minute that Johnson set foot on Liberian soil. Twe, on the other hand, would shadow
Johnson throughout his stay in Liberia. In November 1928, the radical Kru had
introduced a bill in the Liberian legislature against forced labor and pawning, a move that
led to his expulsion and charges of sedition. Like Thomas Faulkner, who wished to bring
political and social change to his country through peaceful means, Twe, Harvardeducated and a former valet to Mark Twain, feared that violent revolution would follow if
the commission’s work failed to enact needed reforms.23
A few days before Johnson made his way into Monrovia, Twe sent a report to the
U. S. State Department with news on recent Liberian machinations and native attitudes.
Twe claimed that a Liberian senator had traveled to the hinterland “to shut up Chiefs’
mouths” but “ran back” because natives became “so furious that he saw it was wise and
safe for him to return.” Another Liberian politician, according to Twe, had been in the
Gola country, where he ordered paramount chiefs not to allow any natives to speak
before the commission. When the people of the Dey country heard about the order, they
“became so enraged that they at once met in the Poro Bush and the Devil sent a
Proclamation . . . that no chief holding a commission from the Government should be
23
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permitted to speak for the Dey people . . . but that he, the Devil, would appoint the
speaker for the occasion.” “There is a penalty attached to the decree,” Twe noted, “but I
cannot repeat it here nor put it in writing.” Twe feared that “if the people are not let
alone to get before the Commission and speak freely, trouble is liable to rise: to put it
nakedly, the people (natives) may fight at any time because they are fed up and tired.”24
Several days after his arrival, as he settled into an unoccupied house leased by the
Firestone Plantations Company, Johnson had no idea that he would have to bide his time
for an entire month in Monrovia before a “busy” and then an “ill” President King
officially constituted the commission. Johnson met the Liberian commissioner, the
elderly Arthur Barclay, who had yet to see the commission’s terms of reference, but he
had to wait two weeks for the arrival of Christy. In Monrovia, with its “extravagant
emphasis on politics” and “powerful influence of family connections between the
executive officers and the Government,” Johnson tried to “right” himself and passed the
tedious days by taking photographs, observing native customs, and adjusting to the
“unnecessary heat and body strain, mosquitoes and snakes, tin houses and corroding iron,
dangerous surf and roadless roads.” After only a few weeks, he admitted: “Days with
my subject and no escape from it have almost warped my mind.”25
In a letter written from Monrovia to sociologist E. Franklin Frazier, then a new faculty
member at Fisk, Johnson apologized for the “vast amount of detail left on your shoulders,
the haste of departure, and the onerous proofs” of The Negro in American Civilization,
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the summary report from the 1928 National Interracial Conference. Johnson told Frazier
“it is impossible to be casual” in surroundings so “wrought up” with “meetings, facts and
prayer services, vicious charges and counter charges and really fundamental economic
and cultural problems to be studied over a long period.” Questions of “finance,
sanitation, labor, imperialism, slavery, natives, resources, autonomy, sovereignty,
internationalism, nationalism, sedition—these touch off each a separate and powerful
combination of forces and fears.” Johnson would have liked “a brief respite at a movie
theatre. But there are none.” In the solitude of Africa “all there is to do is see and hear in
the day time, ponder and reflect at night—perchance over a whiskey and soda.” Johnson
found it “futile to speculate” on “how it is all going to end.”26
An “interesting sort” is how Johnson described Cuthbert Christy after the British
physician’s arrival on March 22. During long walks as they passed the time and waited
for President King to officially constitute the commission, Christy spoke “dogmatically”
on “flora, fauna, malaria . . . the physical basis of sleep, therapeutic properties of tobacco,
tea, coffee, rainy seasons, the African tom-tom, rubber, road building, labor, etc.”
During a conversation with Christy on an uphill hike along Monrovia’s main residential
street that led past the British and American legations and ended at the Cape Mesurado
lighthouse, Johnson began to rethink his initial assessment of his fellow commissioner.
The “slow and deliberative” Christy, thirty years older than Johnson, blamed Liberia’s
current economic convulsions on corporate meddling, and condemned Firestone for its
role in the crisis. Christy also claimed that he resented Henry Carter’s “interference.”
From the hilltop Christy and Johnson viewed in the distance a cemetery where gallows
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had been erected between a pair of large palm trees for the public execution the following
day of two natives—a Bassa and a Grebo. Johnson noted: “There will be crowds for the
execution.” Referring to Christy, Johnson wrote later that day: “One difference has been
that I have been disposed to listen to any evidence and he to none.” Christy took “slowly
to new ideas” and clung “persistently” to what he “supposes already to be a fact.”
Johnson ended his meditation by asserting, “Christy’s mind runs in deep grooves.”27
Johnson and Christy also discussed the “strange proposals” made by the Liberians in
regard to the constitution of the commission. Secretary of State Edwin Barclay suggested
a “rotary chairmanship,” while his uncle, Liberian commissioner Arthur Barclay,
mentioned that “the visitors might not wish to return home without visiting our
interesting hinterland ‘afterwards.’” Barclay told Johnson in private, “I shouldn’t think
you would want to stay here more than two months.” For his part, President King
suggested a permanent secretary provided by his government to keep records and
summon witnesses so that hearings could be conducted with “dignity.” King then said
something about “guards and messengers.” Johnson felt that “the government’s position
ends with the bringing of the Commission.” Moreover, both Christy and Johnson viewed
“the hanging job” scheduled for the following day as an important “immediate forerunner
of the Commission. With uninformed natives it could suggest intimidation.” Indeed, in
an environment laden with political intrigue and chicanery, Johnson concluded that one
of his native houseboys, Titus, “is most definitely a spy, although he is as most spies
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ready to play a double game.” Johnson also noted: “The boys are eager to see the
hanging tomorrow.”28
Early the next morning Johnson traveled to the cemetery to witness the executions.
Tribal courts had sentenced both men to die as murderers. Johnson learned, “One killed
his wife for infidelity, although he could have taken her back and received his money
according to custom—says he is not sorry but glad he killed her.” As the man spoke
from the gallows, Johnson received a translated version of his words: “Beware of women
. . . . They will make you do things like I did to bring me to this place . . . . My woman
went out to her lover and when she came back I talked to her and she talked smart . . . .
But I prayed and confessed and feel better. The woman was the cause of it all.” Another
of Johnson’s houseboys, Josiah, “explained that the natives are very particular about their
women—possessions.” Later Johnson wrote: “I know of no place where the
unimportance of women, of all classes, is more marked . . . . They are not public figures.
They are not leaders in church. There is no idolization. They are wholly unimportant
except as breeders.”29
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As Johnson wandered around the native communities of Vai Town and Kru Town on
Monrovia’s waterfront taking photographs and buying handwoven cloth and other
trinkets, he took note of the sanitation program initiated by the U. S. Public Health
Service and the U. S. State Department in the wake of the yellow fever outbreak that had
killed William Francis and James Sibley in 1929. American physician Howard F. Smith,
in charge of the program and working with limited funds from the 1926 loan, paid
especially close attention to the Aëdes aegypiti mosquito, the most notorious of yellow
fever carriers, and tried to eradicate their breeding grounds by burning trash and
disposing of bottles and tin cans. Johnson learned that “failure to put out the fires one
day caused the loss of a house,” and noted “Dr. Smith’s cans are piled high all over the
town.” Near Kru Town, Johnson and Christy met a native boy at work clearing a
dumping ground. The boy said in broken English, “I move bottles make people sick.”
Christy, however, thought that he heard the boy say, “Firestone . . . make people sick,”
and then “commented on the extensive grip which the Firestone development had on the
country.” Before long, Johnson developed a negative opinion of Dr. Smith, whom he
considered ineffective, and came to regard the natives working barefoot in piles of broken
glass as the “heroes”.30
At a luncheon held on March 31 before the ceremonial opening of a new bridge that
connected two sections of Firestone’s Harbel plantation on the Du River forty miles
outside of Monrovia, Johnson had his first meeting with President King. On the way
30
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Johnson and Christy passed through the Mount Barclay plantation and stopped to
examine the closely planted trees and method of tapping. Introductions at the luncheon
went awkwardly although the president seemed friendly enough and several times made a
“conspicuous” effort to draw Johnson near him. At his first opportunity, King, whose
bearing was “quite good,” made his way to the sociologist’s “little group,” which
included Arthur Barclay and Bishop Campbell. With Johnson, King chatted about
natives and the “fusing of cultures,” a process that, according to the president, had “to go
slowly and with their consent.” King then invited Christy and Johnson to his table and
the conversation turned to “Hoover’s internal commission policy, hours of presidential
work, building (his house ordered from America), flora and fauna, tobacco, etc.” When
Johnson rose to leave, King shook his hand. Noticing its warmth—Johnson had been
holding his hands folded behind him—the president “expressed anxiety” about his health
and “the possibility of fever.” Later, King returned to feel Johnson’s hands again, and
warned him about the sun.31
The Fisk sociologist described the president as “an exceptionally clever man” after
listening to his delicately balanced speech aimed at appeasing “the Firestones, all the
foreign consuls, his staff, the Commissioners, the natives, the Liberians, and the
European colony.” King claimed that the only use of forced labor in Liberia “has been to
get the men away from the Firestones when the chiefs called them home.” At the
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luncheon, the president’s wife, a “slightly rounded, freshly middle-aged” African
American, studied Johnson “closely.”32
Moving on to the ceremonial ribbon-cutting at the bridge, an affair “quietly done”
with a “heavy dignified tolerance” as “everyone moved about as in the silent pictures,”
Johnson scrutinized the personal appearance and speech habits of President King. While
drinking champagne along with the other guests, Johnson observed King’s graying hair,
wilted collar, and “teeth not so good, unevenly aligned, and out on the side of his mouth
where he held his cigar.” King spoke with “the merest haltingness” as he slurred over
“grammatical uncertainties,” a style that lacked “crispness of expression.” The “totality”
of the effect, however, “was usually good.” On the other hand, the Firestone ladies in
attendance were “not profound by any means—modish, easily adjusted to the fabricated
comfort which the extended importance of their husbands, backed by money in the
situation, gave. Their “status in the states,” as Johnson observed, “would probably be
different.”33
Johnson and Christy then toured the Firestone properties with general manager
William Hines. The efficiency of the entire enterprise, which included a cold storage
plant, machine shop, and a hospital under construction, had the desired effect on Johnson,
who believed “if Hines’ purpose was to make a good impression, the day gave him a
good break.” When one of the tires on their car went flat—presumably a high quality
Firestone product—Hines managed to summon a mechanic and extract the group from “a
bad predicament.” Christy, who viewed Firestone in only the most negative light, later
remarked that Hines explained his business “better than any person he had met in a long
32
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time,” and that he “was much impressed.” Although highly efficient and technologically
advanced, the Firestone Plantations Company still had much to learn in Liberia. As
Hines noted, the company had built Western-style cottages for workers, but when natives
began modifying them by trying to attach tin or thatched rooftops, which “disfigured the
original,” it was finally understood that the preferred style of building should have
resembled the conical-shaped huts in local villages. Hines also mentioned that six
hundred tons of rice that the company had purchased from Ceylon ended up as food for
“weevils.” But after importing some chili peppers from Sierra Leone and sheeting the
rice with them “the weevils scampered out.” Both Johnson and Christy praised such “a
notable and useful discovery,” but Hines explained that “the natives had suggested it . . . .
They use this method.”34
Confident that the commission would soon begin its work, and that some degree of
equilibrium would be restored to the “upside-downness” that he had felt before even
departing for Liberia, Charles Johnson learned that a mysterious illness had seized
President King, causing a further delay in launching the investigation. Another week in
Monrovia, with little electricity or running water, and no free press, only added to the
sense of disorder that frustrated Johnson. In conversation with Henry Carter’s young
nephew, Johnson referred to a makeshift zoo with a pygmy hippopotamus that he had
seen, to which the teenager remarked: “The whole place seems like a zoo.” Cuthbert
Christy contributed to the tension and confusion by following Johnson’s every move and
referring to the American commissioner as a white man, “reflecting in his mind between
civilized and native.” Drinking, as discovered by many of those displaced in Liberia,
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offered temporary relief from the tedious days. After a visit with Bishop Campbell—“the
jolly Bishop” with red hair and goatee—Johnson noted, “ . . . got drunker at his good
place than any visit in town.” Campbell also relayed the news that at Cape Palmas, the
most important district that Johnson and Christy planned to investigate, native chiefs had
been forced to “eat a brew with their rice under the ministrations of a medicine man,
which will make them die if they talk to the commission.”35
An official meeting with President King finally came on April 5 at the Executive
Mansion. At the meeting Arthur Barclay read aloud from a paper that laid out
“suggestions to the commission on procedure.” One “suggestion” limited the receiving
of official testimony to Monrovia, and only allowed the commission to travel to the
interior after the hearings had ended. Johnson’s cards and stationery fell to the floor as
he listened to Barclay’s inclusion of a “sick provision which would suspend sessions
during illness of any member and if he is still disabled after two weeks to ask his
government to name a substitute.” Johnson objected to the “two weeks” provision,
knowing that it would take at least six to eight weeks to get a replacement either for
himself or for Christy. He noted: “Obviously it was a provision for Barclay, giving
power to the Liberian Government to name a substitute, or a very clever means of
intimidation.” Johnson felt that the provisions “unnecessarily put a premium, in the event
of an unexpected turn, upon the fact of a commissioner’s sickness and place a
temptation.” Everyone eventually agreed, however, to Johnson’s proposals for a quicker
method of replacement. Johnson and Christy had less success in their objections to
35
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President King’s idea of appointing a Liberian as official secretary to the commission,
attorney Plenyono Gbe Wolo, who had received promises of lavish political favors for his
services. In the end an agreement that “due consideration” would be given to changes
suggested to the government left all matters open to further discussion.36
Later that evening the “suggestions” of the Liberian government read at the Executive
Mansion earlier in the day appeared in written form. The changing of “suggestions” to
“instructions” caused immediate alarm for Johnson and Christy. Because the
Commission could not be constituted until after it had committed to the “instructions”
limiting native testimony to Monrovia, “there was the dilemma of running promptly on
the rocks on the one hand, thus delaying the constitution as the President had hinted; and
on the other the acceptance of conditions which obviously restricted operation and would
be regarded at home as taking an inadequate position for such an inquiry.” Johnson and
Christy wrote a joint letter of protest, which they showed to Arthur Barclay, and
promised to raise the issue at a meeting the next day with President King before he
officially constituted the commission.37
When Johnson and Christy arrived at the Executive Mansion, President King made
“certain points” that he had “rehearsed”, transmitting them through Arthur Barclay,
“whose deafness prevented him from following the remarks closely.” King explained
that changes to the “instructions” would only cause further delay, and Barclay asked
Johnson why the “due consideration” agreement “wasn’t sufficient under instructions?”
36
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Johnson replied, “smiling and with halting words,” that “’due consideration’ could
conceivably mean no consideration at all,” a point “pleasantly taken.” The discussion
then “swerved over” to the nature of evidence, and “at one warm tilt” Johnson explained
that he “considered this a fact finding body, a commission of inquiry and not a court; that
testimonial evidence was . . . only a fraction of factual evidence and usually the least
convincing of it; that evidence meant documents, observations, the assembling of as
many elements of a situation as to constitute for any person an objective fact . . . .”
Johnson claimed that he “would not presume to requisition the prerogative of God in
determining who was lying and who was telling the truth.” Further discussion of
objective evidence, Johnson felt, “created more faith in the field work,” and “the
discussion was also softened considerably.”38
President King reminded everyone that his Cabinet awaited introduction outside, and
Johnson “asked pleasantly” of Arthur Barclay if he could think of a word other than
“instructions” that indicated the commission’s “wish to follow the convenience of the
government as far as possible.” Barclay turned the question back on Johnson, who began
“Memorandum Embodying the . . . .” Barclay supplied “Views,” and Johnson continued,
“. . . of the Liberian Government on the Constitution and Procedure of the International
Commission of Inquiry.” “A happy solution,” Johnson noted later. “Everyone agreed,
and with a mighty relief.”39 The diplomacy that Johnson used so successfully in dealing
with Barclay and King, career politicians at least as shrewd as the bulk of local white
leaders in the Jim Crow South, is precisely the approach that present-day historians cite
as insufficiently militant. One can only speculate on the results of the meeting with
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Barclay and King had the irritable W. E. B. Du Bois or the combative E. Franklin Frazier
been placed in Johnson’s position.
After adjourning to the “Gold Room”, President King presented his Cabinet, and then
“took a bible and an envelope” for the swearing in ceremony, something that Christy, a
Quaker, “had been worrying about . . . for a week.” Christy “bent in the direction of the
bible,” but according to Johnson only “got within two inches” of it, “although he swore
later that he had touched it.” Christy worried about “being silly, wondering if reporters
were around,” and if he should repeat the entire oath. In fact, after repeating only one
line and feeling “more foolish because he should have been talking to God,” Christy
added “Your Excellency,” and “ended the thing.” After the swearing in of the
commissioners, “speeches were expected,” for which neither Johnson nor Christy had
prepared, “and both had feared.” After Christy’s awkward effort, Johnson began, “ . . . I
can only say that I accepted this responsibility after some deliberation and being in it will
conscientiously endeavor to see clearly and sift wisely; that it is my hope that whatever
the findings are they will prove of highest good to the government of Liberia.”40
Johnson noticed “a look of relief” on the faces of his fellow commissioners at their
first meeting, which dealt with procedure and moved off “slowly.” Arthur Barclay made
“one phrase sentences definitely and economically,” his deafness another obstacle to
overcome. “He has a difficult role,” Johnson wrote. Plenyono Gbe Wolo, on the other
hand, proved “to be a very much overrated Harvard product,” who probably had “the
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intelligence but lacks energy.” Johnson conceded Wolo “in my soul out of clear
sportsmanship,” and noted sardonically, “It is an unmatched trio.”41
At the conclusion of the meeting in the “Special Room” of Liberia’s Department of
State, Arthur Barclay called Johnson aside after reading a note that he had received from
Thomas Faulkner, who had opposed Barclay’s appointment to the commission, and who
had been holding anti-King political rallies. Barclay, with his “white knotty hair and
beard” and “two prominent fore teeth” with “no others in evidence,” told Johnson, “We
are both Negroes, but I hate ‘nigger doings.’” Earlier Barclay had remarked to Johnson
that he regretted their status as commissioners, hoping that they could speak informally
afterwards. Johnson grew to admire Barclay, reported to know more about the history
and politics of Liberia than anyone alive, and whose interest in literature helped form a
special bond with the Fisk sociologist. The former president of Liberia and senior
member of Firestone’s legal team in the black republic moved easily between discussions
of “African societies, archaeology, cultural problems, ‘air flying’, and legal procedure in
England and the States.” He explained that Faulkner held “a lot of personal bitterness”
against President King. Barclay, however, claimed that he would tell Johnson anything
that he wanted to know, “and what I say can be written and said again. I stand behind
it.”42
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During the first sessions, with Christy as chairman, Johnson tried to “concede as much
as possible, in graciousness to Liberia.” He soon found, however, that “the minutes are
bad” and “the re-wording is clumsy.” Wolo insisted “on giving large typographed
prominence to Secretary to the Commission,” and Christy acquiesced only when “the
Chairman’s name shows on the summons and other papers; also about the bold type.”
Johnson wondered how he would explain “either to the Government or to my wife the
extraordinary anonymity of the American members,” and forced “a change by making the
forms ridiculous.” Christy “got the point” but Wolo had “to be bluntly told to lower case
his name,” which aroused “indignation” in the chairman. Barclay tried to “throw as
much . . . as possible” to Christy. Johnson claimed, “He has his reasons, presumably.”
After Johnson called “for a check on the unequal representation of the chairman, which is
merely a courtesy office, and has no more strength of power,” the group had to
“practically rewrite the minutes.”43
The question of accurate interpretation of native testimony presented the commission
with a dilemma until Johnson suggested that witnesses bring their own interpreters, “a
point that cannot be argued against successfully, because if a man gives false testimony
or complains that he is misinterpreted it is his own fault.” The point seemed “so clear”
that Johnson felt “ashamed to have pitted so successfully.” After winning his argument,
Johnson looked “away and up at the picture of Liberia’s presidents.” He studied “the two
flags above the photographs, painted in by rough hands; the horribly executed and
speculative likeness of President King, in oils, on the wall,” and “a flood of concern”
passed over him. Obviously thinking back on the Harlem Renaissance, Johnson
wondered, “Where are the skilled fingers, the creative art, the sense of fitness of things
43
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other than in politics?” Christy observed, “that the trouble is graft, incompetence and
ignorance, and this before the hearings begin.”44
Several days after the commission officially launched into its work, Chargé Henry
Carter wired the State Department with information gathered from the new financial
adviser that claimed Liberia’s revenues had “so fallen off” that a budget deficit of at least
$200,000 loomed, and that the government had only about half of the funds needed to
meet its May 1st interest on outstanding bonds. Carter suggested confidentially that the
source of the problem lay in the fact that eighty-five percent of Liberia’s government
expenditures went toward paying salaried government positions. Unless President King
took “rigorous measures,” Carter not only anticipated a default on interest payments but
“a serious paralysis of responsible government here which will be intensified by the
probability that many high government officials will be discredited through the slavery
investigation.” Carter then made the startling assertion that the U. S. Government might
have “to consider whether a temporary friendly intervention on its behalf may not be
advisable for the purpose of forestalling European intervention which . . . would probably
mean the end of Liberian independence.”45
On April 11, Liberia’s National Fast and Prayer Day, Johnson wrote: “Ben the Kru
barber comes up to cut hair.” As a boy growing up in Bristol, Virginia, in the 1890s,
Johnson shined shoes at a local barbershop, where he listened carefully to the
conversations of men, both black and white. Indeed, he credited those early experiences
for sparking an interest in human relations that led to his becoming a sociologist. In
Monrovia, Johnson listened as the “nattily” dressed Ben, between snips of hair,
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“delivered one of the most powerful folk addresses I have ever heard.” The barber said,
“I’m a Kru. I have my house down in Kru Town. We have our feelings about these
people here, these Americo-Liberians who want to sit down all the while and make us
work; drag our men and boys out of their houses to work on the streets, for no pay, with
no tools and no food. Do they go out to work? No! That’s what they want the natives to
do. That’s why they are no further now. Lazy. Over a hundred years they been here and
look at the houses. Look at the streets. Full of the same rocks they found here. All the
rich palms and coffee go to waste while they sit down. No farms, no business, no
nothing. All of them want to be government. All of them want to be lawyers . . . . They
scared stiff about this commission. A lot of them going to get caught and know it.”46
Narratives like the barber’s “folk address” later became a hallmark of Johnson’s best
known sociological studies, such as Shadow of the Plantation (1934) and Growing Up in
the Black Belt (1941), where he focused attention on the structure and internal rhythms of
rural black life in the American South, and the effects that external forces had on an
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otherwise functional pattern of existence for individuals, families, and entire
communities.47
The next day Johnson and Christy traveled to Firestone’s Mount Barclay Plantation
outside of Monrovia, where they met the manager, “a Mr. Allen.” The “slim, nervous”
Allen, wearing white mosquito boots and sitting alone at home, greeted the two
commissioners “most cheerily . . . as if wanting company.” After their introductions,
Allen called “Boy,” and “a big, husky” native servant entered, who received a “bawling
out” after bringing only two cups of tea. Johnson may have felt he had been transported
back to the antebellum South when he noticed lying on a table a thick, “rounded leather
whip, about 2 feet long,” with “a tapering handle, flexible end,” and “8 to 12 thongs
tipped with metal.” Allen said, “King has done more for the country than any other man
. . . ” but “he’s got his fingers scorched in this business, I’m afraid.” Allen claimed that
the district commissioners, appointed by King, “made life hard” for the natives. “The
government,” according to Allen, “has hurt more than it has helped recruiting—would
rather do voluntary recruiting—too much filthy graft in the whole affair.” Because of the
“simplicity” of the natives, Allen explained, “anyone can come to them . . . with a little
gin, some tobacco, and . . . lead them anywhere. This is partly the reason for the willynilly loyalty of the natives” and “why King has had so much trouble with them.” Allen
concluded that the only way for the natives “to get out from under this stupid oppression
. . . is white rule, and I say this without any disrespect to you, Dr. Johnson.”48
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Christy later told Johnson that he agreed with the plantation manager about the need
for white rule in Liberia. Christy asserted that Liberia had fallen “a hundred years”
behind England or France, and that “U. S. Negroes were a hundred years behind whites.”
Johnson explained patiently “that some U. S. Negroes were one-hundred years behind
some U. S. whites, but not all Negroes were one-hundred years behind all whites.” With
the rest of Africa colonized, Johnson argued that Liberia stood alone as “an experiment in
Negro self-rule.” As “polite,” “gracious,” and “personally friendly” as he was “childish,”
“grasping,” and “acquisitive,” Christy perplexed Johnson and pushed the sociologist’s
remarkable patience to its limits. Although “opposed on race issues,” Johnson thought
Christy “more national than racial.” Christy “began most immodestly by wanting to see
the League honored by making him chairman; when he got that he wanted to call it
‘President’; then to sign all letters, approve all correspondence, write the minutes, lead
the expeditions,” and “use Matheus’ verbatim notes.” Most annoying for Johnson,
Christy “hops on to every interview out of the house like grim death, fearing that I would
learn the secret ahead of him.” While Christy had “many interesting facts of humanity
and collecting and travel stored in memory,” he was “too apt to apply Congo to Liberia,
or South America to Polynesia.”49
Commission hearings began in Monrovia on the morning of April 14. Because of the
scheduling of Thomas Faulkner as one of the first witnesses, Charles Johnson arrived
shortly after eight a. m. feeling “a moderate excitement of anticipation and wondering if
any trouble is going to break.” Faulkner, “dressed in white drill,” delivered his testimony
against the King administration without incident, however, and his clerk provided the
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names of other witnesses. Christy asked Johnson to preside over an important session a
few days later, which “provided the most direct and definite record of facts so far.”
Johnson, with a headache from the previous night’s “late hour and whiskey and sodas,”
took the chair and listened to a “clean confession” by Quartermaster Edward Blackett.
Working out of Sinoe County, the “eternal man-stealer” and “heartless” Blackett would
receive orders from Postmaster-General Samuel Ross, and then use the Frontier Force to
carry out raids and abduct the required number of boys and men for shipment to
Fernando Po. Blackett offered no apologies for his actions after someone pointed out that
“this is slavery of the worst sort.” “That don’t concern me,” Blackett stated, “. . . I’m
acting on orders, and I carries out my orders.” In the following days came hearings “in
which the most vital testimony broke,” including more evidence of the direct
involvement of high government officials in profiting from forced labor, particularly
Vice-President Allen N. Yancy.50
On the day that Edward Blackett testified before the commission, Henry Carter paid a
visit to Johnson. Carter, whose alcoholism would eventually force the State Department
to remove him from Liberia, arrived “half tanked,” and “spilled a lot of mysterious stuff
about not revealing the U. S. hand or intentions regarding the impending bankruptcy of
Liberia, and of taking over—saw no hope there.” Johnson praised Carter’s attitude,
especially because it unintentionally “threw Christy to the defense of Liberian
autonomy.” Christy and Johnson later overheard the discussion of “a typical German
party” coming from a saloon across the street. The drinkers, including some British
citizens, proclaimed in “loud, boisterous voices what they would do with Liberia if their
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government had it.” Johnson wrote: “This ghoulish European business quite irritates
me.” Christy conceded, “the natives are anxious to talk,” and claimed once again that
they “want help and relief and intelligent guidance from Europeans.” Johnson “argued
more hotly than usual,” that Liberia “had been both menaced and stolen from all sides,”
and that “the only solution is not giving it away to England, or Germany, or even
America.”51
While discussions of financial problems and possible intervention grew more intense
in Liberia, State Department officials in Washington displayed more puzzlement than
alarm. J. P. Moffat, after reviewing Carter’s telegram about the possibility of Liberia’s
defaulting on its May interest payment, suggested that budget deficits in the black
republic “may be taken as a matter of course,” and that “the amount of this deficit is no
greater than deficits in previous years.” Moreover, Moffat’s information showed that
only fifty-six percent of Liberian government expenditures, not eighty-five percent as
Carter had indicated, went toward salary payments. Although Liberia needed “a good
house cleaning,” Moffat noted “the serious reduction in revenue is largely a result of the
reduced export of rubber.” Because Firestone controlled “to a large extent the revenue of
the country,” and because “the revenue of the country is dependent upon the development
of the Firestone Plantation,” it hardly seemed “reasonable . . . for the bondholders of the
Finance Corporation to complain when the revenues of the country diminish as a result of
their own action.” As to Carter’s reference to “the necessity of intervention by the United
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States Government to forestall European intervention,” Moffat found it “unclear” and
invited an explanation.52
In the meantime, Charles Johnson reached the conclusion that his British colleague
harbored a “cold-blooded discontent” for the idea of Liberian self-rule, and found his
“lighthearted” stories of past behavior particularly disturbing. Christy’s previous
adventures in Africa included shooting six “beggars” for killing a white military officer.
Christy and his group first tried to hang the men but the tree limb broke. One of the men,
still chained to a dead comrade, managed to free himself and jump into a river, where he
was promptly shot. Another story involved Christy leading an expedition against a native
tribe, where from the prow of a boat and armed with a Mauser he “opened fire on the lot”
with devastating effect. Johnson also learned that Christy once “played medicine man to
a village chief who would not join . . . a punitive expedition against a relation.” In order
to purge his “protesting spirit,” Christy stuck a hypodermic needle into the chief’s ear,
which induced “violent vomiting,” and persuaded him to join the expedition. Johnson
found it hard to believe that “in all this he seems to regard me as an entirely sympathetic
associate.”53
After dinner one night “the storm broke on the utter childishness” of Christy, who
wanted to “put his name exclusively to all transactions, control the commission, absorb
all documents, be considered the ‘one boss’, etc., of a tripartite arrangement.” Only a few
days before their first trip inland, Johnson lashed out at Christy for “doing his damnedest
to appropriate the party,” and wanted to know what he meant by “one boss.” Following
a “debate” Johnson told Christy of his complete indifference to whether or not they hired
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a guide, or where they chose a campsite, but that he would not allow the Englishman to
dictate his way of working. Having sent his own secretary packing back to England,
Christy asked Johnson if he could borrow the services of John Matheus. Johnson
“dropped a cold discouragement” on the idea, and underscored his annoyance with
Christy by suggesting that he could always “leave the party, write a minority report, and
go home” to Nashville. When Christy finally backed down Johnson deemed the entire
discussion “an unnecessary fuss” and “an elderly gentleman’s fear of not having all the
prestige.”54
As the commission’s first set of hearings in Monrovia came to a close in late April,
Johnson and Christy began preparing for their trip to Kakata, some 60 miles northeast of
Monrovia. A prearranged agreement allowed the elderly Arthur Barclay to avoid the
hazards upcountry and stay behind in the capital city. Shopping for field equipment at
Firestone’s Du Plantation store, Johnson “engaged” two steel boxes and two dozen tins of
Lucky Strikes. As a “check on interpreters,” he also decided to bring along a “small field
machine” that could make temporary recordings on wax discs. Didhwo Twe, one of the
most important witnesses against the government, added a wrinkle to the departure of the
commissioners when he notified the American legation that he would very likely “either
be poisoned or shot,” and left a note “to be opened in case of his sudden death.”55
To be sure, Twe, whose list of grievances against the government stretched at least
fifteen years into the past, posed innumerable problems for the King administration. A
few months after the 1915 Kru rebellion, Twe witnessed the execution of his tribal chief,
and in 1927 his own son was captured by Edward Blackett’s raiders and carried aboard
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the S. S. San Carlos bound for Fernando Po. Twe and his “confidential men” kept a close
watch on developments in the hinterland and informed the State Department in February
1930 how much the coming of the commission meant to natives. Indeed, Twe went to
great lengths to protect native witnesses, such as “the three men who were made to eat up
their own shit at Vonjama,” by hiding them at his farm so that President King and his
“crooked bunch” would “know nothing about them.” Through his “messengers”, Twe
had urged native chiefs to speak openly to the commission because only by “telling
everything” would they be able “to live in peace and acquire property.” Yet, Twe was
forced to operate largely in secret.
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As Johnson and Christy packed for Kakata on April 26, Henry Carter appeared in the
afternoon. Carter, “drunk and afraid for Twe,” informed Johnson that he had wired the
State Department regarding the radical Kru and the threat he had received “to take his life
by poison.” Carter also sent word “through unofficial but effective means” that he would
be most displeased “to hear of Twe’s taking off.” Although Carter informed the State
Department that he found it difficult “to realize that such a situation . . . can exist,” he
would not have brought the matter to their attention “unless convinced that it were
true.”57
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Johnson felt a rush of excitement—tempered by recognition of the possibilities for
disaster—at his first chance to observe native life in the Liberian hinterland. Because
Christy’s endless deliberation had left the commissioners without adequate transportation
for the trip, Johnson was forced to hurry off a letter to William Hines at the last minute
and request that Firestone furnish them with the use of a company truck. Still, the always
optimistic Johnson saw signs of hope for Christy. As they discussed Liberian politics at
lunch the day before their departure for Kakata, Christy admitted “this should be a Black
Republic, if possible.” Johnson felt Christy had “been helped . . . in his estimate of
Negro ability and congeniality,” especially in conversation with the British chargé
d’affaires, to whom Johnson “gave a good game of tennis.” Christy also provided
occasional moments of comic relief. With elections in Liberia still a year away, he asked
Johnson, who had struggled for some days with stomach pain, “Why don’t you run for
President?” Whereas W. E. B. Du Bois most likely would taken the suggestion seriously,
and may even have felt that the position suited him, Johnson laughed off the idea of a
sociologist/politician, and told Christy that he “liked (his) own work too well, etc.”58
A visit to the government hospital later in the day did little to alleviate any concerns
that Johnson had about the inland trip. Apart from Firestone’s medical staff, Liberia had
no more than six practicing physicians in the entire country, and Monrovia’s government
hospital, which Johnson described as a “farce,” only made him more aware of the
possibly tragic consequences should an otherwise minor illness or injury befall him
upcountry. Johnson discovered that the hospital’s chief administrator, “Dr.” Cole, whom
he had played cards with a few evenings before, was actually an “herbalist.”
Furthermore, the nurse knew “nothing of nursing, and yet handles all gynecological
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cases,” and another doctor had been there “so long he has absorbed many of the
superstitions of the natives.” Even worse, the hospital charged patients 6 shillings per
day while “anywhere else this type of patient would pay no more than 2 shillings.”59
On the morning of April 28, Johnson and Christy boarded two trucks, “one Interior
Department, one Firestone,” and left on their first expedition into the Liberian hinterland.
Johnson noted matter-of-factly, “Made my will, got off letter to wife, put important
papers in Legation, and drew £6.” Five miles outside of Kakata the government truck
broke down, but the group eventually made its way to President King’s still unfinished
but “quite extraordinary” twelve-room summer retreat, complete with tennis court.
Johnson’s “first night in a field outfit” was actually spent in the room designed for the
future use of the president’s wife. As Frontier Force soldiers lounged across the street
from the compound, Johnson poked around in a storeroom where he stumbled upon a
cache of “exquisite wood carvings.” The discovery of the art objects no doubt pleased
Johnson’s aesthetic tastes, while the likely means of their acquisition, as well as the rest
of the materials used for the new presidential compound, troubled him and struck at the
very heart of the political corruption that plagued Liberia.60
The next morning Johnson walked from the hilltop compound down to the village
about a mile away, where he took photographs and familiarized himself with his new
surroundings. President King had chosen Kakata as the site for his “commodious”
compound because of a series of roads that connected it with Firestone’s Harbel
plantation, and he held his last conference of upcountry chiefs there because of the
town’s central location and easy accessibility to many of northern Liberia’s native tribes.
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In the village Johnson noticed the “hand of the government” in the “wide, seldom-used
marketplace” and military station built by unpaid native labor. Indeed, even though
Liberian law prohibited travel between one district and another, because of the murderous
tactics of the Frontier Force, many natives had fled from the area around the once
prosperous town and escaped deep into the bush along the border of French Guinea. The
Booker Washington Agricultural and Industrial Institute, founded in 1929 by the PhelpsStokes Fund and the International Education Board, served as the one bright spot in
Kakata. Unbeknownst to Johnson at the time, native thirst for education, or “to get
book,” led to a strong desire for a liberal arts curriculum, and caused some resentment
both toward the Institute and Firestone.61
Before long a group of Kpelle natives began filing into the village, led by Paramount
Chief Dado, a “well-dressed ordinary looking person,” who brought an interpreter and
about thirty followers with him. Like other paramount chiefs, Dado received a
government commission for supplying laborers for roadwork. He indicated to Johnson
that he was only paying a visit but planned to return the next day with more of his people,
and an interpreter other than the Frontier Force soldier then accompanying him. In the
afternoon came three town chiefs with a group of about fifty natives, including drummers
for entertainment purposes. Many of the natives seemed “bursting with things to tell
. . . . Will be back tomorrow.” The drummers, dressed in blue smocks and khaki trousers
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rolled up to the knee, beat their instruments with “turned sticks,” and “shuffled in
rhythm” while another group of men danced. Afterward “the men said something about
dying if they talk. Don’t care if chiefs are here, are going to talk.” Johnson later
concluded: “There is evidence that the men are made uncomfortable, fined, ground
down, but the inefficiency of the Liberians shows again in failure to grind them down as
completely and as effectively as the Germans, Belgians, and English, in a more English
way. Otherwise they would not have the courage to protest so arrogantly.”62
In the village early the next morning Johnson heard the loud beating of drums and
gazed in the distance at the spectacle of a group of Kpelle chiefs dressed in white gowns
leading about 200 natives down the hill. Johnson noted: “Nine o’clock comes, and they
are still assembling. Nine-thirty they start down—a great mass . . . . They bear down, led
by Paramount Chief Dado, and all his town chiefs. They crowd into the baraza. There is
no more room. They sit on the floor. We can scarcely breathe.”63
The session proved particularly difficult for Christy, who “had a bad night” with
symptoms of what first appeared to be dysentery. Paramount Chief Dado, on the other
hand, sat through sessions of “the most vital accusations of him, yawning, not disturbed,
apparently pleased that the men are talking.” The evasive Dado, whose “authority is very
weak,” claimed that “he tells all he sees” and that “it is his business to supply the men,”
which immediately drew shouts of protest from the natives. After changing interpreters,
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Dado argued that he was only doing his duty as assigned by President King, which
elicited more screams of anger from his people.64
When the town chiefs spoke, however, they received “shouts of approval,” and their
“fine voices” and “good bearing” led Johnson to describe them as the “most
extraordinary orators I have ever heard.” During sessions over the course of the next few
days Johnson learned in great detail of the depredations incurred by the Kpelle natives at
the hands of the Frontier Force. Corruption in the system of pawning and road
construction in particular infuriated the Kpelle, as did the annual hut, poll, and education
tax. Native chiefs, stripped of their power by the district commissioners and humiliated
by the ruthless Frontier Force, faced torture and death if they did not provide enough men
for long-term work on the roads. Unpaid native laborers had to supply their own tools for
the roadwork, and if they could not were fined, beaten, and forced to pawn their wives or
children. A practice most grievous to native dignity involved feeding the very people
who subjected them to so much suffering, as rice from communal granaries had to be
supplied to military and civil stations every month. In turn, soldiers and government
workers, themselves unpaid for many months, generally demanded more rice than needed
in order to sell it in markets along the coast. As in the Monrovia hearings, native
testimony received by the commission at Kakata provided ample evidence of corrupt
practices by government officials associated with forced labor for public purposes.65
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From Kakata, Johnson and Christy had planned to return to Monrovia and proceed
down the coast to Cape Palmas, the area that produced most of the native laborers
shipped to Fernando Po. Christy’s illness worsened, however, and over the Englishman’s
protests, Johnson sent to Firestone’s Harbel plantation for a doctor. After some testing
the doctor ruled out dysentery and instead suggested the presence of a stomach microbe
introduced “from filth in some way.” The group checked “every conceivable source for
accidental or deliberate infection,” but because they had been drinking only bottled water
and eating the same food, Johnson ventured “the possibility that the native medicine
man’s pharmacopoeia . . . and parings and dung from a human carrier” would produce
the same results. Johnson learned that ten chiefs at President King’s 1924 Kakata
conference had died from the same illness. “They were all troublesome chiefs,” the
district commissioner told Johnson.66
Johnson later had a “tremendous argument with Christy about going on to Cape
Palmas,” a district ruled by the thoroughly corrupt Vice-President Allen N. Yancy.
Christy objected to Johnson proceeding alone, claiming that it would be unfair to him and
to the League, and that he would be blamed for any delays. In town Johnson spoke with
the British consul, “who was presumably anxious to learn if Christy had become ill from
unnatural causes—poisoned.” Johnson “discussed the possibilities” but “could not say
with conviction that any such thing had happened.” Later Johnson sought out Henry
Carter and explained his wish to go on and “to continue friendly relations” with his
colleague. Convinced for many months of the necessity to investigate conditions around
Cape Palmas, Carter “promised to write a note which would point to the possibility of
American State Department criticism, and that of the American people if there is delay.”
66
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Feeling the “very imminent possibility of becoming ill” himself, Johnson drove Carter’s
car to the hospital to tell his plans to Christy. He found the Englishman “still persistent”
as he tried to get up to “show he is better,” but then fell against a table from “weakness.”
Even so, Christy vowed that he would try to be in Monrovia soon. Johnson recognized
“that this is suicidal” and promised to “put in” at Sinoe County and meet Christy later at
Cape Palmas.67
After returning to the hilltop capital of Monrovia, Johnson learned that the ship
scheduled to depart on May 6 for the Kru Coast had been delayed for at least three days,
forcing him to bide his time once again. As Henry Carter informed the State Department,
“Johnson has acted with great tact in dealing with Christy and has shown remarkable
ability and acumen throughout the work of the commission, of which he is the driving
force.” Indeed, as if “dealing with Christy” were not enough, Monrovia’s atmosphere of
political intrigue and rumor only made Johnson’s work more difficult—and more
dangerous. While he tried to keep a low profile in the Liberian capital—impossible
under the circumstances—Johnson received an unusual note from the doctor who had
treated Christy. The note “confirmed” rumors “that the Commission had ordered dug up
at Kakata a young girl who had been buried alive, as a living sacrifice to fend off the
effects of the Commission. When exhumed in the presence of the Commission she had a
string around her neck and one around her forehead with Arabic characters which a
Mohammedan woman was able to translate. Two names—Faulkner and Twe were
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written thereon.” On the girl’s head “was an overturned pot, and buried at her head a
rooster, the earth over which had been tramped down by the President.” Although pure
fabrication, Johnson realized that the “exactness of the details and the general character
of the report lent the aspect of truth.”68
Trying to disentangle fact from fiction in Liberia proved just as difficult for chargé
Henry Carter and his superiors in Washington as it did for Johnson, particularly during
the stressful days preceding the commission’s trip upcountry to Cape Palmas. In early
April, an excitable Harvey Firestone had flown into a rage when he discovered that the
Liberian auditor had failed to submit important financial reports, and had neglected to
pay his office help any wages since the first of the year. While Liberian government
officials remained reluctant to make any cuts in expenditures that involved their own
salaries, the auditor’s accountants and typist who complained of “hunger and weakness”
could not draw up the necessary reports because they were “absent sick on account of
lack of proper, regular nourishment.” In a conversation with President King, Carter
learned of Liberia’s “desperate” financial straits, and then received a memo from
Secretary of State Edwin Barclay that outlined a plan to call on the Finance Corporation
of America for assistance in obtaining a £40,000 loan from the Bank of British West
Africa to cover its outstanding debts. In early May, as Firestone declined any further
loan advances and turned up the pressure on King for reforms in government spending,
Carter informed the State Department that the Liberian Secretary of the Treasury had in
the previous few days “openly on two occasions taken action clearly in violation of the
loan agreement.” As Carter saw it, Americo-Liberian mishandling of funds had created a
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situation “which becomes worse daily and which may easily lead to . . . political chaos
in the country.”69
Secretary of State Stimson, annoyed with Carter’s handling of affairs, abruptly
informed his chargé in Monrovia that, as the State Department understood the matter,
“the semi-annual interest due May 1st has been paid,” and Liberia’s salary outlays
amounted to forty-six and not eighty-five percent of total expenditures. Stimson then
wanted to know why Carter had not stated “the cause of the present financial stringency.”
More importantly, Stimson wrote: “As you, of course, are aware, this Government has
no intention of ‘intervening’ in Liberia.” The secretary of state reminded Carter that
“Liberia’s total foreign indebtedness is covered by the Loan of 1926 held in this country
and as the Department has no information of any danger to foreign lives or property in
Liberia, it does not understand on what facts you base your fear of foreign intervention.”
Although he would be glad to consider any “concrete” suggestions that Carter may make
“in the way of informal advice” to help Liberia out of “the present difficult situation,”
Stimson ordered him to “refrain from making any commitments or expressing any views
on behalf of this Government respecting important developments in Liberian internal
affairs.”70
Undeterred, Carter wired Stimson and claimed, “Figure of 85 per cent confirmed by
financial adviser’s office.” The principal causes of Liberia’s economic woes, according
to Carter, rested with Firestone’s curtailment of operations “due to government’s labor

69

P. J. Fitzsimmons to Honorable Financial Adviser, April 5, 1930 (first and second quotations), Box 7013,
882.51/2094, Carter to the Secretary of State, May 2, 1930, “Draft Memorandum,” (second quotation), Box
7013, 882.51/2107, Carter to the Secretary of State, May 3, 1930 (remaining quotations), Box 7013,
882.51/2093, RG-59, NA.
70
Henry L. Stimson to the American Legation, Monrovia, May 9, 1930 (quotations), Box 7013,
882.51/2093, RG-59, NA.

217

policy and Fernando Po traffic”; “maladministration” in native policy and “unwise”
financial policy; and the “slump” in the international economy. As to his suggestion of
an “intervention,” Carter had “envisaged a possible intensification of American control
including financial dictatorship,” and “reform of government machinery and
reorganization of hinterland administration by American officials approximating 1921
loan plan,” rather than any kind of “forcible” action. Although Carter admitted that
foreign intervention was not actually imminent, he believed that it “would become a
distinct possibility” in the event of the government’s collapse, unless “the United States
were then prepared to take a fierce stand and to undertake rehabilitation of the country.”71
As the overzealous Carter continued to play Russian roulette with his assignment in
Liberia, Johnson decided to use the extra time available and visit the Suehn Industrial
Academy, located about forty miles outside of Monrovia. Like many otherwise mundane
activities in the black republic, the trip provided him with more excitement than he had
anticipated. Treacherous government roads constructed by the crudest methods caused
two tire blowouts, and Johnson thought “every bridge would be my last.” He and his
traveling companion, Firestone’s Dr. Rice, twice “fell into streams” before reaching the
school.72
The Suehn Industrial Academy, founded in 1912 by the National Baptist Convention
and administered by Sarah C. Williamson, impressed Johnson with its manicured lawn
and “touches of neatness and beauty.” The school had a “well-disciplined” coed student
body of 115 who “chanted” books of the Bible and recited the names of the presidents of
Liberia. Johnson noted happily, “no mosquitoes found yet,” although the mission had
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“leopards about.” The Fisk sociologist had met one of the teaching staff before at a
conference of social workers in Memphis, and praised the group for its efforts. Christian
missionaries played a key role in Liberian education, having founded over half of all the
schools in the country. Yet, Johnson felt that “the missionaries began at the wrong end.
Instead of trying to transplant a highly developed and abstract religious concept from a
civilized to a preliterate group, and get them to understand it, it seems wiser to change the
preliterate character of the individual, making it only logical that he would then seek
higher spiritual satisfaction than the gods of the old culture can yield.” That night as
Johnson reflected on his time at the Suehn Academy, a heavy rain began to fall and
continued into the following morning.73
Before leaving for Cape Palmas, Johnson learned of “several new wild rumors . . .
some of which were brought seriously to me by Twe, who wondered if I had been
confidential with Faulkner since he was originally in America.” One rumor suggested
that Faulkner’s secretary had “obtained by stealth a rough stenographic note of an
important paper” which Johnson had supposedly shown to Faulkner. The “note”,
allegedly a State Department cable, concerned “French and English desires for a mandate
which the United States would block to take for itself.” The second rumor claimed that a
League of Nations cable had been intercepted and purported to state: “King and Yancy
would have to be made to resign.” Johnson noted that the cables, according to rumor,
“were sold to President King for £5 and when he read the last one he fell on the floor and
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wept.” Johnson wrote: “There are no such messages anywhere, so far as I know, and I
have given Faulkner nothing, of course.”74
Later in the day, Plenyono Gbe Wolo urged Johnson to meet privately with Dr. Cole.
Believing that Cole “was the one who knew folklore,” Johnson consented, only to
discover that “he was a different person.” The seventy-eight-year-old Cole told the
American commissioner how he diagnosed cases by reading the stars, and that he had
cured President King’s high blood pressure. After more talk of “herbs”, “occult
sciences”, and “old men’s prostate troubles”, the “very dangerous” Cole gestured and
three women and a boy came into the room with a plate of food and two thermos bottles
of “light fluid—one coffee, one Hevea.” Both Wolo and Cole insisted on Johnson’s
eating or drinking, which he declined after a “most recent dinner.” He found the situation
especially embarrassing, however, because he “suspected” the food.” Indeed, he later
learned that the Hevea tea had in fact been “intended to ‘get’ something in” him so that
Cole could influence him “advantageously for President King.” The Hevea, Johnson
discovered, “as many of the other drugs played with by these ‘doctors’ has its action on
the sexual glands and eventually exhausts their power.” He described the day as “most
phantastic.”75
On May 10, with the rainy season in full swing, Johnson and the remarkably resilient
but still “rocky” Christy, along with Firestone’s William Hines, boarded the “little
German cargo steamer Wakama” for a fact-finding trip down the Liberian coast to Cape
Palmas in Maryland County. Although Johnson argued against it, Didwho Twe also
booked passage on the Wakama, while Arthur Barclay stayed behind in Monrovia as
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planned. After two months of hovering conspicuously around Monrovia in its unnerving
political atmosphere, Johnson was anxious to carry on with the commission’s work
elsewhere, no matter what perils lay ahead in the blinding rain. For its part, the King
administration hoped that the American commissioner would never return from the
hinterland. If Johnson managed to survive the expedition, King and his associates knew,
as did the U. S. State Department, that evidence gathered along the Kru Coast would
almost definitely implicate high government officials in trafficking in forced labor.
Without any word from home since he left the United States, and amid endless
complications, distractions, and dangers, Johnson must have questioned the veracity of
the adage that he quoted earlier in a letter to Countee Cullen: “All things, in time, can be
understood, I suppose, and mayhap, loved.”76
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CHAPTER 5
“JOHNSEY COME TO SET US FREE”

I dreamed of crusades, of unrecorded voyages
of discovery, of republics with no history, of
hushed-up religious wars, revolutions in customs,
displacements of races and continents: I believed
in every kind of witchcraft.
Arthur Rimbaud, Delusions:
II. The Alchemy of the Word

By the time that Charles S. Johnson left for Cape Palmas in May 1930, the
relationship between Firestone and the King administration had reached a new level of
discord that only further complicated matters in Liberia, and that suggested the possibility
of more drastic upheavals in the future. While the U. S. State Department looked on in
bewilderment, Firestone cited nine specific loan violations, which included the diversion
of funds designated for road building between Monrovia and Kakata to the construction
of private homes for Americo-Liberian officials. As a result, a fuming Harvey Firestone
carried through with his threat to withhold any more loan advances until the black
republic repented and changed its ways.1 Now headed for the most unstable region in
Liberia, and the most important as far as the League commission was concerned, Johnson
1

Raymond Leslie Buell, Liberia: A Century of Survival, 1847-1947 (Philadelphia: University of
Pennsylvania Press, 1947), 34. For Firestone’s list of grievances against the Liberian Government, see The
Finance Corporation of America at Cleveland to the National City Bank of New York, June 14, 1930,
Papers Relating to the Foreign Relations of the United States, 1930 (3 vols.; Washington, D. C.: United
States Government Printing Office, 1945), III, 400-4. Hereafter cited as Foreign Relations, 1930. John
Loomis, the American financial adviser in Liberia, submitted an “imaginary budget” to Harvey Firestone,
Jr., that zeroed in on the company’s main concern in the black republic. Loomis wrote: “The Hinterland
will be the source of enough additional revenue if we can get the hinterland in our control so far as revenue
collections are concerned. In a few years Internal Revenue should exceed, or at least equal, Customs
Revenue. John Loomis to J. P. Moffat, May 28, 1930, (quotations), Box 7013, 881.51/2106, Record Group
59 (National Archives, Washington, D. C.). Hereafter cited as RG-59, NA.

222

found himself caught in the middle of a situation that could, given a hard enough push
from one direction or another, deteriorate into anarchy and chaos. But unlike before—in
France in 1918 and Chicago in 1919—he had at least a degree of autonomy and control
amid the disorder that surrounded him. Indeed, he understood that completion of the
inquiry rested mainly on his shoulders.
On board the Wakama, Johnson soon realized that a recent brush with death had in no
way diminished Christy’s capacity for intransigence. At the first call for dinner the
chairman of the League commission chose to sit in the captain’s chair, a decision that
elicited a mild reprimand from the steward. After learning that the captain always ate at
second call, Christy became “apprehensive about his status,” and missed first call for the
duration of the trip. The Englishman’s “quite obvious fright about being mistaken for
less than what he is” would have been all right by Johnson, “except that a truly large
person would not be so affected.” Johnson felt that his fellow commissioner would
“make any compromise in return for being respected as the head of this work—instead of
the expected role of one of a trio acting as chairman by courtesy.”2
During a lengthy discussion with William Hines, Johnson learned that the price of
rubber, which stood at $1.40 per pound when Firestone began operations in Liberia, had
dropped to twelve cents, well below the cost of production. Hines then explained that
more than fifty percent of the crude rubber produced in Dutch-owned areas of the Far
East was in fact grown independently by natives, a system that Firestone encouraged
“selfishly in their own interest” in Liberia by offering free seed and plants “to any who
wanted it.” President King and several other Americo-Liberian officials, along with the
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radical but capitalist-minded Didwho Twe, had accepted Firestone’s generosity to the
tune of about thirty thousand rubber plants. Hines also indicated that Firestone had
initiated a lawsuit against William V. S. Tubman, a senator from Maryland County and
future president of Liberia, who purchased a company car and then sold it before paying
for it. Johnson noted: “Hines is also keeping an eye on the investigation, I presume.”3
At Grand Cess, the last stop before Cape Palmas, a Kru man intent on seeing his
young son off to school down the coast, attempted to board the steamer. A Liberian
official “quite bumptiously asserted that the boy would have to pay £4 head tax, which
the father did not have. He cried.” Didwho Twe told the official, “When you see a Kru
man cry . . . it is very serious. It is also very dangerous. Remember, you have to come
out on these Kru boats every day.” The officer then “growled, ‘Well, go on.’”4
Upon reaching Cape Palmas on May 11, Hines preceded the commissioners ashore
and arranged for their stay in a house leased by the Firestone Plantations Company.
Johnson felt none too “keen” about accepting the general manager’s favors “just on
general grounds,” although Hines seemed “perfectly fine about it.” The bungalow,
located on a promontory near a lighthouse, provided an ocean view that Johnson
considered “ . . . one of the most beautiful I have ever seen.” A few hundred yards from
shore was a small, picturesque island, and “down the water line . . . the fantastic figures”
3
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of rock outcroppings that concealed more jagged formations below. Lying nearby in
waves that broke “mysteriously” was the “slowly rotting hulk” of a ship “that had its
bottom ripped out” while transporting its cargo of eleven automobiles, a “total loss.” The
house, however, approximated “luxury”, with a living and dining room, “two bedrooms
(one mine, overlooking this eternal charge and rumble of the waves) books and
magazines, two servants and two closets of stores.” In addition to the plentiful supply of
Evian and Perrier water, Johnson counted twelve bottles of wine.5
The presence of Christy, however, along with other distractions, ruined any hope that
Johnson may have had for finding a few moments of peace before the rugged trip ahead.
Hines had told Johnson earlier in Monrovia that labor at Firestone’s seven-thousand-acre
Cavalla plantation had become such a problem that it had interrupted development, and
only six hundred workers were now employed there. Firestone found it particularly “hard
to get the Grebos to work” because they were “difficult” and “liked to fight.” Indeed,
Johnson had to cope with constant fighting between the six houseboys who had
accompanied the commissioners from Monrovia, and the Grebo houseboys at Cape
Palmas. The fighting, combined with the close proximity of Christy, nearly caused
Johnson to crack. The black sociologist, who would have to sit through endless
conferences with southern segregationists in the Jim Crow South in the 1930s, wrote: “If
Christy doesn’t stop sucking and clicking his teeth I’ll lose my mind and temper
completely, I fear.” “Africa,” as Johnson observed, “begins to take its toll of patience.”6
From Cape Palmas, Johnson and Christy planned to proceed to towns along the coast
and inland, where travelers from throughout Maryland and Sinoe counties who wished to
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testify before the commission could reach it. Christy wanted Twe to accompany the
group upcountry, an idea that did not sit well with Johnson. He wrote: “I like Twe
immensely, and it would reduce our work a great deal, but it seems like taking an unfair
advantage. It is not well as finding what we can ourselves.” As they prepared for the
trip, the county superintendent introduced Johnson to Vice-President Allen N. Yancy.
Expecting a “stout, pompous, rather forceful person,” Johnson instead discovered a
“rather small, cunning individual, who would be arrogant if he dared.” Resenting the
encroachment on his territory, Yancy “rubbed it into” the Liberian official “several times
about just coming to this county.” Johnson learned that “Yancy is hostile to the Firestone
Company,” particularly because Firestone, unlike the vice-president, paid wages to
natives for work completed, leaving fewer men and boys for shipment to Fernando Po.7
After a few days in Cape Palmas, Johnson had a clearer picture of how the illegal
recruiting for Fernando Po worked, as well as Yancy’s central role in the process. In
nearby Harper, where Yancy ran the Maryland County Recruiting Company for native
labor, Johnson learned that authorities in Fernando Po paid more than £12 per worker, out
of which £2.10 went for “government fees”, and £9 to the recruiting agent, PostmasterGeneral Samuel Ross. In the labor contract with Spain, workers were supposed to
receive half of their monthly salary of £2 in Fernando Po, and the other half from the
Spanish Consul after their return to Liberia. More often than not, workers fortunate
enough to return alive after being away as long as two or three years, received nothing.
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Yancy handled all legal hearings in the county, although he had no jurisdiction to do so
except for “President King’s orders,” and assessed all fees and fines in trials often held at
his home, where he had built a jail. In lieu of payment for fines levied at the whim of
Yancy, the Frontier Force demanded more men and boys from chiefs for transport down
the coast. Before departing Johnson made a note to himself to subpoena the contracts of
the Maryland County Recruiting Corporation.8
In the “beautifully situated” nearby town of Harper, Johnson noted: “This section was
colonized by the American Colonization Society, largely with persons from Maryland,
from which the County takes its name.” Independent from Liberia during its initial years
Maryland County “now wishes it had remained so.” Johnson learned that Harper had
only irregular communication with Monrovia, and he found conditions in the town most
discouraging. The town, without any hospitals or doctors, had “very poor” schools,
unnamed streets, and lacked either birth or death registration. “No census had been
taken,” Johnson observed, “probably for political reasons, when small places of less than
500 roll up Whig majorities of 2000 and more.” Firestone’s struggling Cavalla plantation
at Cape Palmas served as the area’s principal source of income. His mood already
darkened by the depressing conditions in Harper, Johnson also had nearly reached the
breaking point with Christy. “I fear I have been most glum all day,” he wrote. “Fed up.
When Christy thinks I am getting too much attention he tries hard to get it understood
that only he knows Africa. What part of it doesn’t matter. I make no claims to this; nor
do I see the necessity for constantly reminding all our joint conferees.”9
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On the morning of May 15, the commissioners left Cape Palmas with 105 native
porters and three hammocks.

The system of porterage, or transporting passengers

overland by hammock, served as another serious point of contention among natives, who
often had to provide up to a thousand men for Yancy and other government officials,
always without payment. Johnson deemed his crew “extra good,” as they “sang, laughed,
and raced,” each time reaching their destination ahead of Christy. Johnson “developed a
real affection for them.” As the group crossed the Hoffman River at Cape Palmas and
began its journey up the beach, Johnson noted: “Dreadful going, hot, the sand dry and
yielding 2 and 3 inches under foot.” Johnson walked several miles from Harper to
Rocktown, where his group rested before continuing on to Fishtown. The pause gave
Johnson a chance to analyze “the parts” of him “that gave way first under the intense
strain.” He commented on pain in his back and kidneys; his left eye from “the sun
streaming constantly back of my dark glasses;” his right side; his left thigh; and his
“head at the top, from the weight of the helmet and the sun . . . .” Yet, he “was never
winded.” At Fishtown the commissioners pitched their tents a few yards from that of
Paramount Chief Sie, a native labor recruiter and self-described “indomitable fighter and
defier of the government.”

Although too tired to sleep, and “disturbed by cattle,”

Johnson found his situation “quite comfortable,” even as it began to rain.10
After hearing the testimony of two chiefs the next morning, a “terrible downpour”
began and prevented the group from taking down their tents. A pause in the rain allowed
for the commissioners’ departure from Fishtown, but thirty minutes later “a tremendous
storm” overtook them. Johnson wrote: “It poured. Rain penetrated everything; the
ocean was mad.” In the “rough elemental scene” ocean waves reaching five feet high
10
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“rolled like huge glass cylinders,” making it impossible to see “the line of march ahead.”
Christy considered the storm the worst that he had ever seen. With their loads weighted
down by the rainfall, the number of porters dropped to ninety-two, not understanding that
“they were going to be paid.” On the approach to the town of Garawe, Johnson finally
switched from his heavy, crepe-soled boots to a pair of tennis shoes as he “squashed
about in water.” The image of a rain-soaked Charles S. Johnson in white sun helmet,
dark glasses, and tennis shoes slogging along the Liberian beach contrasts sharply with
that of the conservative, “buttoned-up” sociologist often portrayed as spending most of
his time in the security of foundation boardrooms. Outside of Garawe the commissioners
received “much interesting testimony.”11
As the expedition moved on to Garawe and searched for a campsite, Didwho Twe
suddenly appeared. Johnson wrote: “It occurs to me that Twe is staying for reasons of
personal safety, within the shadow of the Commission. He was most interested in getting
out of Monrovia.” Eventually the group made its way to the Garawe Mission, under the
direction of “a Miss Hall,” a graduate of Clark University sent to Liberia in 1905 by the
African Methodist Episcopal Church. Needing an elevated site for their camp, Johnson
asked the missionaries “if they would not be embarrassed by the presence of the
Commission.” After some deliberation, everyone agreed to an “alternate selection of a
site in the graveyard, where the missionaries had been buried along with the other
civilized natives. The spot for the tents was within 3 feet of 2 fresh graves.”12
Didwho Twe, however, tried to discourage the group from camping, which
“exasperated” Christy. Already “in fair form” and angry at the Kru for “running off”
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with five porters and thereby “congesting” the commissioners’ loads, Christy yelled at
Twe “that we were not relying on him to provide for us.” When Twe left shortly
afterward, Johnson reminded Christy that he “had argued against his invitation to Twe to
come on this trip . . . so strongly that he remarked about my spirited contentiousness.”
Johnson “let the matter drop” but felt: “It has never seemed quite right that Twe should
escort the Commission, being, as he was, at the same time, anti-government and one of
the most important witnesses against it.”13
As Johnson and Christy “talked casually” of the report, the American commissioner
revealed that he knew nothing of how the U. S. State Department had maneuvered
President King into calling for an inquiry. Johnson observed that “the arch diplomatic
mistake” of the Liberian Government “from their standpoint, was that of inviting a
commission of inquiry.” He told Christy that the report might be called The Bluff That
Failed. Still “in a facetious mood,” he thought of another title that he did not share with
the Englishman: The Reneger in the Woodpile.14 Had he known that Secretary of State
Stimson had in fact pressured King into requesting the inquiry, Johnson almost certainly
would have declined President Hoover’s appointment.
Over the course of the next couple of days, “few new points came up” from the
assemblage of Grebo chiefs, although Johnson learned that many of the Garawe people
had planned “to migrate to some British colony if they had not heard that the
Commission was coming.” The chiefs, as Johnson observed, had “a doubly saddened
aspect, for their land, their authority, their pride, their ‘boys,’ had been taken away, not
alone by government order (against which they were then complaining), but the
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devastating influence of coastal exposure.” Johnson also discovered that the natives from
Fishtown to Garawe “want white man rule,” having suffered “an utter loss of confidence
and hope in their black rulers . . . .” Natives had “nothing comparable to the ‘race pride’
of the American Negroes, or the self-determination and enthusiasm of the AmericoLiberians. They want security and a chance to earn a livelihood.”15
After another night of rain, Johnson and Christy decided on a new course of action.
They determined that Christy would return to Cape Palmas to rest, and Johnson would
move on to the coastal village of Wedabo, across the Po River. Later, the two would
meet up again along the border with Ivory Coast. Christy left before Johnson and thus
missed the bizarre free-for-all that took place along the riverbank. Although the
American commissioner had been informed of the long-standing hostility between the
Garawe Grebos and the Po River Krus, which in 1924 resulted in a killing and Paramount
Chief Jeh’s imprisonment, nothing that morning indicated any imminent violence. As a
result of the 1924 incident, it was agreed that Garawe natives could carry loads between
Fishtown and the river, where they would set them down on the bank to be picked up by
the Po River natives. The fact that the carriers were to be paid, however, altered the
situation. Left to ride the swift current in a rickety canoe, Johnson watched as the Grebos
began crossing the river with an unusually large escort of men for the relatively light load
of baggage and hammocks to be transported. Other than the ominous silence of the
crowds of natives that lined both banks of the river, Johnson noticed nothing else out of
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the ordinary until he landed. Almost immediately, an argument broke out over which
group of natives would transport the hammocks. Shoving between four or five pairs of
men soon erupted into fistfights, buglers sounded “the cry of trouble,” and the arrival of
more men turned the scene into a battle royal.16
Fighting between the Grebos and Krus quickly “became general and vicious.” As fast
as Johnson “could get one scrap settled another would start. They drew blood.” Johnson
noted: “Curiously they let me cuff them about, pull them apart, separate them, and they
took it obediently, all of them as soon as I turned to break another fight they would be at
it viciously again.” As a frightened John Matheus looked on, a messenger sent by the
county governor received a severe beating. Johnson suspected the messenger, a young
man named Mooney, of “being partly responsible for the scrap,” and regarded him as
“uncivil and a coward.” The man’s “mother was a Kru woman, his father a Grebo. He
was in a helluva fix because he belonged to neither side and yet belonged to both.”
Several times Johnson dragged Mooney away from a pile of men who had been
“pummeling” him, and who promised to kill him “and would have done so if I hadn’t
been present.” Now nearly exhausted from separating the fighters, “holding back the
boats, dragging men and putting them back in the boats,” Johnson viewed the situation as
“hopeless.”17
Mooney then told Johnson: “If the Garawe men go back it will be very serious.”
“Serious be damned,” Johnson thundered, and told Mooney that the men had to go back.
The American commissioner later wrote: “I was tired of the scrap and it would never
stop, but grow worse as long as they were both on the same side of the river.” Finally, he

16
17

Johnson, “African Diary,” May 20, 1930, 121, 122 (quotation), CSJP; Johnson, Bitter Canaan, 205.
Johnson, “African Diary,” May 20, 1930, 122 (quotations), CSJP; Johnson, Bitter Canaan, 206.

232

managed to get about half of the men back into the boats and was preparing to give them
a small payment, or “dash”, for transporting him to the other side, when “some damned
fool raised the question of giving all the dash to one man to divide.” In no time the men
had left the boats and were fighting again until Johnson ordered the Po River natives to
bring the loads “one by one” away from the water. Less than five minutes after he
“started Matheus off” with the first load, warriors began arriving with cutlasses and
poison-tipped spears “like harpoons, with string tied to them.” A quick-thinking Johnson
intercepted the warriors and convinced them that the battle, termed a “palaver,” had
played itself out. About two hours after the fighting began, individual carriers managed
to transport the loads before either side suffered any fatalities. The women, as Johnson
noted, “were a nuisance, dancing around urging the men to battle, bringing their
cutlasses, old and young.”18
* * *
Liberian greeting: Shake hands, work finger down to point and snap against each
other’s finger. It means “brother.”
* * *
As more rain fell, Johnson and his group moved on for a brief stay in Wedabo, a pair
of conjoined villages on the beach that served as outposts for the Webo tribe led by
Paramount Chief Jeh that lived further upcountry. As they set up camp, the group came
under “the curious gaze” of local natives, and Johnson noticed “the enormous navel
hernias on the children, some as large as an orange.” He learned that midwives “bite the
cords.” Before long, the “bronzed and magnificent” Jeh appeared and extended his
welcome after a long journey from the Webo capital of Soloken, an inland town that
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Johnson planned to visit later. Jeh, the scion of a long line of courageous and dignified
Webo rulers, introduced Johnson to the native headman of the five hundred men
demanded as payment by Yancy in 1924, and then escorted him to the point where
townspeople had been held as hostages until those bound for Fernando Po were herded in
from upcountry. Before leaving, Johnson gave the town chief a white linen handkerchief
and two shillings in return for the white chicken presented as a dash to him upon his
arrival. Johnson noted: “A white dash says, ‘Here is my heart as white as this token.’ It
is like shaking hands. You must return dash.”19
On May 21, after enduring heavy rainfall the entire night before, Johnson and his
group “made an orderly departure” as they headed for Grand Cess. Normally a four-hour
trip, they arrived in only three hours and fifteen minutes “without urging the carriers at
all.” At Grand Cess, an “active and alive” coastal town divided between a large native
section of about eight hundred inhabitants, and a smaller area populated by assimilated
natives, the commissioner happened to be away but a Kru man named Nebo “was in
charge and very cordial and helpful.”20
As he waited two days for chiefs to assemble and offer testimony, Johnson learned
that fishing had been an important source of income in Grand Cess for many years but
few fishermen now lived there; farming had been all but abandoned due to poor soil
conditions that natives attributed to a curse. Most able-bodied men and teen-aged boys
from Grand Cess worked elsewhere along the coast. A native man who had recently
returned to see his family after being away for three years, told Johnson: “I’m a
tradesman. I wear tan and white shoes and eat at a hotel in Lagos.” After being informed
19
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that a “great tower” was being built in his town, the man felt more than disappointed
when he saw the “small cement block church” across from Johnson’s campsite. “They
call this thing a tower,” the man said in disgust. “If this wasn’t my native land where my
wife and child stay, I never come back. Look in the streets. They don’t got none. No
sewer. Nothing.” Johnson considered the tradesman’s restlessness to be “the price of
domination,” a result of exposure to better conditions along the Gold Coast that only
magnified the underdevelopment of his native land. Johnson also noted: “Twe wants to
borrow money.”21
As chiefs from the surrounding area began to arrive in Grand Cess, Johnson observed:
“The crowds are most amazing, standing and gaping.” The “retinue” of paramount chiefs
who testified before the American commissioner was, in fact, the same that VicePresident Yancy had assembled for his “second wholesale demand” for men and boys for
Fernando Po in 1928. Yancy told the chiefs that he had just returned from Monrovia with
an order from President King demanding that each paramount chief in attendance furnish
sixty men or pay £10.0.0. for each man less than the required number. Any chief who
refused to pay or failed to supply men received a promise that soldiers would be sent to
destroy his town. When a chief dispatched messengers to President King to ask if he had
issued such orders, the chief was imprisoned and had his government commission
revoked. Soldiers then sacked the surrounding towns, beat women and children, and
killed four men. Chiefs also complained about roadwork without pay or food. One chief
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stated: “We cannot send people to Fernando Po and to the road. Where we got such an
amount of people?”22
While serving dinner a few nights before leaving Grand Cess, one of Matheus’ young
native assistants, Widoweh, was bitten by a poisonous snake. Without access to any
professional medical care, Johnson had little choice but to allow the use of “native cures”,
which began by rinsing with a mouthful of vinegar, blowing on the wound three times,
and applying a layer of salt. A native man then sucked the venom out of the wound and
placed Widoweh in the care of an elderly woman, who tied a palm shred around his leg
above the ankle. Just outside of Grand Cess, Johnson’s group, minus Widoweh, crossed
their “worst river” on the way to Soloken. Surrounded by a giant swamp of “dismal”
vegetation, it took the group an hour to cross over the river on a bridge made of “frail and
uncertain string poles.” Afterward the countryside consisted mainly of sandy soil and
bush with uneven hills. The porters, as Johnson noted, drank from each of the small
streams in the hilly depressions, “including the coffee colored water of the first rivers.”
On the way Johnson observed burial sites that he described as “most lugubrious,” with
“the man’s clothing, pots, lantern, jugs, bottles, pans, etc., stacked around the grave.”
After crossing eleven streams, Johnson’s group eventually reached Jeh’s home of
Soloken, or Bigtown, where “we sat down.”23
As they recovered from their journey, Chief Jeh, “the most gracious of hosts, really
put himself out to supervise, personally, our comfort,” and presented Johnson with a goat
as a dash. With everyone “tired and worn down by the trek and setting up camp,” the
22
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American commissioner went to sleep early only to be awakened by the “ritualistic”
shouting of men and the sound of cattle hurrying to an open space near the campsite.
Thinking nothing of it, he went back to sleep until the cattle knocked down part of his
tent and tore through the mosquito netting. Outside with a flashlight to repair the
damage, Johnson learned from a native that a leopard had entered the town. Jeh offered
refuge in his house but Johnson decided instead to barricade himself in his tent. After the
government banned native ownership of firearms in 1916, villagers had become “easy
prey,” not only for wild animals but also for the Liberian Frontier Force. On that night,
however, the leopard only managed to carry off a goat.24
In Soloken, like everywhere else that he visited in Liberia, Johnson took countless
photographs and noted the peculiarities of native life. He observed that Webo women,
who shaved their heads in back and front but left a tuft on the top like “a bald-headed
man,” seemed to be “the hard workers,” although he saw only “infant girls and old
women with flat, pendulous, dried up and well used breasts.” Later he learned that the
hairstyles symbolized mourning. Indeed, Johnson saw few young men in the villages.
Older men wore numerous styles of clothing and the boys amused themselves “by
playing with the foreskins of their penises.” Many of the children had “sores like yaws—
on face, buttocks, legs, back, mouth.” Johnson also took note of the “desolation” of the
Webo villages. Everywhere he noticed “a silent square mound” where a hut once stood,
patches of empty ground that still required payment of a hut tax. As evidence of the
effects of Frontier Force raids, he photographed a deserted village with “lizards in
possession,” overgrown by bush and strewn with rotting breadfruit. Although natives
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used communal labor to assemble huts, owners not only had to buy materials but also
feed and entertain workers; the loss of a town or even a single hut placed a great burden
on them in a “shilling-a-day economy.”25
Most striking to Johnson was the dignity of the Webo people. He claimed: “The
politeness of the Africans is generally enough to put us all to shame. They come to say
‘Good morning’ and to say ‘Good evening.’ No other business is mixed with this
ceremony.” Chief Jeh, in particular, made an unusually strong impression on the
sociologist. Neither had Americo-Liberians forgotten Jeh. About a month before
Johnson’s arrival in Soloken, the Liberian secretary of the interior dug up the case from
1924 that involved the killing of the Po River man, and demanded that Jeh turn over the
“three murderers.” The paramount chief then had to prove that he had already presented
the men to Yancy, who then “put them to work on his farm, where they stayed at least a
year.”26
Over the course of the next few days, Johnson heard testimony from Jeh and his
subchiefs as well as numerous villagers who had suffered in one way or another at the
hands of the Frontier Force and Vice-President Yancy. From one nearby town, ninetyfive out of 125 men who had been forcibly shipped to Fernando Po died there. Besides
the abduction of men and boys for shipment to Fernando Po and Libreville in French
Gabon, Johnson discovered that natives “are clamoring for the abolition of the special
taxation of the seagoing men.” Head money paid by seagoing Krus and Grebos—two
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tribes that had traditionally avoided domestic slavery or pawning—“is resented by them
as a form of servitude.” Before being expelled from the legislature, Twe had introduced
a bill that agitated against the head money, deeming it as nothing more than another
recruiting fee. When Chief Jeh asked Johnson if he should still pay the “illegal tax,”
Johnson told him that, “although bad, he must until we see what effect the report will
have.”27
On his second night in town, Johnson had listened to a man regarded as having the
finest voice in the district, Soloken’s own “Homer” or “Virgil”, who sang “the great
deeds of his chiefs.” Later Johnson played for Jeh a few of the recordings that he had
made on wax discs with his “small phonograph-record apparatus”. The recordings
fascinated the natives, and when a village elder heard about them he asked that Johnson
record the singing voice of Jua, his young daughter. Johnson had only four discs left, and
although “skeptical,” he agreed “out of courtesy.” In front of a large crowd Johnson then
sat transfixed as he heard Jua sing the Lament of the Webo Women, a song that began, in
translation: “We were here when trouble came to our people/ For this trouble Jeh was
imprisoned and fined/ For this reason Yancy came to our country/ He caught our
husbands and our brothers/ Sailed them to Nana Po/ And there they die . . . . They will
never go to Nana Po again/ You may as well dig a hole and put us all in it/ We well
never go back again/ Yancy, why?” Toward the end of the long lament, which included
names of individuals lost to Fernando Po, Jua sang: “Dr. Johnson is here from America/
He and Twe going to help, so hold your head up and have courage.” As Twe told the
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Webo people: “Johnsey come to set us free.” If the full weight of his mission had not
occurred to him already, Johnson’s time in Soloken drove the point home.28
As they prepared to depart from Soloken, Chief Jeh asked Johnson to make more
recordings. “He is much enchanted about them,” Johnson wrote, “and continues to refer
to us as white men.” In reference to the recordings, Jeh told Johnson, “The thing you do
last night the people like too much. You white people be God people, they savvy God.”
Johnson, who never made any personal references to religion in his journal entries, left
Soloken and a “regretful” Jeh on the morning of May 28 in a heavy rain. Headed now for
the town of Kaaken, located in Sinoe County’s Tienpo section, the American
commissioner and his group crossed seventeen streams and three rivers, two of the
streams “above our waists . . . and no bridges.” Johnson described the bush as “deep like
a mine and sunless,” the trek “the longest . . . so far, and the hardest.” In Kaaken the
hearings “were as stiff and formal as all the rest,” the town chief “young and long on
ceremony.” After two hours of testimony and a promise of more the next day, Johnson
learned that the townspeople had heard about his phonograph and wanted to hear his
“native music”. Although “tired,” he “let them hear one and made one.” Amid the serene
African village noises of “cows, goats, crickets, rustle of leaves, and drowned laughing,”
Johnson noted that the children, “of whom there seem to be many,” played a game called
Soldiers Catchy Men and Beat Them.29
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After a few days in Kaaken, Johnson’s group moved on to the town of Niwaken, a
four-hour trip across swollen streams and up steep hills. As the beating of drums
signaled their approach, townspeople brought out Paramount Chief Doe, who had
traveled from his capital of Tarea, to greet Johnson. Doe was paralyzed and seated in a
chair, the result of being poisoned by his own people for suspected complicity in the
building of a Frontier Force barracks at nearby Borobo. Only later was it understood that
Yancy and the soldiers had forced Doe to consent. “The first meeting with the people,”
as Johnson observed, was “very formal and impressive.” Before long he took note of the
severe shortage of food in the town. The people “had suffered not only from the soldiers,
but with the men away and the women making barracks no one planted farms and . . .
there is no food.” At one point Johnson felt a sharp twinge of embarrassment over his
middle-class American standards when he carelessly threw away a sandwich covered
with ants. Immediately, three men ran after it, saying, “Ah, it’s good! I’m goin’ keep it.
It hungry time.”30
In Niwaken, Johnson also visited a Pentecostal mission run for thirty years by J. M.
Perkins and his wife. Johnson described their assistant, Miss Shelton, as “ a large not bad
looking Salvation Army type young lady.” The Perkins’ house, “like a good old
American country place, even to the comfortable smells,” provided Johnson with a
chance to rest and recover. The missionaries sent Johnson’s group two boxes of fruit,
mango jelly, and fresh-baked bread and cookies. “Delightful!” Johnson noted. With the
Perkins’ he later ate boiled breadfruit, which he described as “very good . . . tastes like
white potatoes with the consistency of yams.” That evening, with a touch of fever that he
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battled until morning, he recalled the different sections that he had passed through and
asserted: “I can now account for 1380 boys recruited by force for Fernando Po.”31
After “considerable carrier trouble”, Johnson and Matheus, along with their entourage
of assistants and porters, left Niwaken on June first, a Sunday morning. As Chief Doe
and a small party of his men followed behind, the route turned “hilly and rough.” The
caravan then crossed seven streams and two rivers during the four-hour trip to Gropaka,
the town near the Frontier Force barracks. Natives beat drums and danced upon their
arrival, and at the barracks gate Johnson met a group of officers, including a young
captain who had immigrated to Liberia with his American-born parents. Johnson “liked
them all and found it difficult to reconcile them with charges against the Frontier Force.”
Most gracious in his meeting with Johnson, the captain’s mood changed suddenly when
they went outside and met Chief Doe and his men on the verandah. The captain “spoke
in the most patronizing manner” and the chief’s group “responded as southern Negroes to
a white man.” The captain asked, “So this is the paramount chief, eh? Well, what are
you doing here?” Later, Johnson wrote: “Truly has it been said that race prejudice is
least of all racial.”32
A few hours later in “threatening rain”, Johnson arrived in Tarea, or Rocktown, Chief
Doe’s capital. In Tarea, the American commissioner received word from Christy. “His
messenger had met mine and brought him back with my note to Christy. I sent them both
back forthwith, by night.” After the group set up camp, natives received the strangers
with a ceremonial presentation of kola nuts, palm nuts, “salt (white—friendship)”, and
other items that signified: “We offer you what we eat—our hospitality.” On the
31
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following morning natives offered the American commissioner a freshly butchered
bullock, an expression that he felt they could not well afford, considering the acute
shortage of food in the region. Johnson refused the meat and asked if they had eggs or
fowl instead, an uninformed gesture that “offended”.33
No doubt mortified by his clumsiness in receiving the dash, Johnson regained his
composure, and was soon reminded of his main purpose for being in Liberia when a
group of native women who had been standing outside of the “crowd of men” asked to be
heard. Johnson judged the woman who stepped forward to speak to be about thirty-five
years old, and he noted that she carried a child on her back in a kinjah, a woven seat with
matting for protection from the harsh elements. In a clear voice that commanded
Johnson’s attention, the woman claimed that in their testimony before the American
commissioner the men had not told everything, and it was her duty to set the record
straight. She then told how soldiers had taken women in groups of two hundred to the
barracks and kept them there for nine months against their will. “The soldiers used us as
their wives,” she said, “we who had husbands and children. They had guns and we could
not protect ourselves and our husbands could not protect us.” As a result, pregnant
women from the Borobo section had to prove paternity, and many were forced to abort
their unborn children. “We pray to the Commission to stop us from having to go to the
barracks.”34
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Moving on once again the next morning, Johnson intended to reach the town of Webo
by nightfall but had to stop at the first Nyenebo town on the way because the local chief
“put up the most forceful, polite argument for our staying.” Although his paramount
chief lived about a mile away, the town chief claimed that his people had much to say.
Johnson, who had run out of money, wrote: “Anyhow there were no carriers at the
moment, and after long discussion and argument, we sat down.” After another
ceremonial presentation of kola nuts, water, and salt, Johnson’s group of fourteen
received a full-grown cow that was butchered and laid before his tent. “For us,” Johnson
noted, “there was selected an ungodly amount of meat.” His three clerks “took a whole
quarter—the greedy dogs,” and the young assistants “stuffed themselves like hogs.”
Johnson became “disgusted”, first with the clerks “who could read and write and had no
consideration for the ‘heathen natives’, who couldn’t,” and then with the boys “who were
getting a rare taste of meat and gorged themselves until I swore blazes at them for their
hoggishness.” Later, he had to hand out “constipation pills”. Johnson then returned half
of the meat “to the really poor and hungry living around us,” who divided it “down to
hoofs, parts of tripe, skin, long into the day, until about fifty had gotten a small
portion.”35
After the feast came “palaver” over the absence of Paramount Chief Casar, whom
Johnson had earlier invited to Rocktown. Casar, however, had suggested that Johnson
visit his town instead, a “logical” offer that the American commissioner had mishandled
“through ignorance.” After thirty minutes of palaver, Casar arrived “and accepted the
invitation in good grace.” As he approached, townspeople had been “going through the
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ritual of saying ‘I am afraid.’” They told Johnson, “Tomorrow you will be gone, and
who is going to protect us from the wrath of the fireheads by whom we are surrounded?
They will come and destroy our towns, as they have done before.” Chief Casar, after “a
brief polite recognition of our visit and thanks for stopping,” said: “You hear them say
that they are afraid, that if we talk our towns will be destroyed. It is true . . . we are a
small people and helpless before them, their soldiers and their guns.” Then, with “a burst
of voice” that startled Johnson, Casar said: “Then let it be history for our children that in
the year Nineteen-thirty the towns of the little people of Nyenebo were destroyed because
they made known their complaints. I shall talk fully and truthfully.” Johnson noted:
“And he did.”36
True to an earlier promise, the Nyenebo provided carriers for Johnson’s group,
although “difficult” to do so in light of the shortage of able-bodied men in the town.
Now on the last leg of his journey, Johnson settled on the town of Webo as the site for his
last set of hearings after a visit to Kronokeh. Chief Casar asked permission to follow and
the group paused in the small Nyenebo town of Wodoweka, where native women
crowded around and sang another lament like that of the Webo maidens in Bigtown. The
trip that followed was “long and hard,” with rain, endless swamps, steep hills, and high
bush. Johnson rode in a hammock for less than a quarter of the trip, which lasted from
eight-thirty in the morning until five o’clock in the evening. On the way they
encountered sixteen streams and three rivers with “logs across.” From the time that he
had left Grand Cess, Johnson determined that he had crossed a total of ninety-one
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streams. Upon arriving in Kronokeh, he found “the cables from home and the £10.0.0
cash, for check sent to Firestone.” Also waiting in town was Cuthbert Christy.37
On the first night in Kronokeh, Paramount Chief Choami wanted to offer testimony
but “was constantly interrupted and prodded by his followers.” Johnson later discovered
that the chief had been “tampered with” by the district commissioner, a Gola native
named Carney Johnson, who Christy claimed to have been “playing to and treating as a
gentleman and getting some interesting letters.” While Christy ventured off to the town
of Webo to talk to the district commissioner, Johnson took the time to recount the journey
so far and noted eight stops made for setting up camp, eleven sections covered, and
hearings with more than one hundred chiefs and subchiefs as well as more than fourteen
hundred natives. As he wandered around Kronekeh, the sociologist showed signs of
having readjusted his thinking more along the ethnographic lines discussed with
Malinowski in London. For instance, he suspected that the characteristic geometrical
design on local native houses had evolved from the leopard’s tooth “so familiar as a part
of the decoration of native warriors.” Also, he thought the design’s “conventionalized”
shape was due to “crude tools which can make angles more easily.” Johnson went on to
note that native huts often displayed paintings of ships. He asked a native man about
other patterns and learned that they represented “canoes, breadfruit, a spoon, plate,
woman’s cloth”, and “a native water cooler.” “These, presumably” Johnson wrote, “are
the things idealized by the natives of this town.”38
With Christy away on the following day, Chief Choami made a formal presentation of
a young bullock to Johnson. Thinking now more as an anthropologist, Johnson
37
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welcomed the dash and “indulged this time in a bit of humor” about his “ignorance” of
“delightful but strange” native customs. He told the chief that “not expecting such
overwhelming hospitality as a bullock we had not brought a butcher and would have to
rely again upon their help.” Johnson believed that his new, more sensitive approach
“helped immensely with the session later.” He then congratulated himself on having
“greater grace and understanding in doing this now,” and believed that it “went off well.”
Indeed, the chief later testified “unhesitatingly and fully, and seemed to feel relieved.”39
With the hearings in Kronokeh completed, Johnson took down his tent in “a pouring
rain” and “scraped together enough carriers” to make it into Webo in two trips, traveling
on foot the entire distance and in part down a “wide and crude” government road. In
town he had an unusually frank discussion with the district commissioner. To the Fisk
sociologist, D. C. Carney Johnson seemed very “engaging.” “Hale and intelligent” like
“a college athlete,” he “wore his clothes like an American.” Although a Gola, the district
commissioner had “received book” at the College of West Africa, and seemed to Johnson
one of the few who had “not reverted.” Because of his loyalty to President King while
employed as chief clerk in the Interior Department, he had been sent into the “rear of
Yancy Country,” where “his sympathies were not particularly native except where Golas
are concerned.” D. C. Johnson, who had initially opposed shipments of native workers to
Fernando Po, felt that natives must “be doubly good to get anywhere or stay there.” But
after first advising chiefs to resist the forced labor policy, the “compulsion of higher
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officials” eventually persuaded him to fall in line with the plan, and now his methods
“were as brutal as the others.”40
In Webo, Johnson also met with an agent of the Woerman shipping line, a young
German in charge of the company store on the Cavalla River. The “cordial” young man
cashed checks, arranged for boats to take Johnson and Matheus downriver to the
Firestone plantation, and served meals for which he refused payment. The agent, “lonely
for company,” told his guests that he rarely left the store and had not crossed the street for
six months. In order for Johnson and his secretary to get an early start, he asked the two
Americans to stay the night and then kept them up late “talking, talking.”41
Early on the morning of June 7, Johnson and Matheus, along with six assistants, a
headman, and two clerks, loaded their field equipment into a fifty-foot long dugout canoe
and climbed in for a hair-raising trip down the rushing Cavalla River along the border
with Ivory Coast. Johnson did not fully trust the “fishy, suspicious looking oarsmen”
who wanted to stop and drink gin made from sugar cane. As they traversed the
treacherous river with “rocks and even trees concealed,” they passed a town “on the
French side from which inhabitants had been driven and kept by baboons—probably
chimpanzees.” Johnson noted that “the cramped position, the relentless beating of the
sun, then the rain . . . and wind that pushed up waves on the river” kept him company
until they reached their destination of Gyidetarbo.42
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Once they had stopped, Johnson sent the headman onto the Firestone plantation with a
note to bring them a truck, but about forty-five minutes later William Hines and an
assistant happened by in a car “on a chance to inquire if either Christy or myself had
come down—had missed the headman.” Johnson then accompanied Hines and left
Matheus behind “with our lunch spread, to load our stuff on the truck to come.” Christy
showed up the next day by way of “motor canoe” after learning that a ship that Hines had
“called in for himself and speculatively for the Commission” was scheduled to arrive on
the tenth to take them back to Monrovia.43
* * *
Strange names encountered: Cash Money, Blue Peter, Soon Be Gone, White Man
Trouble, Big Box Locked, Afraid God No More, Black Man, Monkey Brown, Little Snake
* * *
At Firestone’s Cavalla plantation, Johnson “passed in fair comfort” in a house recently
vacated “but not entirely clean”, where he “enjoyed the rest, the whiskey and soda.” The
Firestone house, which faced Hines’s living quarters, was made of Celotex and described
by the sociologist as “roomy” and “pleasant.” At lunch with Hines, Christy complained
that the canned food must have been poisoned, and also blamed his servant, James, for
poisoning him. James then sought out Johnson as “someone to cry to”, and claimed, “the
old man humbugs me too much.” James vowed to quit once they returned to Monrovia
because Christy “gas about everything.” Johnson deemed it “good” that Christy’s
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“second illness happened before we joined him at Kronokeh,” and considered the
Englishman “a sick man and an ultra-suspicious one.”44
Even so, Christy passed along at least one story of interest to Johnson. A “wizened,
cockeyed, serious, non-vituperative” native complainant named Davis had told Christy of
a rubber farm that he owned and worked in 1924 when Firestone’s Donald Ross paid him
a visit. Ross told Davis to ask a local chief to provide men to “cut around” the farm so
that he could examine it. Shortly afterward, the district commissioner had Davis arrested
for stealing men away from the road, “tied and beat him”, and then jailed him along with
his fifteen-year-old son. Later, the D. C. ordered them to work on the road and said,
“You think yourself a white man with a rubber farm, eh?” The D. C. then put them
through the “No. 1 basket ordeal”, a torture that Johnson had heard about repeatedly on
his trip upcountry. Soldiers would take a double-woven basket two feet in diameter and
fifteen inches deep with a concave bottom, pack it with dirt and rocks, and then place it
on the head of the victim and tell him to walk with it. The basket required four men to
lift. “Soldiers delight in exacting this punishment,” Johnson observed. “They sometimes
spin it with a monstrous strain on the neck, sometimes breaking it, or so injuring the
person that he dies later.”45
With a few days before the scheduled arrival of the Wahehe, Johnson spent one
evening in a long discussion with Hines, who surprised him when he asked how division
of interior sections worked. Johnson replied that he thought “it was by tribes . . . and
44
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that each respected the other’s towns and farm lands, but sometimes engaged in
prolonged fights over it.” Hines then told Johnson that he had considered sending
recruiters into the interior to remain there for a time until they could form friendly
relations with natives, essentially staying as “hostages” until a first group of laborers
returned with positive reports on Firestone. Johnson, always thinking of ways to use the
latest technology, suggested that “moving pictures” could be made of Firestone laborers
receiving “rice issues, pay, etc., and purchasing of goods might help and also stimulate
wants.”46
Inevitably the questions of labor and road building came up, and led Hines to cite a
report from Douglas Gent, a “prospector” for the Elder-Fife Company, a British
subsidiary of the United Fruit Company. Gent’s tour of Liberia had taken him to depths
of twenty and as much as fifty miles into the interior. Although “plenty of labor” was
available upcountry behind Bassa, he noted the “desperate” state of towns behind Sinoe.
Gent claimed that “extortion, pestering and pilfering by soldiers” and “bloodsucking by
the station masters, particularly one by the name of Jeffrey,” had caused natives to run
into the bush at least fright,” terrified of “all men in khaki.” Jeffrey had “cleaned out the
county of all able-bodied men.” One Bassa chief reportedly asked Gent, “What is the use
of our producing anything when they take it right away from us?”47
After several years of dealing with Americo-Liberians, Hines concluded: “The ruling
class of Liberia is non-productive, and either through habits of laziness or spurning of
work as dishonorable, produce nothing.” He cited “the lack of dignity in public
buildings” in Monrovia, where the courthouse and city hall appeared as a “ragged
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disgrace”, with “shells of walls never finished” that “have been standing now for five
years.” As a result of dependence on “eternal loans and internal fines . . . there is no
economic stability.” Hines complained that the Liberian government had become
dependent on Firestone “for many things which they should themselves produce,” and
provided as examples President King’s requests to the company for sewer pipe, tools for
road work, use of the company’s radio station, and transportation. On the other hand, the
government would not grant Firestone a “license to transport, thus receiving a fee to
cover the gas, labor, time, wear and tear and inconvenience. So it continues free, if one is
declined, there are petty recriminations.” Worst of all, the “habit, which grows more
national,” placed the Liberians “in a position of economic dependence upon Firestone—a
thing which their orators and their theoretical legislation are bold in opposing, but which
continues, nevertheless. In the end temptation is set. They will surely regret it.”48
Hines also mentioned that the question of League of Nations mandates in West Africa
would be revived within the next year, and that Germany was “insisting on colonies, and
it is recognized that she needs them.” The British, according to Hines, had found it
necessary to allow for more representation among natives and “the French have had to
make certain concessions,” but “at present native courts are scarcely more than debating
societies,” and “there is restlessness.” As Johnson later reflected on his conversation
with Hines, he wrote: “There is some question yet in my mind whether the surrounding
colonies do not find it to their advantage (unfortunate as it might be) to have the example
of inadequate government. What would it mean to their administrations and to native
psychology and demands to have next to them a flourishing and well-administered black
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republic? . . . . The place is rich. It is strategic. It is a useful political unit. It is an
experiment.”49
On the day before their scheduled departure from Cape Palmas, Hines told Johnson
about a message that he had received from Donald Ross at the Harbel plantation. Ross
radioed Hines that Chargé d’Affaires Henry Carter had also booked passage on the
Wahehe and would be leaving Monrovia. A surprised Johnson could “hazard” no
“satisfactory explanation save, perhaps, a break with the Department at home over his
handling of affairs.” Carter’s “ruffling of Christy” and the “impression of his more than
neutral and friendly attitude toward the investigation or some complication on the
financial tangle,” as Johnson speculated, might also have contributed to the chargé’s
dismissal.50 In any event, a return to Monrovia promised more, rather than fewer,
complications for the commission.
In the meantime, Johnson passed what he understood as his last day in Cape Palmas
by observing Firestone’s system of issuing rice to native workers at the Cavalla
plantation. As a group of “husky” young natives carrying sacks passed by an office door,
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a native using a salmon tin—“the universal standard for a cup or pint”—ladled out five
“heaping” portions of rice, or the equivalent of a shilling’s worth, the standard daily pay
for laborers at Firestone. Rice issues took place twice a week; those who failed to work
at least five days in a row had their ration withheld. Waiting nearby Johnson observed
native women who Firestone “encouraged” to bring their “piles of cassava, yams and
country asparagus” in exchange for rice. “This helped to vary the diet,” Johnson noted,
“since it would be inconvenient for Firestone to try to issue any but a basic food.” The
workers, according to Johnson, seemed “casual and free enough.” He noticed that many
of the men had “one eye punched out. This is a favorite trick in fighting—punch out the
man’s eyes.”51
When no ship arrived the following day, Johnson was left to wait and wonder, and
spent most of his time indoors working on notes and indexing data. The next morning,
still with no word from the Wahehe, Johnson walked into town after breakfast and passed
one of Yancy’s farms where rice and cassava were grown, and later another of the vicepresident’s “well developed” farms, this one “fenced in.” That afternoon, Johnson met
with the governor of Maryland County, J. S. Smith, to “thank him for his courtesies.” A
self-described “strong man” who had been transferred from Bassa County to replace the
“weak” former governor of Maryland, Smith “broke his verbs emphatically” as he spoke
with “assurance” about what Johnson had found during the League investigation.52
“This is a awful condition,” Smith told Johnson. “Thousings and thousings (sic) of
people suffer from it.” Smith had been in Maryland County since February doing
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nothing more than “stopping up cracks,” and had yet to receive any payment from the
government. Reform was uppermost in his mind, as he was tired “of this handing around
offices in a little circle, just shifting the name of the office.” Although too early to
discuss the possibilities of Liberia’s next presidential election, Smith felt that the position
would have to be filled by someone “strong”, like legislators in the past. Referring to
“the strong ones who founded the country,” Smith said, “When legislation time came
they didn’t wait on no ship. They rolled up their pants and walked the beach that two
hundred and fifty miles to Monrovia.” “You know,” Smith continued, “in a way
Faulkner was right. He wasn’t fighting for himself so much as he was fighting
corruption.” After the rigged 1927 election, Smith claimed that Faulkner “applied” to
Liberia’s lower courts, its legislature, and then its supreme court, but “they wouldn’t hear
him. Then, by gum, he applied to the League of Nations.”53
Johnson found the “jolly” governor, described as a three-hundred-pound “hulk of
meat,” as informative as he was amusing. With his “small head, vast feet, and most
mobile stomach,” Smith expressed his “crudely good” ideas “for all the world as would a
lady hippo drowned in a wave of righteousness.” But Johnson “liked his spirit,” and felt
that nearly everything Smith had said, although “pedantically illiterate” and somewhat
vague, aimed at “a soundness which the country needs.” “I should not like to have him
meet outsiders,” Johnson wrote, “but back in the interior where good English is not as
vital as honest form he would do much good.”54
As the days crawled by and no ship appeared on the horizon, Johnson met with
numerous visitors, including a variety of government officials that he referred to
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sarcastically as “pillars of society.” On Sunday afternoon, June 14th, after more
organizing of notes for the commission’s final report, Johnson “talked at length with
Christy regarding Liberia.” Both men agreed on “corruption and lack of standards” in the
black republic, but Christy believed “it was a situation that could not correct itself now by
American Negroes, because they could not have the standards. A good, strong white man
must have control somehow.” Johnson admitted that he “knew nothing of international
politics nor cared particularly,” but ventured “that a poor white man is not necessarily a
better administrator than a good Negro, simply because more white persons have been
good administrators.” Christy insisted that Germany wanted Liberia, “but that Britain
was best equipped, through experience, to control Africa,” although it “had no desire for
this place. America has the sphere of influence but knows nothing of African
administration.”55
While “allowing full reign” for Christy’s “apparently non-self-conscious observations
on Africa and Negroes and Americans,” Johnson felt compelled “to make mention of one
or two items.” To Christy’s comment “that the American Negro would quickly go native
and carry on the same exploitation because they had not the white man’s standards,”
Johnson suggested “that I was an American Negro and certainly could not accuse myself
of having the same standards of those observed; moreover, that natives themselves had,
to my surprise and present wonder, considering my complexion, persisted in calling me
and Matheus ‘white men’ . . . .” Christy “demurred, saying that we were white men—
color made no difference, only standards . . . .”56
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A few days later Johnson met with Vice-President Yancy to talk and take photos
“which he seemed extremely anxious to have taken.” Yancy spoke “confidentially, ‘If I
am made president’ and soon forgot the word ‘if.’” Once, he mentioned “emperor.” If
the public knew what he wanted to do in Liberia, Yancy claimed that he would be
assassinated. The vice-president vowed that he would open up the Liberian interior to
industry and would forsake loans because they “are not out of the earth.” He believed in
“work,” and would have been at his rubber farm if Christy had not told him that Johnson
was stopping by. “People are afraid of what would happen if you let American Negroes
emigrate,” Yancy said. “I’m not, I want them.” Yancy wanted to give his “own people”
the first chance at profiting from any new industries, and declared: “I’m a Negro first, last
and always.” “We are the same and understand,” he told Johnson. “I can’t say this to
Christy. You have a chance to be President of the country, but he hasn’t . . . . I say give
me my eight years, and if things aren’t better, you can have the country.”57
Later that evening Johnson and Christy dined with a group of local businessmen that
included an agent of the Elder Dempster shipping line, the manager of the Bank of British
West Africa, and Douglas Gent, the British agent of the United Fruit Company on the
hunt for soil “sour” enough to support banana plantations. Johnson enjoyed the “good
music,” which, quite appropriately under the circumstances, included Tchaikovsky’s
Pathétique, “one of the saddest pieces ever written.” After a dinner of soup, salmon and
onion, fresh beef, pudding and jelly, and then coffee and “drinks”, guests talked about
music and traveling, with Christy “always ready to indicate familiarity by correcting or
disputing a point.” Douglas Gent told many fascinating stories in great detail, but
disturbed Johnson when he discussed the town of Grand Cess. Fresh from listening to
57
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Allen Yancy’s delusional proclamations, Johnson wondered as Gent claimed with
certainty that Grand Cess had only about ten trading stores “squatting on a sand hill,”
each of them going broke because the town consisted of only seventeen or eighteen
shacks. Johnson happened to know, however, that “the big town from which they derive
their trade has exactly 770 huts, for we counted them—and no less than 3,000 people;
that the Woerman store was piled high with piassava and it lined the street, drying—
down to the waterfront.” At dinner Johnson also learned that outgoing ships had been
quarantined in Monrovia due to a yellow fever scare.58
As days passed and the quarantine dragged on, Johnson had time to get better
acquainted with an assortment of Liberian officials. While he chatted with the local
customs collector one afternoon, Vice-President Yancy showed up. Affecting “more
poise and self-possession” on this visit, Yancy lounged around and spoke “deprecatingly
of most things, as if they were mere trifles,” such as the dangerous sandbar in the Cavalla
River where at least ten or fifteen people drowned every year. Yancy mentioned that
France had gained control of the Cavalla after two Liberian supreme court justices went
to Paris and “lost the river somehow—he didn’t know.” The customs collector then
commented that the river had risen unusually high, and that he had received a letter from
a mutual friend of his and Yancy’s who claimed that at least fifteen huts had recently
washed away. The friend, believing that the river would take his house next, asked for
advice on what he should do. Yancy replied, with “surprising cold-blooded flipness:
‘Tell him to get inside and ride away with it.’” The customs collector soon left but
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Yancy stayed and talked “loudly” about “nothing in particular,” and “evaded” every
“lead” that Johnson threw out.59
Even more annoying for Johnson was a visit from an Americo-Liberian lawyer and
“that incomparable boor” Chief Sie, the native labor recruiter of whom the sociologist
“had gotten a different and better impression earlier.” The chief “strutted in like a
bumptious colored bishop” and “was full of air . . . and lies.” Sie “added” Meharry
Medical College, located next to Fisk University in Nashville, “to the fabulous list of
schools which he says he attended in the States.” Also on his list were Virginia Union
University and the University of Chicago, two schools that had granted degrees to
Johnson. At both universities Sie “had just gotten out or hadn’t reached the school” when
Johnson had attended. “His dates were horribly mixed up.” When Sie spoke of the
University of Chicago, he imitated Johnson in “affected speech, which was never
grammatically correct even by chance.” But when he presented a “dirty card” with
addresses on it, Johnson’s “defensive spirit for Virginia Union and the University of
Chicago reached its fuming heights.” Sie and the lawyer “would not rise to go,” and
finally Johnson and Matheus “had to appeal to the necessity for packing our baggage for
tomorrow’s boat, and we arose.” After the two left, Johnson wrote: “My only comment
is Damn!” Their “boat” did not arrive the next day, however, and Johnson’s frustration
began to mount once again. “I have thought so much of home,” he wrote, “I am sore
with thinking and dreaming.”60
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After nearly three months in Liberia, Cuthbert Christy had turned even more rigid in
his opinion of local politics. In a “brief exchange” Johnson noticed that Christy exhibited
signs that “he is getting more and more bold in his disparagement—not of what is, but
what can be.” Christy claimed “that a bunch of American Negroes dumped” in Liberia
“couldn’t be expected to do anything. Stink pot. No government. Exploitation of
natives . . . . Americans ignorant of Africa. Know nothing of administration. Firestones
in for a devil of a time, blundering ignorance—won’t take advice.” Johnson suggested
that the commissioners’ duty “officially ends when we have diagnosed the case—gotten
the facts.”61
One afternoon in the days of rain and waiting that followed, Johnson went to see the
customs collector for papers “forgotten” on their previous meeting. “He gave me all I
asked for,” Johnson claimed, and he discovered that the man “was not frightened of
Yancy after all.” The American commissioner received government customs lists of
shipments to Fernando Po, Libreville, and the Gold Coast, along with “names, tribes,
chiefs, etc.,” evidence that provided “the most direct link yet with the testimony of the
chiefs.” Johnson noted with surprise: “He let me carry them away to copy.”62
On Friday, June 20, Johnson noted: “Rained all day. Net no ships. Worked on
notes.” The next day his journal entry read simply: “Rained again.” To break the
monotony, Johnson played snooker at the Elder Dempster office with Christy and some
others the next day. That evening came more games of snooker and Johnson forgot to
count his “whiskey and sodas, and went to bed dizzy and without dinner.” With an upset
stomach the next day, he continued indexing his notes and received a visit from the
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county superintendent, Harold Fredericks, who “seemed ashamed of what we had found
in his section.” The superintendtent, fearful of losing his job, suggested that “things
have not always been so,” and that “some sort of steadying hand might given without
taking away the whole experiment and calling it impossible.”63
Fredericks also wanted to address a personal matter with Johnson, and eventually
worked his way around to asking about a new rumor. He stated that Colonel Davis had
read extracts to him from a letter allegedly written by Johnson to Faulkner. In the letter,
which had been “intercepted”, Johnson supposedly said “that he was impressed with the
graciousness and gentility of Yancy, and didn’t see how anyone could have said such
things about him as I had heard.” The American commissioner concluded that the letter
probably came “by the same route as the forged ‘instructions’” from the State
Department, affairs that he considered: “dangerous ground; childish tricks.”64
Other information passed along by Fredericks, however, had a ring of truth to it.
Earlier, Johnson had learned “through the strange grapevine route from Monrovia” that
Henry Carter had made “indiscreet remarks” to President King one evening at the British
legation. Afterward, King protested, and Carter was recalled. Fredericks told Johnson
that at a birthday party for the president a “hot-headed” and intoxicated Carter had
apparently asked King how he would like it if the Germans or English took over Liberia.
A “surprised” King replied that he “would cross that bridge” when he came to it. Carter
then said, “Well, you’d damn sight better cross the bridge, because you are at it; if you
can’t cross, you had better let somebody help you across.” King sent a “stinging” note to
Carter the next day, but the chargé “merely replied that he must have misunderstood what
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he said,” a description of events given credence by official State Department
correspondence.65
In his “most vital and yet calmest discussion” with Cuthbert Christy, who reiterated
his argument for colonial government in Liberia, Johnson pointed out some salient ideas
for the Englishman to ponder. He argued that “the present practice of Republican
government in Liberia, rather than the form of government” stood at fault. Johnson’s
explanation of the problem as he saw it displayed a sense of fairness that added even
more power to the conclusions reached in the League’s final report. Johnson claimed that
the commission had come to Liberia with a limited scope of inquiry “into a set of
conditions condemned as bad from the beginning,” and that they had worked only in a
small area while avoiding “the sections of the country reputed as sound—the northern
sections with their well-knit industrial communities, the farming settlements, etc.” After
spending half of their time in “the most notorious section of the Republic,” the
commissioners could not, according to Johnson, “presume to speak of this as being all of
Liberia” or of “the people met as the Liberians, or the conditions studied as being the
whole of the life of the Republic.” Johnson later wrote: “How intransigent can
judgments be, involving the fate of the lives of millions.” Rather than adopting “a
visitor’s guess,” Johnson could “state the circumstances of his evidence,” and provided as
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an example some receipts given to him by the former governor of Kru Town that totaled
“£81.0.0 to Senator Tubman” for shipments to Fernando Po.66
As Johnson and Christy continued to wait for a ship back to Monrovia at the end of
June, the district commissioner came to Cape Palmas and sent a radiogram to the
government about the collection of hut taxes. Although natives “had not yet reaped their
rice crops from the sale of which they usually get their tax money,” D. C. Carney
Johnson had orders to collect the taxes ahead of the usual August deadline. Yancy had
already imprisoned Paramount Chief Casar and a number of other chiefs for failing to
pay, and Johnson noted: “There is the possibility that enforcement of this is an aid to
punishment for deposing.” Word also came about a protest meeting held in Monrovia
that called for the resignation of the president and vice-president.67
On Sunday, June 29, Johnson counted seven ships that passed around the cape, and
concluded that one of the reasons that they did not stop “is the small amount of cargo to
be gotten” and the danger of the jagged rocks hidden beneath the water’s surface. To
keep himself occupied, Johnson read all of the British papers that he could find, “graphic
and sporting news”, Maurice Maeterlinck’s The Life of the Bee, a biography of Oscar
Wilde, and two Tolstoy plays. Eventually, Firestone’s immediate need to transport fiftyeight tons of rubber tree stumps to the Du Plantation led Hines “to exert efforts in all
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directions to get a ship in.” On July 2, Hines finally “induced” the Wakama to stop,
although its German captain insisted on bypassing Monrovia for Sierra Leone.68
After an “exciting” surfboat trip with his six assistants and twenty-eight pieces of
luggage, Johnson learned that he would have to forego a stateroom on the Wakama and
accept deck passage. “Bribing” the steward, however, got Johnson a deck chair and
blankets, and the sociologist noticed “a curious set of passengers it was” that accepted
without a word Firestone’s “extreme measures” to “accommodate the Commission.”
Firestone’s instructions included a departure “at Marshall—a Firestone outlet, via the Du
River; take the barge to shore and a launch to the Du.” Johnson’s fellow passengers
included President King’s brother, a brother-in-law of Yancy’s, and Hodges, the native
Grebo stenographer “who was with us in the bush, going to Monrovia to get away from
the penalty of serving us.”69
After talking with the group of passengers Johnson concluded: “Liberia does the best
it can, perhaps, without books, schools, travel, contacts, and only a government to play
with.” Later, he found himself “sitting and thinking again about this Liberia business.”
Uppermost in his mind was the profound underdevelopment of the Republic. The
nation’s “wasteful display and lack of manual skill” bothered Johnson. He recalled the
half-finished bridge on the road to the Harbel plantation, and how the Americo-Liberians
had spent the “entire appropriation of £6,500 putting up two vast cement buttresses, yet
68
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no bridge.” At a ferry crossing one of the cables had broken two years before, repairs
that Johnson estimated would have cost about £400, but “now one must get a car across
on canoes lashed together, and it costs £1.” Also, the “telephone line to Bassa operated
about two weeks. The radio station has been closed down because the machines have
gone wrong. The power system is down because no one knows enough about machinery
to keep it up.”70
After four days on the deck of the Wakama, Johnson went ashore at Marshall and
boarded a barge that had to navigate in “a terrible sea.” The barge master, as Johnson
discovered, “is a swearing Negro from Arkansas who has rambled over the earth as a
sailor.” After reaching the Du River by launch, Johnson noted: “ . . . a most pleasant
trip—interesting were the mangroves along the river bank—the tree branches that shoot
downward to the water and implant themselves as roots—a tangled stem.” Although
“dirty and tired” from their trip, Hines led the group into a Sunday afternoon party at the
home of Donald Ross, manager of the Firestone Plantations Company. At the party
“were the characteristic Firestone ladies being smart and leisurely and grunting sweetly
for the servants and giving imperious orders, lacking nothing but a lorgnette for their
gestures of command.” The Firestone physician did parlor tricks, and Hines “was
efficiently cordial as usual, and everybody was drinking whiskey and sodas and smoking
Lucky Strikes.”71
* * *
Dead man on a live man’s back possessed of the devil. Dead man makes him talk and tell
who is responsible for his death.
* * *
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On their return to Monrovia a different reception awaited the commissioners, “the
most curious that we had experienced.” Indeed, Americo-Liberians exhibited “surprise
of the most elaborate sort” upon seeing Johnson and Christy. At a meeting with President
King and Secretary of State Edwin Barclay, the commissioners learned that an
“authentic” rumor had indicated that they “had been drowned, while crossing the bar at
Sinoe, some days back.” Other versions of the rumor suggested: “1. The boat had
capsized and one commissioner drowned. 2. Both commissioners drowned but Matheus
escaped. 3. All persons in the boat drowned, including the boys, and there was great
lamentation in the Bassa Country.” Although King claimed relief at being “able to
demonstrate that the report had been ‘grossly exaggerated’,” the fact that he sent “no
verifying couriers” to investigate the matter left Johnson to write: “Something might be
said here of the wish being father to the thought, etc.”72
Not long after the commissioners returned to Monrovia, Claude H. Hall, Jr., Henry
Carter’s temporary replacement, informed his superiors in Washington of the
“painstaking character” of the investigation, and his belief that the final report would be
signed by Christy and Johnson but not by Barclay, who would probably “deny its
validity” because of his absence at Cape Palmas. Hall felt that the report would “leave no
doubt as to the existence of slavery, the mistreatment of natives, and perhaps while
generally discrediting the government it will not have the appearance of a criminal
indictment of any high official excepting Yancy.” In the meantime, the Bank of British
West Africa had decided to terminate operations in Liberia before the end of 1930, and
Harvey Firestone held fast to his decision to withhold any more loan advances,
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effectively crippling the King administration’s ability to pay government employees or
sustain its local sanitation program.73
On Sunday, July 13, Johnson had his “first important session” on the report with
Christy. For two or three weeks, Christy had been trying to write a first draft and
criticized the card system that Johnson used for grouping data. Eventually Christy’s
“unwieldy and scattered” approach led him to ask Johnson, “Suppose you make me notes
on what information we have, so I can work over it and write it up?” Johnson regarded
Christy’s request as “naïve.” After examining Christy’s findings Johnson discovered
“hysterical, extreme statements in summary fashion, condemning the whole government
and calling everything slavery, slave dealing, slave traffic, etc.” Johnson explained to
Christy that in order to “create confidence” their conclusions needed to be “deliberate and
analytical.” Christy then proposed that Johnson “not write up any more but give him
narrative notes, embodying all the testimony . . . and let him write it.” Johnson noted:
“I am willing to do anything to get the business over, but I dislike his attempt to cover up
ineptness both in arranging his material, memory for detail and sequence, and no writing,
by taking my drafts and calling them his own.” After another encounter with the
Englishman, Johnson concluded: “The point at issue is not what is to be done with
Liberia, but what is wrong . . . . Questions of autonomy, the appropriateness or
inappropriateness of a Republic in Africa in the midst of colonies; the capacity of blacks
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for self-government; the experience of the British in colonization; the inexperience of
America are issues, to my mind, better to be determined by the home governments.”74
The next day, Johnson received a letter from London written by Henry Carter, who
regretted not having a chance to meet again before his hasty departure. Mail arrived
every two weeks in Monrovia, and Johnson felt gravely disappointed when he found no
letter from his wife, Marie. He wrote: “This not hearing from home seems to me just
about unforgivable in these parts.” Then, in a rare moment, Johnson noted some thoughts
of a most personal nature: “However, I got a warm glimpse in a flash of a dream which
stayed with me into the day. Its consequence fades on the thinking of it rather than the
feeling of it. I am playing with her and giving an exaggeratedly stern order to do
something. Her little figure is all intent on doing it and she walks by me at a lively,
serious gait. That is all. But very real.” Indeed, Marie had tried to contact her husband
but seemed confused on how to locate him, at one point asking the State Department to
help her get in touch with the “Librarian (sic) commissioner.”75
As Johnson and Christy settled back into Monrovia, another round of hearings began.
While the commission “heard a lot of inconsequential general comments,” it also
received testimony from key players like Firestone’s Donald Ross and William Hines,
and had a long session in camera with President King. Arthur Barclay asked Ross and
Hines if Firestone had “ever employed anything that looked like forced labor?” Ross
replied, “Never. I think we have the freest labor in the world, in the tropical world, at
74
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least.” Ross also explained that the practice of paying district commissioners for labor
recruitment had “stopped a long time ago,” and Hines added: “. . . a great deal of the
labor that . . . would have come under ordinary circumstances has been afraid to come for
fear they would be forced to go elsewhere . . . . I must add that . . . we have been
troubled considerably with the interference of soldiers and other officials on our property
without permission and they disturb our labor force in many instances.”76
During his testimony President King denied any knowledge of illegal labor shipments
to Fernando Po and claimed that he had never received any complaints about illtreatment of native laborers on his road construction program. Johnson, using all the
diplomacy that he could muster after his trip upcountry, tried to allay King’s fears about
the investigation when he suggested: “Personally, I would not be interested in a study
which was merely intended as a newspaper article . . .” and that “. . . if attention were
called to anything which was current or acute . . . it would be similar to a medical
diagnosis in the case of a patient who asked for a physician to come in, and its
significance goes no further than that.” King replied: “I feel we are in perfect accord.”77
Shortly after Johnson’s return to Monrovia he ran into Secretary of State Edwin
Barclay and arranged for an “informal chat” sometime in the near future. After their
street encounter, Johnson underscored the fact that “Barclay didn’t tell me that he had
printed a booklet containing the forged letter addressed to me.” Desiring “another slant”
for his “understanding of this situation,” Johnson arranged for a “chat” on general
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subjects of mutual interest, and met with Barclay a few days later in the secretary of
state’s office, “a small room surrounded with book cases, rather plainly built.” Barclay
mentioned that he had belonged to the Book of the Month Club but his “interest fell off,”
interestingly enough, after W. R. Burnett’s Little Caesar, the 1929 novel about a small
time gangster’s rise to prominence in the underworld. Johnson found Barclay, later
regarded as the nation’s “first dictator”, to be modest but “extraordinarily clever,” and
“about as competent a man as is in Liberia.”78
From Barclay, Johnson learned more about the system of adoption in Liberia, whereby
native chiefs would send a child to live with an Americo-Liberian “in good
circumstances” who would provide education “or at least . . . the benefit of exposure to
civilization.” Adopted children often assumed the name of their new guardian and
sometimes married into the Americo-Liberian group, although “they never go back to
their native life again.” For Johnson, the rules of adoption suggested “a sort of caste
system . . . conscientiously maintained, in self defense.” He believed that with only “a
bare handful of Americo-Liberians on the coast, one must guard with some defenses the
little culture they have, against the possibility of reverting. If a man marries into a tribe
and lives with the tribe he is bound to feel the forces of its imperatives. But if one if
drawn from the tribe through such processes of education and contact . . . the danger to
relapse is lessened.”79
Barclay then brought up the subject of the Human Leopard Society. Human sacrifice
served as a key element of the society’s rituals, and Barclay claimed that about ten years
earlier Leopard men had raided towns near the Suehn section where they killed
78
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“hundreds” and then tried to sell human flesh as beef in the markets of Monrovia. Before
President King left for the United States to try and secure the ill-fated loan of 1921, he
gave Barclay orders to round up the Leopard Society and execute its members. The
Frontier Force brought in about 600 society members, and Barclay chose sixteen leaders
for execution. The secretary of state “stopped smiling and with teeth shut said, ‘I ordered
them shot.’” Barclay claimed that the executions “broke up” the Leopard Society,
although occasional flare-ups of cannibalism still occurred.80
On the following day Johnson received a visit from Plenyono Gbe Wolo, who brought
along his friend Dr. Cole. Johnson looked on with incredulity as the medicine man, or zo,
“entered carrying in front of him, like a crucifix, a sprig of flower or plant.” Wolo and
Cole “talked with most incomprehensible conviction about astral planes, astral lights,
diagnosing by stars—spiritualism . . . .” Johnson professed “astonishment” as the
Harvard-educated Wolo showed “complete subscription to all of it,” sitting at Cole’s feet
and “pouring out tributes of respect and adulation.” Moreover, Johnson learned that Cole
counted a Liberian state department official, Gabriel Dennis, as one of his “advanced
students.” Dennis later served as Liberia’s secretary of the treasury and secretary of
state.81
The second set of hearings in Monrovia ended on August 8. Johnson’s longing for
home and the need to get away from Christy undoubtedly spurred him on to try and finish
the commission’s final report as quickly as possible. Christy’s inability to use a
typewriter or to organize data left it to Johnson to write the entire report submitted to the
League of Nations and to the commissioners’ home governments. Just as a decade earlier
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when Johnson wrote most of the The Negro in Chicago and received no special credit for
its authorship, the Report of the International Commission of Inquiry into the Existence of
Slavery and Forced Labor in the Republic of Liberia became known as, ironically, the
“Christy report.” On August 20, Samuel Reber, Jr., who replaced Hall as chargé, notified
the State Department that the commission’s report would be finished soon, and that it
would, in fact, have Arthur Barclay’s signature on it, as he “is in accord” with “many of
its findings.”82
Indeed, Arthur Barclay’s defense of his government eroded over the course of the
inquiry as evidence mounted until “disgust” characterized his attitude. Still, Liberia’s
elder statesman made one final objection, arguing that natives should bring their
grievances to the government rather than the League commission, and took up privately a
relatively minor complaint of a tribal citizen. After four days of bouncing around
between government departments just to get a hearing for his client, Barclay finally gave
up when he realized no effective action would be taken. The fact that a former president
of Liberia could not exact justice for a native led Barclay to sign the full report without
amendments. Although the Liberian commissioner knew that he would face criticism by
his colleagues, Johnson noted: “With characteristic courage and calm, Barclay faced the
new future of Liberia.”83
On September 8, 1930, the International Commission of Inquiry submitted its final
report to the Liberian Government, and Johnson carried a signed copy with him when he
sailed from Monrovia bound for England on September 11. Chargé Reber informed
Secretary of State Stimson that “the report is exceedingly well documented and seems a
82
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clear indictment of the government’s policy of suppression and intimidation which has
been permitted if not actually indulged in by nearly all high officials including the
President.” With conclusions drawn from “over 260 depositions,” Reber noted that the
report cited “many suspicious criminal practices and even torture.” Although only VicePresident Yancy, and a few other officials that included district commissioners and
superintendents, participated directly in forced labor shipments to Fernando Po, “the
President and the Cabinet were aware of these practices, having received recorded
complaints from the natives, and took no steps to put an end to them.” On the other hand,
King, Yancy, and other officials, used forced labor “often ruthlessly impressed under the
guise of government work” on their private farms. Reber also noted that when Johnson
delivered the signed report to the State Department in Washington, “it is anticipated that
[he] will explain his fears regarding the almost inevitable reaction against the natives.”
As many “foreign observers in Monrovia” believed, the Liberian Government was then in
the process of “preparing drastic measures of retaliation against the natives who testified
as to these practices.”84
Indeed, while Johnson felt it a great relief to complete his mission and escape from
West Africa unharmed—physically, at least—he also understood in a visceral way that
Liberia’s most vulnerable inhabitants, its natives, could not so easily leave their troubles
behind. Concerned with the future of the black republic rather than that of the King
administration, Johnson left Liberia with a clear conscience as far as politics went.
Without a moment’s hesitation he could file away in the past his six months of enduring
the sophomoric behavior and unbending colonial ideas of Cuthbert Christy, as well as the
almost unbearable atmosphere of political intrigue in Monrovia. But abandoning
84
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Liberia’s tribal citizens to their fate was another matter altogether, an emotional burden
unanticipated when he accepted his assignment in December 1929, and one that he alone
would carry.
Had Johnson followed his own advice to Christy and detached himself completely
from Liberian affairs once the commission submitted its final report, departure from the
black republic would have come with no small outpouring of joy. But the heartfelt
respect that he had developed for the courage, honesty, and dignity of natives in general,
and for Chief Jeh in particular, made an easy transition impossible.85 Johnson realized
that he was bound to fail the very people who had treated him with the most kindness and
trust, and who had anticipated his arrival with the most hope. While he understood that
the violence certain to follow would not be of his making, and that his terms of reference
had by necessity been limited, he also knew that in the role thrust upon him by natives—
an American Moses coming to set them free—he had succeeded no further than Marcus
Garvey several years earlier.
After one last surfboat trip Johnson boarded his ship on September 11 for the long
voyage to England and then back home, the excitement and sense of adventure felt
months before on his approach to Africa having given way to somber reflection.
Although deeply interested in the question of Liberia’s independence, six months in the
black republic had resulted in a seismic shift in Johnson’s thinking; his new primary
concern—the welfare of tribal citizens—catapulted him beyond the mainstream toward
larger, more complicated issues that other African Americans were not ready or able to
consider. In that regard, Johnson was a radical, far ahead of his time.
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CONCLUSION

In November 1930, a month or so after he stepped off the S. S. Leviathan in New
York and tried to return to a normal life that did not include medicine men trying to
poison him or even a hint of encouragement from others to run for President, Charles S.
Johnson is alleged to have told black economist Abram Harris, Jr., that he viewed a
researcher as “one who gathers facts and leaves it to others to draw conclusions,” almost
an exact duplication of an idea that he tried to impress more than once upon Cuthbert
Christy in Liberia. Harris recoiled at Johnson’s detached attitude, for which “foundations
paid liberally,” and he grew to despise the diplomatic approach of the sociologist who
had helped him earlier by giving him a job at Opportunity.1 Even so, the blow delivered
by facts that Johnson had gathered and presented in the commission’s final report fell
with all the diplomacy of a sledgehammer in the Republic of Liberia.
In order to further explain the conditions that he worked under during the months of
the inquiry, Johnson also drafted a minority report that he submitted to Assistant
Secretary of State William Castle. Using material drawn from his diary, Johnson
provided information about key figures like Didwho Twe and Arthur Barclay, and placed
into context his trips to Kakata and the Kru Coast. Furthermore, Johnson felt compelled
to explain his difficult working relationship with Christy. He wrote: “Although
opinionated on many points and dogmatic in his assertions,” Christy “was amenable to
fact and reason, at times reversing judgment completely with such facility as to give the
impression of instability.” The sociologist felt that “long years of solitary life in the
1
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bush” may have been responsible for Christy’s “personal habits and intolerance which
helped create situations,” but suggested that problems never reached the point of being
“insurmountable.” Always the diplomat, Johnson stretched the truth to a considerable
degree on Christy’s behalf when he claimed, “. . . despite frequent disagreements on
policy and procedure” the two commissioners “eventually found accord.”2
Although the League of Nations commission made no visit to Fernando Po, and never
actually witnessed any torture, beatings, or killings, its final report nonetheless caused
President King to express “mortification” over the conditions that it found in his country.
Without implicating King directly, and without suggesting any evidence of domestic
slavery as defined by the 1926 Slavery Convention, the commission concluded under its
terms of reference that contract laborers shipped to Fernando Po had been “recruited
under conditions of criminal compulsion scarcely distinguishable from slave raiding and
slave trading . . . .” The commission also condemned abuses in the system of pawning,
and pointed to the widespread use of forced labor for private purposes. In regard to
public construction projects like President King’s road-building program, compulsory
labor had been “wastefully recruited and used, frequently under conditions involving
systematic intimidation and ill-treatment on the part of Government officials, messengers,
and Frontier Force soldiers.”3
Most damaging of all to the Liberian government, the commission pointed to VicePresident Yancy and other officials for their sanctioning of forced labor for roadwork and
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shipment abroad through the use of the Frontier Force “for purposes of physical
compulsion on road construction, for the intimidation of villagers, for the humiliation and
degradation of chiefs, for the imprisonment of inhabitants, and for the convoying of
gangs of captured natives to the coast, there guarding them till the time of shipment.”
Much to the disappointment of Raymond Buell, the commission exonerated the Firestone
Plantations Company, claiming that it used only voluntary labor, although this “was not
always the case when recruiting was subject to Government regulations over which the
company had little control . . . .”4 Indeed, Harvey Firestone wrote to Henry Stimson in
January 1931 and claimed that the conditions outlined in the report had been “a source of
grave concern to us” and “seriously interfered with our obtaining free labor upon which
we insisted from the first day we went into Liberia.”5
Suggestions and recommendations made by the commission bore a strong
resemblance to those suggested for consideration in November 1929 by J. P. Moffat of
the State Department. Above all, they called for drastic reforms in the “disastrous”
administration of the interior. The most “radical” change recommended the removal of
all five “corrupt and dishonest” district commissioners. Needed to assist and oversee new
district commissioners would be “a higher grade of official” selected either from Liberia
or the United States. Other measures urged by the commission included abandonment of
the system of pawning, curtailment of road construction, and cessation of shipments of
laborers to Fernando Po, along with reform of the Frontier Force, native policy, and
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education.6 Even if President King considered comments in the report “too severe,” he
quickly concluded that the recommendations “were not impossible to fulfill,” an
approach that Chargé Reber viewed as “an endeavor to determine the relative importance
given the recommendations compared with the other sections.”7
Because the League report singled out only Vice-President Yancy for condemnation,
Reber claimed that King would try to vindicate himself and seek a fourth term as
president by fixing guilt “upon one individual whose punishment is possible.” After a
public clamor for information about the report, King allowed an “official gazette” that
contained the commission’s findings and recommendations to be published and
distributed. In late September 1930, a committee of King’s Cabinet members examined
the commission’s findings and issued its own report. The Cabinet committee’s report,
while indicating the acceptance of “certain facts”, offered only partial reforms with few
measures for enforcement. Reber informed the State Department that the report had not
been made public, and that it would “effect no real improvement or fundamental change”
in any event.8
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As Charles King assured the U. S. State Department of his intention to accede to the
inquiry’s recommendations, Harvey Firestone issued his own list of reforms that he
wanted the Liberian president to follow. Firestone’s demands concentrated on reform in
Liberia’s financial and fiscal affairs, and called for the hinterland districts to be opened to
commerce, a measure that would boost revenue earmarked for repayment of the 1926
loan.9 Worried that the international community had “lost confidence” in him, and that
the United States would withhold its assistance in carrying out reforms, King also faced
opposition from his own administration. In particular, Secretary of State Barclay bristled
at one of Firestone’s suggestions that called for the appointment of white district
commissioners.10 Yet, King consented to Firestone’s demands, even as Thomas
Faulkner’s Citizen’s Non-Partisan League demonstrated in the capital and demanded that
the president and vice-president resign.11
As tensions ran high in Monrovia in November 1930, Chargé Reber received a
delegation of Kru chiefs who confirmed recent reports of Frontier Force depredations
against their villages, and who expressed hope for aid from the United States “against the
oppression of the Liberians whose Government not only has failed to protect them but,
under the guise of other charges, is punishing them because of the information they gave
to the International Commission.” The delegation presented Reber with a petition signed
by several hundred Kru and other tribal chiefs and headmen that recalled promises of
protection made by colonization societies in the nineteenth century, and by the Liberian
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Government when it declared its independence. The Krus charged that the Liberians had
never kept their pledges, and asked Reber to expedite the petition to the United States
“with the prayer that our appeal for aid in succor in this hour of great need will be heard
and acted upon.” Although in the past the United States had helped to prop up the
government in Liberia against internal rebellions with the presence of a naval gunboat, it
chose not to intervene on behalf of the black republic’s tribal citizens.12
Didwho Twe wrote to Johnson about the recent Kru Coast raid and the “hard times” of
natives in Liberia. The radical Kru saw a “dark” future for his people full of “oppression,
exploitation, and destruction of lives.” Officials in Sinoe County had taken “everything”
from the Krus down to pots and mats, and Twe considered the situation “hopeless.” He
pointed out to Johnson that natives had “nothing to resist the Frontiers with,” and that it
would be “a different story” if they had guns. Twe figured that about a half-dozen
machine guns and 500 rifles would do the trick. He also noted the “strong opposition” to
the commission’s recommendations even though chiefs “all over the country” were
“perfectly satisfied” with them and “anxious” to see them carried out.13
In late November, not long after Secretary of State Stimson expressed his appreciation
to Johnson for his “valuable and unselfish contribution” to the commission, Charles King
came under fire from an increasingly hostile legislature that blocked his attempts at
reform and threatened impeachment if he did not resign. The legislature’s anger
stemmed not from the many improprieties documented in the League report, but from
King’s having “exceeded his authority” when he accepted the commission’s findings and
12
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recommendations. Pressure continued to mount against both King and Yancy until both
finally resigned in the first week of December. King had the last laugh, however, when
he issued proclamations before he left office that outlawed slavery and stopped labor
exportations, moves that further angered legislators and made it appear as if they opposed
reform and had ousted a president devoted to honest government. While King retired to
his farm, Liberian courts issued criminal charges against Allen Yancy. Later, after
learning that he would have to pay restitution to natives for money that he had extorted
from them, Yancy suffered a seizure and spent the rest of his life paralyzed.14
With the resignations of King and Yancy, Secretary of State Edwin Barclay became
the next president of Liberia, a development unforeseen earlier by the U. S. State
Department. In mid-1931, after trouble broke out along the Kru Coast, Barclay sent
Colonel T. Elwood Davis to investigate the problem, a mission that only antagonized
Paramount Chief Juah Nimley of the Sasstown Krus. A few months later, after the
Sasstown Krus took up arms against the Frontier Force, Davis led a punitive expedition
ordered by President Barclay that resulted in the burning of forty one villages and the
deaths of 141 natives, including women and children. Davis, an African American and
“firm believer” in the Lightning Society, denied that he had burned six children alive,
claiming instead that he had ordered soldiers to bathe the children and had given them his
own ration of porridge after they had been found hiding in the bush.15
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The punitive expedition effectively ended Kru resistance and allowed President
Barclay to proclaim successful reforms in native policy after banning labor exports and
easing government demands on natives for porterage and road work. The outlawing of
labor shipments to Fernando Po came without much opposition after the accidental death
of Postmaster General Samuel Ross in late 1929 and the illness of his former partner,
Allen Yancy. Over the course of the next four years, as the League of Nations considered
a mandate over Liberia, Barclay bided his time and maneuvered Firestone and the U. S.
State Department in much the same way that they had done to Charles King in the 1920s.
Eventually, neither the United States nor the League took any effective action against the
black republic. Although British author Graham Greene met Barclay in 1935 and
considered him “worth a dozen Kings,” he failed to make any connection between the
president and a “concentration camp” that he had seen where “political prisoners” were
being held a full five years after they had testified before the League commission.16
For their part, African Americans supported some form of assistance for Liberia from
the United States even as they criticized Firestone and absolved Americo-Liberians as
victims of “economic imperialism.” African Americans as diverse in their thinking as
Alain Locke and W. E. B. Du Bois both pointed out that conditions similar to those in
Liberia existed elsewhere in Africa, and even closer to home in the American South. In
February 1931, however, Johnson felt it necessary to point out “items of misinformation”
in a forthcoming piece that Du Bois had written for The Crisis. Du Bois had confused
Yancy with former vice-president H. Too Wesley, had described adoption when he meant
to address the system of pawning, and suggested that the League commission had
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demanded a “white” replacement for Sigvald Meek. Although Johnson believed that they
were “in accord” that slavery was not any worse in Liberia than other parts of Africa, he
felt that “the native population of Liberia has some claim to the interest and sympathy of
the American Negro population, and that the future of the Republic will very largely rest
upon their intelligent development.” Indeed, Du Bois’ thinking on Liberia never included
the welfare of that nation’s indigenous tribes.17
In November 1931, Johnson attended a conference along with other speakers that
included Raymond Buell, and journalist Benjamin Nnamdi Azikiwe, who would later
serve as the first president of Nigeria. Both Johnson and Buell criticized AmericoLiberian policies toward natives but emphasized that, in general, conditions in the black
republic did not reflect a failure of black self-government. Azikiwe defended the
Liberians and suggested that forced labor for public and private purposes was accepted as
a matter of course throughout Africa. The Nigerian dismissed criticism of Liberia as
nothing more than propaganda intended to portray blacks as incapable of governing
themselves.18
As he realized the futility of arguing on behalf of the welfare of Liberia’s tribal
citizens, Johnson soon withdrew from any further public debate. Over the years, in rare
moments away from other projects, he would return to his African journal and try to
fashion his experiences into a book on the black republic. In Bitter Canaan: The Story of
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the Negro Republic, Johnson focused on Liberia’s economic underdevelopment, an idea
that foreshadowed later studies on impoverished nations that came to be known as the
Third World. Much of Bitter Canaan, however, dealt with the history of Liberia,
particularly its economic troubles. Johnson omitted any material that described the inner
workings of the commission. His writing, unrestrained and powerful in his journal, took
on a stiff and controlled tone in Bitter Canaan. In regard to Cuthbert Christy, who died
in 1932 on a mission in Belgian Congo, Johnson had only kind words. Indeed, he saw no
reason to contradict the London Times obituary that praised Christy’s “unusual tact” and
“knack for getting on well with primitive peoples.” As Johnson tried to prepare the book
for publication in 1947, Raymond Buell was scheduled to publish his own study of
Liberia to commemorate the republic’s first hundred years of independence. For that
reason as well as other complications, Johnson abandoned Bitter Canaan.19
As William R. Castle had suggested in late 1929, the League of Nations inquiry into
slavery and forced labor in Liberia would indeed serve as one of the “very important
incidents” in Johnson’s life; it had a wide range of effects on the sociologist, both
personally and professionally. On a personal level, the psychological torment that he felt
over the impending slaughter of natives upon his departure from Liberia, as well as his
failure to persuade African Americans to take an interest in their cause, stood out as the
most negative consequences of his appointment as American commissioner. Neither did
the results of the inquiry—the resignations of King and Yancy followed by years of
political turmoil—endear Johnson to many black leaders in the United States. In fact,
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apart from government circles, where he earned newfound respect, Johnson’s work for
the League of Nations probably did more harm than good to his career, at least for a time.
But this is not to say that Johnson came away from his African experience emptyhanded. In fact, just the opposite is true; Johnson benefited enormously. Face-to-face
encounters with Liberia’s indigenous tribes not only had a deep effect on him personally
but also had a major impact on his thinking as a scholar. His distinctly humanistic brand
of sociology, evident in embryonic form in The Negro in Chicago and characterized most
prominently by a determined effort to see the world through the eyes of his subjects, took
on a more nuanced and mature tone in Liberia. To be sure, the complexity of the black
republic’s diverse population and competing interest groups broadened his understanding
of human relations beyond anything that he had experienced in the United States.
Johnson’s compassion for society’s underdogs, so apparent in his African journal, carried
over with powerful effect a few years later in Shadow of the Plantation, his 1934 study of
black sharecroppers in Alabama, and again in 1941 with Growing Up in the Black Belt.20
Above all, Johnson’s six months in Liberia, a society divided by caste and class rather
than by race, gave him a deeper understanding of the central importance of education in
the age of globalization. Natives equated education with individual and collective
superiority and power; they based their consideration of Johnson as a white man not on
race but on the fact that he had “received book.” In the years after 1930, Johnson
examined the connections between political disfranchisement, economic exploitation, and
the withholding of educational opportunities that stood out as clearly in the American
South as they had in Liberia. Personal empowerment through education became the
central theme of his course of action. Gunnar Myrdal in particular embraced Johnson’s
20
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ideas on social engineering in the field of education, and cited the black sociologist’s
work a remarkable sixty times in An American Dilemma (1944). Thurgood Marshall, in
his argument on behalf of the plaintiffs in Brown v. Board of Education (1954), cited
Myrdal’s work—and, in effect, Johnson’s—when he used it as evidence to persuade the
U. S. Supreme Court that segregated education was innately inferior for African
American children.21 Until his death in 1956, Johnson waged his own battle against
social injustice and inequality through a tireless search for ways to improve education for
African Americans, his most important and lasting contribution.
Harvey S. Firestone, on the other hand, did not live long enough to benefit from his
struggles in Liberia, which paid large dividends to his company and to the United States
during World War II when the scarcity of crude rubber made it a precious Allied
commodity. As the United States hurried to develop synthetic forms of rubber, Liberia
grew in strategic importance both for its natural latex and as an African base for the
American military. But economic development in Liberia during and after the war, when
the U. S. built an airfield and a harbor, did little to improve life for natives. Although
granted the right to vote in the 1950s, tribal citizens still found themselves all but barred
from the political life of the country, a situation that would have tragic consequences
decades later as a horrifying civil war destroyed every last vestige of Firestone in Liberia,

21
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including roads, hospitals, and schools. By the end of the twentieth century, Liberia had
collapsed into a nightmare unimaginable to even the most negative observers in 1930.22
Labeled as too conservative and beholden to white-controlled philanthropic
foundations, and largely dismissed as irrelevant by modern historians who nevertheless
continue to cite his work extensively, Charles S. Johnson has become a misunderstood
and underappreciated figure in African American history. Although Johnson risked his
life in Liberia, his role in the League of Nations inquiry met with mixed feelings among
fellow African Americans unable to recognize the similarities between their second-class
status in the United States and the plight of Liberia’s tribal citizens. But as entries in his
African journal amply demonstrate, there was much that churned beneath the surface in
Johnson that contradicts the image of a self-centered, essentially weak-willed scholar
afraid to raise his voice on behalf of society’s underdogs. His 1930 League of Nations
mission to Liberia, a significant event in African American history during the interwar
years, must be viewed as central in shaping the thought of an important but often
overlooked African American thinker and scholar.
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